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ABSTRACT 
Thi s  thesis examines four questions in the field of executive stock option plans: the 
legal framework governing their use in Malaysia, their effects on firm performance, 
managerial turnover and the tax effects. The research presented in th is thesis extends 
the l iterature on stock options in these directions. Owing to the dearth of studies that 
have examined the issue of stock option p lans, as well as the uniqueness of the 
M alaysian corporate environment which is dominated by family control led firms. 
Using standard event study methodology, in the short-term, the results indicate a 
negative share price before announcement and a sl ight positive effect fol lowing the 
announcement. The announcement, however, does not carry any surprise to the 
market and this seemingly confirms that early information releases before official 
announcement could be ruled out. Over the long-term, the results indicate that stock 
option plans have no sign ificant effect on the performance of Malaysian firms, 
suggesting that executive stock option plans do not entirely improve the value of 
Malaysian firms.  Further examinations over the i ncentive of stock option plans 
indicate reductions in top executive turnover in Malaysia l isted firms. The effects of 
executive stock option plans in mitigating unplanned turnover at the executive levels 
take into account the mediating control variables at firm level such as ownership 
structure, corporate governance, firm characteristics and level of pay. The 
consequences of executive turnover are focused on firm performance. Using 
accounting and market performance measures, the result indicates that poor firm 
performance lead to h igh executive turnover. However, the study documents weak 
support for performance measures in the evaluation of executive turnover. The thesis 
also examine other factors that are l ikely to influence executive turnover, of which 
the empirical results indicate that managerial ownership, board attributes and firm 
size do not lead to high executive turnover. However, mix payments are found to be 
influenced the management turnover. This thesis also examines and attempts to 
understand the effect of stock option and tax benefits between corporate taxpayer 
and personal taxpayer, which i s  found to be ambiguous. Although previous empirical 
results indicate that taxpayers may extend their tax l iabil ity usual ly for three to five 
fol lowing the grant date, but it would seem that Malaysian stock option programs do 
not produce any tax preferential treatments in our sample. This is due to lim itation in 
the Malaysia tax pol icy which makes no allowance for expenses-related to stock 
options. This appears that Malaysia taxation rules do not affect tax benefits. 
However when the data for tax groups were decomposed according to information 
d isclosed in annual reports for executive and the finn, the result suggests that 
executive stock options are responsive to changes in personal income tax rate. For 
firm, awarding stock option is perhaps driven by a psychological contract between 
executives, rather than tax incentives, which suggest that cash payment salary and 
bonus are sign ificant component for executive payments in Malaysia. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation of the study 
In the economics and finance l iterature the most commonly cited justification for the 
granting of executive stock options is to align the interest of managerial employees 
and shareholders and by doing so, it is held that stock options wil l  not only help to 
increase the value of the firm but be also shareholder wealth enhancing. In this way 
the granting of stock options is argued to tie a managerial employee's wealth to the 
firm's stock price which, it is hoped, will motivate them to work harder and thereby 
increase the firm ' s  performance, since both of their interests are intertwined. In th is 
respect, the motivational role of stock options is consistent with the work of Fishman 
( 2000) and Thompson ( 2003) which indicate that the granting of stock option would 
also serve as a catalyst not only for motivation and the retention of the existing 
employees, but crucially it wi l l  help to attract new management talents. On this 
i ssue, Balsam and Miharjo (2007) point out that the incentive to retain executives is 
l imited to the vesting period because the retentive effect is l ikely  to reduce when the 
actual vesting period ends. This is because the executive may leave after the vesting 
period ends without forfeiting the money for unvested stock options. Within this 
field, it has been argued that the granting of executive stock options may serve as a 
substitute for cash payment in order to gain some favourable advantage associated 
with non-expend ing cash payment, particularly for firms with d ividend constraints 
(Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevl in, 2003). On the same issue, the l iterature on corporate 
governance point note a tendency among companies to invite their employees to 
purchase a company's shares, particu larly companies experiencing financial 
difficulties, in order to avoid a hostile takeover. 
Through the granting of employee stock options, the firm is expl icitly seeking to 
align the interests of managers with shareholders, but the granting of such options 
may also give rise to the risk-adverse type employees, while at the same time 
encouraging excessive risk-taking behaviour among top executives. The reported 
empirical evidence in this area shows that wh ile stock options might be a popular 
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method for executive payments, its popularity tends to wane when the stock option is 
largely allocated to non-executive employees (Core and Guay, 200 1 ;  and Kedia and 
Mozumdar,2002). Other sections of this wide and extensive field note that the use of 
stock option compensation plans are not entirely consistent with the intention of 
awarding stock options, which therefore raises q uestions on the efficiency of stock 
options (Meulbroek, 200 1 ;  and Hall and Murphy, 2002). The efficiency of stock 
option has also received attention in the corporate governance l iterature with 
emphasis placed on managerial efforts to increase firm value with in the spirit of 
agency theory. Notably, the appl ication of stock option plans in an emerging market, 
such as Malaysia is not a new phenomenon, since the first use of stock option was 
first documented in the last two decades, and to the best of our knowledge studies on 
the use of stock options in Malaysia has not featured in the l iterature. 
As a resu lt of the growing use and influence of stock options in corporations, a 
substantial l iterature has focused on the appl ication of stock options, with attention 
given to uncovering the positive role stock options may have on firm performance. 
One of the reasons for the wide use of executive stock options is to provide 
incentives for managers so that they take decision that is, from the standpoint of the 
firm, value enhancing. A review of numerous contributions to the field ind icate that 
when firms announce stock option plans, the usual response is for the market to 
process the new information which then shifts the share price in terms of its short­
term and long-term performance. But whi le there 's  agreement that stock options 
might result in improvements in firm performance, some studies counter th is by 
noting that the use of stock options have l ittle or no influence in improving firm 
performance and thus firm value. In l ight of th is observation, it i s  crucial for this 
study to examine the impact of stock options on the performance of Malaysian firm, 
given the prevalence of different ownership types. This should go some way towards 
helping to shed l ight on the effects stock options plans have on, in particular, family 
owned versus non-fam ily owned firms, as wel l  as the corporate governance structure 
of Malaysian firms. In the latter respect, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) point 
out that in the corporate sector of M alaysia, there is significant involvement of 
owners in management as represented, especial ly in fam i ly owned firm. This 
immediately suggests that the agency problem might be widespread within 
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Malaysian fami ly  owned firms due to the h igh number of major shareholders who 
are also m em hers of the board of directors whose attributes directly contrast to what 
is  d irectly observed in developed markets such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom in  which firms are managed by outside executives. According to the 
l iterature, under this arrangement there is a tendency for executives to pursue their 
own interests rather than the interests of the firm which suggests that stock options 
m ight be the best mechanism to counter this problem, while at the same time 
al lowing the interests of both parties to be aligned. The question of whether stock 
options p lans is the best mechanism to ali gn the interest of executives and 
shareholders provides a further motivation to the study of the effects of stock options 
on the performance ofMalaysian firms. 
Another reason for the present investigation derives from a number of notable 
stud ies which shed l ight on the incentive effect of stock option plans in the United 
States and the United Kingdom using firm level data. Although few studies have 
examined the incentive effects of stock option plans in Malaysia, perhaps due to the 
statutory requirements for a centralised government-managed retirement fund 
(Obiyathu lla, Syarifah Raihan, Mohd Eskandar and Azhar, 2009), the l iterature is 
more partial towards accounting disc losure. C loser examination suggests that many 
Malaysia PLCs began to adopt stock option plans  as part of a wider compensation 
package, which might explain why there is a dearth of studies that have exam ined 
the use of stock options in Malaysia. On a practical level, all the ind ications are that 
the use of stock option plans in Malaysia is widespread due to the perceived benefits 
which, in turn, has motivated Malaysia PLCs to increase the size of their stock 
options, while the Malaysian government in seeking to seize an opportunity 
launched, in 201 1 ,  a Private Pension Fund for the benefit of private sector employees 
and the self-employed .  
The third motivation for th is thesis derives from the response to  the statement made 
by Samsa and Scheidt (2003) who note that the nature of Malaysian laws and 
regu lations ' shou ld be compiled separatel y  because it does not provide clear 
guidance as to how the law should be enforced. In consequence, the speed of law 
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enforcement is seriously impeded. Seemingly, there is no interrelation among the 
legal structure practised in Malaysia. The law that is currently enforced is not 
compatible with laws on stock options that have been enforced in countries such as 
the U nited States and the United Kingdom. By  studying the laws applied to the use 
of stock options wi l l  go some way towards shedding l ight on best practices in 
countries that have employed wide use of stock options, as wel l  as providing an 
input for government to update the regulatory frameworks in l ine with international 
standards. One of the areas that should be given due emphasis are the rules applied to 
taxation, which is closely associated with the issue of tax benefits. In this area 
Malaysian taxation rules do not provide favourable tax, either for individuals or 
firms. However, in countries where stock option plans have a long history, such 
p lans do offer tax benefits in the form of a tax shield due to the absence of any 
expenditure at the time of the granting of stock options (Aier and Moore, 2008). 
Besides, it defers the tax l iabil ity until such time the employee realises the gains 
from exercising his  or her stock options, which provides us with a further motivation 
to embark on a study of Malaysian PLCs to uncover the personal tax effects 
associated with the use of stock options. 
Having recognized the effects stock options plans can have on firm performance, 
understanding its role and influence in Malaysia becomes an important issue to 
detect. As it stands however, whi le the l iterature is large, it is often at odds regard ing 
the overall effects of stock option plans. And although this is not entirely surprising 
due to the complexity of the problem at hand, it suggests that any contribution to the 
l iterature should careful ly  explore the robustness of the conclusions drawn. Th is 
therefore represents one of the key motivations for this thesis. Accord ingly, ou r 
purpose is to examine the effects of executive stock option grants in Malaysia along 
a number of dimensions that contributes to the existing literature. 
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1 .2 Research methodology 
The l iterature on executive stock options IS not explicit about which particular 
statist ical approach should be applied to this question. It rather consists of a 
com bination of empirical methods to explore several related aspects. The present 
research fol lows in  this  l ine and makes use of the range of statistical approaches used 
in the l iterature. 
The subsequent essays in th is thesis address specific issues, commencing with Essay 
1 ,  which assess the legal and regulatory framework governing the use of executive 
stock option plan in Malaysia. The study use a common method used in legal studies 
which draw on both positive and normative analysis. The positive analysis approach 
is based on descriptions to explain the phenomena of using executive stock option 
and evaluate the impact of the legal pol icy changes given the ways to respond to the 
incentives of the pol icy, whereas the normative analysis approach is conducted on a 
prescriptive and judgmental basis. Thus making policy recommendations based on 
the economic consequences of various policies have affected the appl ication of 
executive stock options. 
Essay 2 examines the effects of the announcement of executive stock option on firm 
performance, testing for both short-term market reaction and long-term performance. 
An event study methodology is used to investigate the effects of stock options on 
share price performance, which allows us to determine whether there is an abnormal 
stock price effect associated with an event. From this, it infers the significance of the 
event based on the assumption of an efficient market. It should be noted that the 
length of time period used in this study accounts for the possibi l ity that investors 
m ight respond to event signals in cases where the share prices does not immediately 
or ful ly reflect all avai lable information . 
Essay 3 examines the consequences of executive stock option plans on executive 
turnover. The relationship is empirical ly examined using the logit regression model. 
Th is method is appropriate for the response takes one of only two possible values 
representing executive turnover and no turnover in given years for the study. 
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Moreover, using the logit regression model allows us to provide val id estimates, 
regardless of the design of the study (Harrel l  200 1 ) .  
Essay 4 examines the effects of executive stock option grants on taxation. In 
particular, the study identifies the impact of changes in tax pol icy (marginal tax 
rates) on stock option grants in relation to cash pay received by executives. Gritsch 
and Snyder (2007) employ both logit and tobit model to determine tax savings, in 
which two tax rates, personal and capital gain tax entered the equation. There are 
some studies that use ordinary regression model to capture its effects. However, 
since the dependent variable is not binary in nature and also given non-presence of 
censored data, the logit and tobit regression model could not be employed in th is 
study. As a result, I use an ordinary regression model which is more appropriate for 
th is study to examine the degree of impact stock option has on total compensation. 
Therefore, from the tax standpoint, stock options are l ikely to have a positive relation 
during periods of good corporate performance, and therefore the tax saving is likely 
increase. Thus, stock options may be used as a means of producing tax preferential 
for executives and the firm, and seemingly a clear relationsh ip should exist between 
tax incentives and stock option plans. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
In the subsequent section 1 review the l iterature on executive stock options placing 
emphasis on the main themes of this thesis. In this context, I review a number of 
studies deal ing with the use and effect of stock options plans that div ides into 
employee and executive stock options comprising a number of incentive effects and 
the effect of stock option grants on taxation . This section of the thesis extends and 
reinforces some of the points made in th is introduction. In addition to th is general 
l iterature review, I also provide a brief survey of the literature in each of the 
corresponding chapters. Based on the literature reviewed, the discussion in this 
chapter d iscusses the main findings as they relate to the incentive effects on firm 
performance, executive turnover and taxation. Essay 1 introduces our first 
investigation, which examines the legal and regulatory frameworks governing 
executive stock option plans in Malaysia. It begins with a brief discussion on the 
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feature, basis and legal aspects on how stock options operates within the market at 
the international level which principally focus  on the U.S, U.K., Japan and 
Singapore. The essay then proceeds to examine the regulatory frameworks 
underpinning stock option plan in Malaysia and d iscusses the associated issues under 
which the plans operate (that is accounting and taxation), before discussing the 
reform in  j urisdictions that would benefit Malaysian firms as Malaysia moves closer 
into l ine with international standards .  
Essay 2 examines the effect of announcement executive stock option on firm 
performance in the short-term and long term . Using a standard event study 
methodology, the results reveal a negative share price before announcement in the 
short-term fol lowed by a positive effect which is in l ine with conclusions obtained in 
previous studies. However, such announcements do not carry any surprise to the 
market which confirms that early information releases before official announcement 
can be ruled out. For the long-term effect, the resu lts indicate that stock option plans 
do not have a significant effect on long-term firm performance, which implies that 
executive stock option plans do not entirely improve firm value in Malaysia. 
The next essay is essay 3 which examines the relationship between executive stock 
option plans and top executives turnover in Malaysian l isted firms. In brief, the study 
examines the effects of executive stock option plans in mitigating unplanned 
turnover at executive levels by taking into account the mediating control variables at 
firm level such as ownership structure, corporate governance, firm characteristics 
and level of pay. The consequences of executive turnover are focused on firm 
performance. The result shows that poor firm performance lead to high executive 
turnover based on the use of accounting and market performance measures. In 
evaluating  executive turnover, the study found no evidence that accounting measures 
are any better than market-based performance measures. When exam in ing executive 
replacement decisions according to turnover types such as routine and forced 
turnover, the empirical results indicate that current firm performance influence 
decisions taken for executives to be d ism issed . Other factors are also found to 
influence executive turnover, as the finding ind icate that managerial ownership, 
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board attributes and firm size do not leads to high turnover. However mix pay is 
found to influence top management turnover. 
The last essay is Essay 4 which examines the tax incentives on executive stock 
option plans. In brief the study identifies the preferential tax treatment for personal 
taxpayer and the firm . The result indicates that personal taxpayer may extend their 
tax l iabi l ity usual ly  for three to five year fol lowing the grant date. For granting firms, 
however, executive stock options do not provide any preferential tax treatments. Th is 
is due to l im itation in taxation rules which do not allow expenses-related stock 
option for tax deduction. Further analysis indicates that tax pol icy changes affect the 
tax benefits received by executives and the firm. The empirical result suggests that 
changes in the income tax rate influence equity-based payments. S imi lar effects are 
observed for gains from stock option exercised which impl ies that executive stock 
options are responsive to changes in ordinary income tax rate. Moreover, the study 
emphasize that by imposing simi lar tax rate for executive stock options and cash pay 
is l ikely to be driven by a psychological contract between executives and the firm, 
which implies that changes in tax policy ( i.e. a decrease or increase in the marginal 
tax rate) wil l  not reflect the stock option value of the firm . 
Final ly, the thesis conc ludes by providing a summary of the main conclusions of 
each essay and assesses the implications for prior empirical findings, and also offer 
suggestions for future research. 
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2.0 EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION PLANS: A REVIEW 
OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1  Introduction 
There is a large number of studies that constitute the l iterature on the role and use of 
stock option plans in corporations. In the l ast 30 years scholars have studied different 
aspects of the use of stock option p lans and their effects on the corporation. 
Developments along this  dimension of enquiry have produced important theoret ical 
and empi rical contributions accordingly. To date, researchers have examined several 
aspects of the use of stock options in corporations with the majority of research 
papers focusing on executives and employee stock option plans that comprise a 
number of incentive effects in stock options usage, as wel l  as the effect of stock 
option grants on taxation . 
The main objective of this  section of the thesis is to provide an overview of the 
l iterature on stock option plans  as wel l  as to highl ights the approaches used for the 
valuation of stock option pricing and the rationale for adopting stock option plans in 
corporations. Our goal is to place the research topics of this thesis in a broader 
context, emphasising the relationship to different strands of the literature. I intend to 
review these branches of the l iterature in order to mark the sensitiv ities of our main 
variables of interest. 
2.2 Main strands of the literature 
According to Gelderblom and Jonker (2003) and Espen and Nassim (2009), the 
appl ication of stock option plans is a not a recent development. Historical ly, the first 
use of option contracts occurred in the 1 600s, although no specific information is 
known about the exact time and date when options were first traded. Nevertheless, it 
has been argued that the first trading in options contracts was conducted in Hol land 
when they were first used by Amsterdam grain dealers in 1550.  S ince 1550, the 
extensive use of this instrument was observed around the time of tu l ip options 
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trading in 1 637, fol lowed by trading on London' s  financial market during 1 700s. 
S ince the 1 700s, stock options have been widely used across European countries. 
The development of stock options is common place and has been increasingly 
avai lab le  in the U .S .  since 1 920s, though some studies note that the origin of stock 
option p lans in the U .S .  only became widely used in the 1 930s when they were seen 
as a means of tax avoidance among salaried executives. The 1 960s is the period in 
which stock options became more pronounced at the non-executive levels when new 
economy firms such as the high tech firms i n  S i l i con Valley began to offer stock 
options at al l  levels of the firm .  S ince then, stock options have gained popularity and 
are now increasingly used within the corporate sector. 
In the 1 970s, trading in stock options was expedited by the development of the 
theory of option pricing as wel l as the emergence of organized stock options 
exchanges such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), which was the 
first exchange to commence trading in stock options. In the 1 980s, the deregulation 
of financial markets combined with enhanced market volati l ities stimu lated activ ity 
in the use of options, and now options exchanges are to be found in international 
markets. Over the years, a growing number of the l isted options have shown positive 
developments in response to the passing of new Jaws which al lowed financial 
institutions to incorporate options in their portfol ios. As the use of options grew, so 
too was the trend in the use of stock option grants which continued wel l  into the 
1 990s as a result of a growing number of U .S .  corporations showing interest in 
equity sharing. Further emphasis was given to stock options during economic 
expansion and, with it, the rapid growth oftechno logy-based companies in the I 990s 
which led to the popularity of stock options as a method for executive pay in a 
number of countries (Hall ,  1 998). However, it is widely acknowledged that the 
misuse of stock options can affect not only  grant value but may also have a 
detrimental effect on the reputation of the firm, thereby giv ing rise to two major 
effects. These effects include the al location of stock options extended to non­
executive employees. This has been h ighl ighted by the reported evidence of Shanna 
(2006) who notes that that stock option size has been reduced by one-third (from 
$ 1 1 9  b i l l ion to $7 1 bi l l ion) and that non-executive are predominantly holders within 
the US corporations. In addressing this issue, Hal l  and Murphy (2003) note that it 
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m akes l ittl e  economic sense to provide all employees with stock options as it incurs 
unnecessary expenses particularly when it comes to the administration of options 
plans.  
I n  addition, the U.S .  corporate scandal over accounting methods produced additional 
effects with stock option grants which become a source of public debate among 
academics and finance experts. One of the debates revolved around packages offered 
to executives, which contend that the roles of stock options are not consistent with 
the real intention of awarding equity plans (Meulbroek, 200 1 ; and Hall and Murphy , 
2002). It is also argued that stock options might substitute the manager's interest in 
the p lace of the shareholders. This particular perspective suggests that stock option 
grants help executives to m itigate moral hazard problem in the context of pay-setting 
des igns . This would ensure that the stock option grants for senior executives are not 
exceeding the optimal level of existing shareholders (Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin, 
2003). Related studies on this issue conclude that stock options would be best served 
as an alternative to cash payment which would go some way towards motivating 
existing staff and at the same time helping to attract new talents into the firm. Other 
than that, the l ikelihood of some firms granting stock options to employees is 
primari ly for the purpose of gaining the non-expending cash payment incentive, so 
that their profits can be retained. However, it is widely acknowledged that all firms 
bel ieve that attractive compensation plans would enhance staff performance and firm 
value and, if successful, wi l l  ultimately minimise potential agency problems. 
2.3 Stock option pricing model 
The growth and application in the use of derivatives and, in particularly, in the use of 
warrants begun in 1 900s in the U.S and European countries. With regard to the 
development of warrants, Wang and Ma (2008) divide its growth into three phases 
involving an early pricing and method theory as the first phase which covers the 
period in wh ich the mathematical formulation that influence finance theory and 
improvement in resu lts. The second phase of development highlights the impact on 
the practice of finance and the appl ication of option pricing models such as the Black 
and Scholes ( 1 973) option pric ing model which become more influential owing to 
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the ease at which practitioners could use the model to price options. Thus the Black­
Scholes m odel provides a reliable method of pricing stock options that is widely 
employed by the industry. The third phase is a modification of the Black-Scholes 
model whereby many scholars have made amendments to the model and as a result 
the m odel has become more applicable. 
The earliest theoretical work on option pricing is attributed to Bachelier, a French 
m athematician, whose thesis  deals with the pricing of options in speculative markets, 
an activ ity which is an essential part of modern finance. Bachel ier' s work provides a 
fram ework on option pricing which marks the path of continuous-time mathematics 
of stochastic processes and the continuous-time economics of derivatives security 
pricing. Bachelier 's  only influenced Kiyoshi Ito ' s  work on stochastic calculus but 
also Paul Samuelson 's  ( 1 965) theory of rational warrant pricing. The new financial 
models that emerged, such as stochastic differential dynamic portfolio theory, the 
capital asset pricing model and derivative-security pricing which appeared towards 
the end of the 1 960s and in the early 1 970s were developed using the aforementioned 
mathematical tools. 
Among the most notable progress in the financial application l iterature is the period 
between the 1 960s and 1 970s, just prior to the development of the Black-Scholes 
model, which witnessed a series of innovative finance papers which was to have a 
significant bearing on modem finance. These include Sprenkle (196 1 ), Ayres 
( 1 963), Boness ( 1 964), Samuelson ( 1 965), Thorp and Kassouf ( 1 967), Samuelson 
and Merton ( 1 969) and Chen (I 970), all of which make some contribution prior to 
the publ ication of the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing models which helped to 
provide a more profound understanding of option pricing. Schaefer ( 1 998), for 
example, point out that the pricing formula of Sprinkle ( 1 96 1 )  is very close to the 
model of Black-Scholes ( 1 973) with the assumption that stock prices are log­
normally distributed and drifted in the random walk, but had overlooked the negative 
share price that allowed risk aversion and had also fai led to estimate the value of the 
parameter for share price growth and the degree of risk aversion . Another significant 
development is the work of Samuelson ( 1 965) which includes the stock risk level by 
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the arbitrary parameters, dependent upon investors' preferences towards the level of 
risk and rate of returns. Samuelson ( 1 965) used a Brownian motion to eliminate the 
occurrence in negative asset prices and, in combination with Merton ( 1 969), the 
extension of the theory is primarily in the u se of a discount rate to establish 
investors' decision to hold the option and the fact the option price is a function of the 
stock price. Both papers are built on a strong set of assumptions that: 
i) the stock price is Jog-normal ly distributed, 
i i) the investors util ity function is !SO-elastic, and 
i i i)the bond and option are in zero net supply 
These approaches are simi lar to Black-Scholes option pricing formula which, it has 
been argued, is a mi lestone for splitting between warrant and option. A stock option 
is a simple-type of European cal l option, whi lst the parameters of Black and Scholes 
formula are easy to estimate. The derivation of the Black-Scholes options pricing 
model is based on a number of assumptions as fol lows: 
a) The short term interest is known and is constant through time, 
b) The stock price fol lows a random walk in continuous time, 
c) The stocks pay no div idend, 
d) The option is European and it can only  be exercised at the maturity date, 
e) No transaction costs of buying or sel l ing the option, 
f) It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a security and to buy or to 
hold it at the short term interest rate, 
g) Short sell ing is al lowed such that an investor can sel l  shares that he does not 
own and trading takes place continuously. 
Based on the above assumptions, stock option value seemingly could be affected by 
the factors of price and time and other constant variables. If a long and short position 
in the stock option is relied on the time and the value of known constants, it wou ld 
therefore create a hedge position. As a consequence, the stock option value is 
derived as a function of the stock price and time. The principal contribution of 
Merton to option-pricing relates to the dynamic trading strategy as prescribed by 
Black-Scholes which is used to offset the exposure risk of stock option . I t  also 
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provides a hedge in the continuous trading l imit, whi le the payoffs on the options 
wi l l  be exactly replicated, if one can conduct trading continuously without cost 
combined with the use of the underlying traded and riskless assets. 
The final stage in the development of option pricing models lies in the study of 
Wang and Ma (2008) which covers the period fol lowing the publ ication of Black­
Scholes model when some scholars d iscovered that pricing models formulated on 
strict assumptions seemingly predicted that the market does not exist for investment 
opportunities. It is also observed that the existing Black-Scholes model fai ls  to take 
into account di lutive effect and the volatil ity of stock prices, whi le the l iterature on 
model improvement in the traditional B lack-Scholes model involved several 
modifications to the existing assumption on dividend payments, di lution and 
volati l ity. The trad itional Black-Scholes model indicates that a dividend would not 
be paid in advance, but in reality this  is not impossible, as highlighted by Merton 
( 1 973). 
With regard to the d i lution effects, it is noted that upon the employee exercising the 
options that the l ikely result is for an increase in the equity capital of the firm . On 
th is particular issue, Wang and Ma (2008) note a number of studies that consider the 
impact of di lution on option pricing, including Gala and Schneller (1978) and Hall 
(2003). Several extensions to the Black-Scholes option pricing formula have also 
been documented by Jennergren and Naslund ( 1 993) which include the variable of 
forfeiture and early exercise behaviour in the Black-Scholes-Merton model . Pandher 
(2003), for example, finds that the model ignored the realisation value of early 
exercise that wou ld generate loss or in other words the stock option becomes 
worthless, while Finnerty (2005) modified the Black-Scholes-Merton frameworks by 
including four critical factors involving vesting requirements, early exerc 1se, 
forfeitures and transfer restrictions. The mod ified model emphasises that the 
employee cannot exercise the stock option before the vesting ends and that the value 
will be worth less if the employee leaves the firm with reasons such as resignation, 
retirement, death or voluntary termination. Al l  these reasons are considered as the 
risk-type that cannot be hedged by firms, though the effects would be different if the 
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holder voluntary forfeits within  the allowed period and exercises after the vesting 
period . Thus if an employee decides to voluntarily forfeit his benefits of the stock 
options, the probabi l ity for the stock options to expire and render it to be worthless is 
h igh. This is due to the fact that stock options are non-transferable. Finnerty (2005) 
c lassifies this kind of risks as id iosyncratic which can be diversified away if the risk 
adverse investors value the stock options based on the risk-neutral probabil ity of 
vesting. It is noteworthy to mention that if the value of options is in-the-money, then 
the employee wil l  be able to exercise the option freely between the vesting date and 
the expiration date in the annual fraction value. In addition, Finnerty (2005) provides 
reasons under which the stock options' holder may exercise early to accommodate 
financial l iquidity needed through diversifying the portfolio (risk adverse type), even 
though it wil l  be very costly to sacrifice the remaining time value of stock options. 
Thus in order to gain the l iquidity, the holder must exercise and sell the share in 
which the stock option provides risk on the defer payment for the shares until 
exercised. It should be noted that early exercise behaviour might occur until the 
vested and, if-in-the-money, wil l  require adjustment during the vesting period. 
Finnerty (2005) treats the exercise and forfeiture of stock options as the type of 
stochastic process in the Black-Scholes-Merton model that leads the employee stock 
options to be overvalued. In a more recent study, Espen and Nassim (2009) review 
the historical evidence and report no invention pricing formu la in the Black, Scholes 
and Merton due to the removal of some economic determinants of the "risk" 
parameter through "dynamic hedging". 
Several attempts have also been made to develop alternative option pricing models 
post the Black-Scholes and Merton era. Models include Huddart ( 1 994) and 
Kulatikala and Marcus ( 1 994) who developed computations for a certain price 
between trade and hedge-restriction option and non-option in the risk-free asset, 
while Rubinsten ( 1 995) using forfeiture risk faced by option holders developed an 
alternative option pricing model based on the binomial utility-based model, and Carr 
and Linetsky (2000) who drew on a continuous-time executive stock option (ESO) 
valuation model to develop a model based on the assumption of constant exercise 
and forfeiture intensity. These developments aside, some studies have focused on 
extending the existing models. For example, Aboody ( 1 996) extended the binomial 
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model introduced by Cox,  Ross and Rubinsten ( 1 979) to value employee stock 
options u nder the assumption that ESO price must be adjusted downward due to 
probabi l ity of early termination in  the firm. However, since this is  not one of the 
m ai n  research themes of the thesis, I do not devote further attention to other strands 
of the l iterature except to note that from an accounting standpoint; only two models 
are u sed to value option grants through the use of either the lattice model or the 
B lack-Scholes-Merton model. But it stands to reason that the Black-Scholes-Merton 
m odel has made the most s ignificant of  contribution to the academic literature. 
2 .4 Employee stock option plans 
A considerable amount of l iterature has discussed at length the use of stock options 
across the firm (Yermack, 1 995; Aboody, 1 996; Baker, 1 999; Murphy, 1 999 and Core 
and Wayne, 200 1 ). These stud ies generate evidence about interests amongst firms 
that establ ish stock option p lans which gained popularity during the 1 980s and over 
recent times due an increase in economic activity and the growth technology based 
firms .  Stock option plans are now more commonplace and are therefore frequently 
used to compensate executive and non-executive employee pay. In essence, stock 
option plans refer to the right of employees to purchase a firm '  shares at a pre­
specified price (exercise price) with the terms that they cannot immed iately 
exercised . Moreover, the common exercise price charged to employees is equal to 
the market price on the grant date (at-the-money) and expires in several years 
(normally in a ten year period). The expiry date occurs due to the non-transferable 
feature of stock option plans, which will be automatically forfeited should the 
employee leaves the job before the vesting ends. 
General ly, stock option grants are split based on the beneficial groups and it serves 
as an explanation for the observed application which might vary substantially across 
firms.  Several studies emphasise the application of stock option plans allocated at 
executive levels (Bettis, B izjak and Lemmon, 2005; Core and Guay, 2001 ; and 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2002). Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2005) note that the 
executive positions encompasses posts such as chief executive officer (CEO), 
chairman of the board, president, chief operating officer (CEO), non-management 
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board ' s  member, v ice president, chief financial officer and divisional manager. Core 
and Guay (200 1 )  and Kedia and Mozumdar, (2002) define executives to be those in 
the top-five positions who are h ighly  compensated, whilst other employees are 
defined as non-executive. A study by Landsman, Lang and Yeh (2007) split the 
definit ion of executive and non-executive based on the nature of publicly available 
data such as broad-based stock option plans. 
In the early years of their use, stock option plans were granted primarily to top 
executive employees. The evidence on the use of stock option plans in the U.S. by 
Wi l l iamson and Kleiner (2004) note that stock option plans have been in use since 
the 1 940s and 1 950s, and mainly granted to key executives and restricted to top 
managements. However, and fol lowing the excesses of stock option value for 
managerial levels which generated much public debate, particularly in U .S. 
corporations, stock option plans were extended to non-executive employees and 
subsequently other countries followed suit. The reason behind this extension is 
because stock option plans are considered to be the best available mechanism to 
mitigate the agency problem between employees and shareholders. As a result, the 
equity-based compensation plans become more favoured as it helped to tie 
management to performance-based rewards. Naturally, by implementing stock 
option plans  the firm is essentially signal ling that increasing ownership in the form 
of shares would strengthen the l inking interests of the employee to those of 
shareholders by tying payment to share price performance. However where emerging 
markets are concerned, Ding and Sun (200 1 )  caution that the advantages of stock 
option plans as a means of align ing interests between employees and shareholders 
are not always in tandem with the intended incentives. 
Most of the empirical studies emphasise the incidence of extensively adopted stock 
options for non-executive employees. A large number of these studies examine the 
factors associated with option grants (Core and Guay, 200 1 ;  and Kedia and 
Mozumdar, 2002) and conclude that the incentive effects of stock option plans tend 
to have an impact across positions in the firms examined . Core and Guay (200 1 )  find 
strong evidence that the granting of stock options to the non-executive level is an 
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incentive that helps to attract new employee, while also serving to help retain 
existing employees. Another benefit of stock option plans is its abi lity to motivate 
empl oyees. On this, Fishman (2000) and Thompson (2003) find that stock option 
p lans  have contributed towards not only making the workplace more attractive but is 
also a usefu l  aid in helping  to galvanize staff loyalty and inspiring employees to 
work harder. Similarly Selvarajan, Ramamomihy, Flood and Rowley (2006) note 
that the incentive conveyed by the granting of stock options helps to foster better 
understanding between the firm and its employees which can be seen through 
positive changes in employee attitude, increase job satisfaction, commitment and 
reductions in intentions to walk away from the firm .  While agreeing with this 
argument, Balsam, Gifford and Kim (2009) argue that the retention of employees is 
only for a short while and that the retentive effect will soon waver after the vesting 
period ceases. This suggests that employee turnover is l ikely to increase substantially 
after this period and, moreover, that employees may choose to walk away fol lowing 
the conclusion of the vesting period without forfeiting the money of the unvested 
stock option. 
Based on earlier discussion above for advantages of stock options grant to executives 
are in general, the theory contents that they are playing big roles as agents for 
principal . This  means that executive stock option plans may work d ifferently than 
the stock option schemes provided for employees, particularly when pursuing 
strategies to meet the shareholders' expectation . Therefore, the l ikel ihood of 
executive stock options reduce agency problems and serve as mechanisms that align 
and safeguard shareholders' interest is higher. It could also serve as executives' 
financial wel l -being. The useful  of executive stock option schemes for interests 
aligning is  well documented in most developed market. Instances of studies on this 
area have been carried out by DeFusco, Johnson, Zorn, ( 1 990); Bizjak, Brickley, and 
Coles ( 1 993); M eh ran, ( 1 995); Yermack, ( 1 995); Yeo, Chen, Ho and Lee, ( 1 999); 
Core, and Guay( 200 1 ) ; Ding and Sun, ( 200 1 ) ; Hi l legeist and Penalva, (2004). All 
these studies are conclusively indicate that executive stock option plan is work well 
to align the interest of shareholders; thereby it lowers agency cost and better firm 
performances. In other words, granting stock option at the executive l evels works the 
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way it was intended to solve the problem between managers and owners by making 
them to share part of the consequences oftheir decisions. 
However, in later l iteratures such as Gerety, Hoi, and Robin  (200 1 ) ;  Hanlon, 
Rajgopal, and Shevlin, (2003); and Bebchuk, and Fried (2004) argue the usefu lness 
of stock options to solve the conflict between managers and owners are remained 
questionable.  As the owner cannot observe executive's actions due to of high cost of 
monitoring agent's actions, and the executive actions do not completely determine 
the intended outcome, th is leads to make stock option plans are available for non­
executive employees. Moreover, in the agency theory l iterature there has also 
focused to provide same incentive for executive and non-executive employees. This 
can be achieved through establishment of broad-based stock options which could 
increase of interests aligning between management and non-management employees. 
There has recognized that broad-based stock options create more incentive for 
employees to improve firm value that is beyond the executive groups. Although, a 
negative perception that broad-based stock options could potentially drain on 
shareholder return, but it provides incentive for employees to access valuable 
information and encourage them to act based on superior information (Sesil, 
Kroumova, Kruse and Blasi , 2005). This is consistent with their finding whi ch shows 
that adopting broad-stock options increase productivity and maintaining firm growth. 
The precise question is whether stock option plans targeted to executive employees 
could overcome the problem between principal and agent in a short run or long-run 
is remained as unsolved issues. According to past studies, executive stock options 
lead manager to maxim ize their util ity through util izing own position produce 
conflict between manager and shareholder (Jensen and Murphy, 1 990; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1 989; and Sigler, 2009). In some part of studies address that executive stock 
options could al ign the interests between manager and shareholders and in short, 
executive stock options usually generate advantages for firms to increase risk-taking 
behavior and selectively invest in a high profitable project. For long-term effect, 
executive stock options are use for retaining key executives as stock option creates a 
sense of psychological contract between the organization and employee (Pierce et 
al . , 199 1  ). However, Sigler (2009), for example, emphasize four issue in his study 
include overpaying managers, the payoff from the stock option is due to market but 
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are not related to a manager's overall perf01mance and lastly firm faces di lution of 
ownership. 
The diverse patterns that exist in the application of stock option compensation plans 
are i l lustrated in many regional stud ies which tend to be more incl ined towards 
factors associated with firm specific characteristics. In particular, Ding and Sun 
(200 1 )  using S ingapore data report evidence which suggests the size of the firm 
determ ines the adoption of stock option plans and that larger firms are more likely to 
make use of employee stock option plans (ESOP). Interestingly, Nagaoka (2005) 
finds that an increasing number of younger firms  adopt stock option plans and that 
such firm 's  tend to be negatively affected when they grant stock options to 
employees. Kato, Lemmon, Luo and Schallheim (2005) offer comparable results 
between Japan and the U.S . ,  which indicate that stock option plans in  Japanese firms 
offers h igher ownership to their employees than their U.S .  counterparts . It is 
important to note that a study of U.S.  firms by Tzioumis (2008) report that stock 
option plans do not increase ownership structure but rather have a negative effect on 
the payment of d ividends.  On the other hand, Uchida (2006) report results wh ich 
show that Japanese firms that rely exclusively on debt financing produce a negative 
association between leverage and stock option plans. Notably, such evidence has not 
been found in U.S. based studies. Using Canadian data which focuses on the 
determinants of CEO stock options, Chourou, Abaoub and Saadi (2008) find that 
firms with moderate levels of risk tends to offer more stock options to executives. 
Chourou, Abaoub and Saadi (2008) further contend that other factors should be 
considered when awarding CEO stock options including such variables as firms 
growth opportunity set, firm size, leverage, CEO age and CEO ownersh ip - all of 
which contributes to the adoption of stock option plans by firms. 
2.5 Employee stock options and the incentive effect 
Different types of incentive arrangements may be important when it comes to 
explaining d ifferences in the level of firm performance when employee stock options 
plans are uti l ised . This issue has been tackled by researchers who have produced 
contributions at the theoretical and empirical level .  Studies along these l i nes 
highlight the beneficial use of stock option plans as well as providing empirical 
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evidence on the positive outcomes of such plans. F irms are therefore keen to adopt 
stock options for two reasons. First, it helps to align the interests of executives and 
shareholders and secondly it helps shareholders to monitor the behaviour of top 
management withi n  the spirit of the framework of agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1 976). Based on literature, the positive outcomes reported are associated 
with agency theory (al ign ing interests), performance (performance related pay) and 
h uman resources (motivation, retention and turnover). 
Generally, the granting of stock options is associated with the incentive effects as it 
is seen to help  in aligning the interest of managers with those of shareholders. Thus 
both parties are considered to share a common goal towards increasing the value of 
the firm. Studies in this direction have examined the extent to which managerial 
effort contributes towards increasing firm value, but the results they yield fail to 
provide satisfactory answers. Bushman and Indiej ikian ( 1 993) suggest using 
accounting figures, that is, accounting earnings, and stock price performance as a 
proxy to measure the outcome of managerial efforts. However, the indicator 
associated with the firm 's  decision to adopt a stock option plan, sometime is not 
consistent between executive and non-executive employees. In fact, the effect is 
more apparent when the value of share prices moves above or below stock option 
price (deep-out-of money) in which an increase in the price of the stock may create 
the desired performance incentive. However, S igler (2009) highlights the problem 
when share price drops the executive stock options being out of money, therefore 
firm wil l  re-price stock option or issuing more option at lower exercise price. As 
consequence, firm common ly used an equal value of stock option price with market 
value in order to avoid it become worthless, if the holder still hold the same value. 
This means that the option grantee holds benefit of having option unti l  the maturity 
ends. However, some option grantees are l ikely to sell their stock options as time 
value decreases as it close to expiry date. And also this suggests that the likelihood 
of managers to focus on short-term returns (that is, to boost the share price) instead 
of long-term performance. 
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On thi s  basis of theoretical models that have been appl ied to determine the incentive 
effects from the use of stock options, the results indicate that associated incentive 
produces information about manager behaviour which suggest that the decision to 
exercise behaviour depends on various factors such as risk-taking behaviour, other 
than that, the factor of increase personal wealth, stock holdings and psychological 
also p lay a crucial determinant (Lambert, Larker and Verrecchia, 1 99 1 ;  Health, 
Huddart and Lang, 1 999; and Hall  and Murphy, 2000). For example, Huddart (1 994) 
suggests that the non-executive employee is of the risk-adverse type which impl ies 
that patterns of early exercise behaviour in stock option programmes are not always 
uniform (Huddart and Lang, 1 996). However, Huddart ( 1 994) and Carpenter ( 1 998) 
opine that in a short-run exercise pattern is more apparent when they are expected 
benefits are greater. However, the incentive is d ifferent for executive levels because 
non-executive levels tend to be more risk averse and so their tendency to exercise 
early wi l l  be greater. 
In a more recent study by Boyd, Brown and Szimayer (2007) find that the behaviour 
to exercise stock options is to achieve personal financial incentive with expectation 
to receive higher returns in dividends. This suggests that the attitude of wi l l ingness 
to sacrifice the value of stock options might increase the personal l iquidity and 
d iversification. Sautner and Weber (2005) attempt of studying behaviour within the 
context of risk-avers ion and diversification find that it would assist to determine 
impact of psychological b iases on economic determinants. Although, they find less 
empirical evidence on l inking between individual behaviour on economics and 
psychological variables, part of their study results support the former findings l ike 
those of H ealth, Huddart and Lang ( 1 999) . From executive point of view, Hall 
(2000) argues that the stock option plan is for ensuring the long term success. In this 
response, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) indicate the stock option plan is not the best way 
to remunerate the executive levels except for sorting to their groups' expertise. In 
fact, it is d ifficult to determine the marginal returns to effort and the variance of the 
individual executive performance. 
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The incidence of corporate scandals in U.S. corporations such as Enron, WorldCom 
and Global Crossing provoked much public criticisms directed towards the adoption 
of stock options which, i n  turn gave rise to changes in compensation pay structures, 
particu larly to executive stock options. Even though, the corporate scandals were 
l in ked to excessive risk taking and a fixation on stock prices, there is an association 
with stock option grants. Therefore, appointments of external d irectors became 
crucial factor in attempts to bring about some degree of normality to U .S. corporate 
environment. Thi s  also suggests that independent directors tend to monitor CEOs 
and key executives for making the correct decision, on that is  focused on enhancing 
firm performance. In addition, firms must take into account that outside directors 
may take risks and increase their management efforts to enhance firm value. In this 
respect F ich and Shivdasani (2005) provide evidence of the positive effect outside 
directors have in increasing firm value since they are responsive to the reactions of 
investors. Aside from the effects of directors, Chourou, Abaoub and Saadi (2008) 
notes that ownership concentration and the equity-market could also help to lessen 
agency costs. 
Sections of the l iterature acknowledge the incentive effects stock option plans have 
in not only working to increase firm value but in  motivating manager to be a risk­
taker for undertaking profitable projects (DeFusso, Johnson and Zorn, 1 990; and 
Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon, 2005). According to Lie (2005) and Zhang (2006) 
better decision making can be achieved through manager opportunistic behaviour. 
Studies Yermack ( 1 997) and Aboody and Kasznick (2000) report consistent 
evidence which indicate that stock-option rewards have a positive effect on manager 
behaviours such as the behaviour of CEOs as well as on d isclosures which help to 
increase the value of their stock options. This implies that top executive enhances 
firm value in a way that increases the stock price which, in turn, provides incentive 
for managers to increase the firm 's risks. From the shareholders' viewpoint, this 
produces unclear outcome for less risk taking managers as it depends on the stock 
option holdings. For the risk-averse managers with large undiversified hold ings of 
financial and human capital in the firm, they would prefer to maxim ize their own 
uti l ity through reducing firm volatility. Thus stock options may help to decrease the 
agency problem . The l iterature argues that the negative effect on shareholders is 
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more apparent when managers accept projects with negative net present value 
(Cohen, Hall and Viceira , 2000). However, Rajgopal and Shevl in  (2002) find that 
the granting of stock options induce the risk-adverse type manager to invest in 
proj ects for risk-neutral shareholders. Similarly Hutchinson (2003) examines the 
associated incentive effect of stock options on risky project and firm value and finds 
a negative relationship. In particular, the firm ' s  risk is found to be weaker when they 
hold a substantial proportion of stock options than their investment shares in the 
firm, which would seem to suggest that executives who share in  their firms' risk 
through stock options are more l ikely to participate in risky and profitable projects. 
2.6 The effect of employee stock options on firm performance 
Theoretically, stock option plan are designed based on the principle that the agency 
problems can be alleviated if the firm has clear l ines of separation between 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The l iterature in th is area 
mostly examine whether compensation plans are effectively designed for ach ieving 
specific goals. A part of the goal is to motivate executives to increase shareholders' 
wealth. In short, stock option plans are v iewed as an effective method to achieve this 
objective and for aligning the interest of principal ( i .e. shareholders) and agent ( i .e. 
managers). In the recent main stream of literature highlights the share price effects 
and compensation plan announcements, particularly with information carried out by 
the plans to capital markets. Thus if the planned announcement contains value to the 
market, the market wi l l  process it and it will be reflected in the performance of the 
share price both in the short and long-term . Such impact on the share price may 
differ according to the target groups and announcement types. 
The findings relating to the short-term effects of executive stock option plans on 
share price behaviour, which is largely based on U .S .  firm level data, is mixed . 
Larker ( 1 983), for example, examines whether the abnormal gain is pronounced 
within U.S.  corporations in 5 days trad ing over the period 1971  to 1 978. The results 
indicate positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following the announcement 
of stock option plans which are significant with in two days trading. Using a sample 
of 1 75 U.S.  corporations that had implemented compensation plans, Brickley, 
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Bhagat and Lease ( 1 985) found that 44 had a small share price effect between the 
date of board and stamp duties and that the share prices reacted favourably but 
insign ificantly neighbouring the 2-day announcement. This suggests that 
compensation plan types are not solely affected by share price performance. In fact, 
Tehranian and Waegelin ( 1 985) observed that where short-term compensation plans 
are concerned, share prices consistently drift positively in response for several 
months before the announcement of plans. Other empirical evidence on the incentive 
effects of stock options on share price such as Conrad ( 1 989) and Detemple and 
Jorion ( 1 990) report positive share price effects with stock option grants. Both 
stud ies studied the share price effects over the period 1 973 to 1 986 and found a 
positive share price reaction between the periods 1 973 to 1 98 0, but find no 
substantial effects after 1 980. Defusso, Johnson and Zorn ( 1 990) studied 64 1 stock 
option plans documents and report abnormal gain for the single event date (i .e. SEC 
stamp date). However, when the event dates are extended for longer periods from the 
board meeting date and SEC stamp date, the results are found to yield a positive 
return of almost 4 percent. The positive share price effect impl ies that the 
shareholders reacted favourably to the adoption of stock option plans, however, the 
reported evidence of Oyer and Shaefer (2005) suggests that the positive price effects 
could be as a result of favourable labour market condition, which is consistent with 
Boyd, Brown and Szimayer (2007) . They report a positive share price reaction to 
stock options plan for Australian firms. 
A segment of the literature also investigates the relation between executive stock 
option plans and their wealth-increasing effect. The general consensus is that 
executive stock options create a conflict between shareholders and managers, 
particularly with respect to managerial quality and effort to increase the firms share 
price which is a common measure of performance observed by shareholders. The 
capabi l ity of executive employee to influence the individual share price performance 
is more direct than the non-executive employees. One of which could be that 
management have better control over information releases. As a result, management 
are considered to receive more benefits due to the effects of incentives even when 
stock prices fal l .  On occasions executives tends to be overly cautious with the 
incentive effects that stock option plans bring, particularly when making decisions 
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that d i rect ly benefits their own self-interests without damaging shareholders' wealth. 
As thi s  suggests, executives tend to be risk-takers, engaging in high profitable 
projects whi le  at the same time they become less risk-taker for increasing firm value 
(Defusso, Johnson and Zorn, 1 990; Cohen,Hall  and Viceira, 2000; and Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002) .  Thus the generosity of shareholders which is reflected in equity 
compensation pay may result in a marginal loss by way of the di lution effects 
(lkaheimo, Kje l lman,Holmberg and Jussila, 2004) .  Therefore, shareholders accept 
stock option plans  unfavourably when the p lan adoption produces decreas ing-wealth 
effects. 
G aver and Gaver ( 1 993) studied the share price effects of over 209 companies and 
report that the insignificant market return may be generalised at two levels. Firstly, 
the positive abnormal return which is usuall y  associated with the meeting dates 
effect rather than the meeting contents. Yermack ( 1 997), for example, examined 620 
CEO stock option grants and found that positive return could be managed through 
the timing of plan announcements. In respect to this, Aboody and Kasznick (2000) 
suggest that managers tend to be more opportunistic when selecting the contents of 
disclosure during times of good market condition in order to drift the share prices up. 
Gerety, Hoi and Robin (200 1 )  also investigate share price behaviour in response to 
the incentive plan proposal to directors, and conclude that shareholders might lose 
their benefits. Nevertheless, the positive assessment that broad-based stock option 
plans improved firm performance would appear to offset the di lution effects from the 
issuance stock option, which implies that stock option plans produce a neutral impact 
on shareholders' returns. 
In addition to U .S .  based studies on stock options, several attempts have also been 
made in other regions to assess the share price effects of the use of stock option 
p lans. For example, using data for Singapore firms Ding and Sun (2001) report that 
abnormal stock returns are significant around the announcement of the adoption of 
stock option plans, whi le Matsuura (2003) used Japanese market data to determ ine 
the share price effect of stock option plan announcement within the context of 
agency theory found that firms with h igh managerial ownersh ip tend to make the 
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agency problems less severe. This also impl ies that the implementation of stock 
option plans has a greater effect and that firms with high management ownership 
have the potential to e l iminate agency problems. lkaheimo et al. (2004) studied the 
market reaction to stock option plans announcement using European data, with 
attention given to the short-term share price effects, and found that positive returns 
for m anagerial levels are affected only by the initial plan or first-time 
announcements. Other than the announcement types, the share price reaction over 
stock  option p lan i s  also determined by the target groups of recipients. Prior studies 
in thi s  d irection indicate that recipient non-executive employees usually lead to 
negative market reaction. This particular observation is consistent with Kato et al .  
(2005) who report positive announcement returns of about 2 per cent in the five-day 
period surrounding the announcement for Japanese firms, and especially for firms 
who set aside a large fraction of shares for top executives. Kato et al . (2005) also 
notes that large al location of stock option plans to employees usual ly  result in the 
market reacting negatively due to further portions of the di lutive effects over the 
shareholders. Langmann (2007) also examined stock option plans using data from 
German firms and report that share prices increased by 1 per cent during the 
announcement day. This positive share price reaction before the announcement date 
indicates that the timing of proposed stock option p lans usual ly coincides with 
positive market conditions. In relation to this, Triki and Ureche-Rangau (20 1 2) 
studied the stock option plan announcements effect on the French capital market and 
found similar resu lts that support the positive share price effects . However, when the 
market reaction is examined, the announcement is spl it according to the type of 
announcement. Accordingly, the initial plans announcement during the 2 1  days of 
the event window reports average returns of 4 per cent. 
With reference to the long-run share price performance and the effects of stock 
option plans, the reported empirical evidence is generally m ixed, while the use of 
executive stock options as an instrument to improve long-term firm performance is 
reported to only have mi ld effect on firm value. A number of studies suggest that 
stock option plan may enhance firm value. For example, Sesi l ,  Kroumova,Biasi and 
Kruse (2002) report that U.S. corporations that provide stock options are l ikely to 
enhance productivity, accounting performance and market returns, even though it 
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does not automatically improve the outcome. H i llegeist and Penalva (2004) also 
report the effect of stock option plans on perfonnance using a variety of performance 
measures target groups during the period 1 996 to 1 999 and find a positive 
relationship across the sample. Likewise Hassan and Hoshino (2007) measured the 
effects of stock option plans for 1 600 firms for the period 1 997 to 2004 with respect 
to enhancing corporate value and found that operating performance and stock market 
returns increased after the plans announcement. The positive effect of stock option 
plans on long-term performance is also found in European market studies such as 
Duffhues,Kabir Mertens and Roosenboom (2003), Duffhues and Kabir (2008) and 
Ozkan (2009). Duffhues et al. (2003) and Duffhues and Kabir (2008) investigate 
the performance-enhancing effects of stock options using Dutch market data as a 
proxy by return of asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) and report a positive 
association between the variables. Their findings are consistent with Ozkan (2009) 
who used UK data to study the long-term incentive effects of stock option plans. 
Their findings suggest a strong association between stock return, ROA and stock 
option plans. However, Smith and Swan (2008) provide more robust resu lts on the 
positive effects. Their find ings indicate that the combination of the level of pay (that 
is, equity and cash basis) create an incentive value for managers to enhance firm 
performance. They also report that stock option p lans are not the main method at the 
d isposal of owners to induce performance -enhancing effects . 
Quite a few studies have attempted to explain unsuccessfu l  stories about the 
performance enhancing effect that stock option plans could generate in long-term . 
For examp le, Sanders and Hambrick (2007) claim that stock option plans result in 
extreme firm performance. In brief, they suggest that a large fraction of stock options 
allocated to top executive employees could lead to big losses rather than gains. This 
is possible, particu larly when executives are motivated to be more of a risk-taker. 
S imi larly, Obiyathul la et al. (2009) using Malaysian data investigate the effect of 
stock option p lans on long-term firm performance and found that accounting profits 
declined three years before and after the implementation of stock option plans. 
Bulan, Sanyal and Yan (20 1 0) found simi lar effects which indicate that stock option 
plans do not have productivity-increasing effects and thus fai l  to influence 
accounting performance. Triki and Ureche-Rangau (20 1 2) examined the long-term 
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relationship between stock options and firm value using French data and report weak 
d irection for both variables as measured by the industry-adjusted ROA, ROE and 
abnormal returns. This finding suggests that stock option plans fai l  to create the 
incentive for value-increasing, even though it is widely appl ied in the French 
companies. Arguably, the extent to which stock option plans can generates benefits 
for shareholders and managers with the ascribed effects does depend on the 
h armonisation of their interests. This is apparent, since both parties might capture 
the benefits that stock option plans bring, even though part of the study included 
m ixed results. In addition, there is also evidence which indicate that stock option 
plans provide signalling effects to the market in the short-term and share prices could 
be expected to react according to the approval of the option plans (Tehranian and 
Waegelein, 1 985). While for the long-term effect on corporate performance, it is 
l ikely to generate m ixed results, which as earlier d iscussed is as part of the l iterature 
which report both positive and negative effects from the use of stock options. 
2.7 The effect of employee stock options on executive turnover 
In a competitive labour market, retaining key managerial talents has become an 
important issue for many firms. Therefore, the granting of stock options would 
appear to be the best mechanisms by which the firm can enable executives to become 
part owners of the firms and thereby lead them to share the common objective of 
maximizing the firms' value. However, offering  executives the opportunity to be 
shareholders also gives rise to questions which directly focus on whether they would 
make decisions that are in the long-term interest of the firm . Thus aligning the 
interest of managers and shareholders wil l  go some way towards alleviating the 
agency problem, which has been the main concern in the design of executive 
compensation structure. Previous studies on this issue by Kole ( 1 997) and Oyer and 
Schaefer (2005) suggest that stock option plans  might help to retain managerial 
talent. These studies find that retention is a significant enough reason for firms to 
issue stock options, the effects of which are more obvious when employee turnover 
is very costly for termination, h iring, training and loss of productivity. Accord ingly, 
using stock option plans in one way in which the firm can reduce intentions to leave 
the firm . Anecdotal evidence on this issue suggests that executive employees are 
usually reluctant to forfeit their unexercised stock option value, even though the 
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effect would  be weaker when the share price plunges below the exercise price. Then, 
the value of stock options being underwater leads to high executive turnover. 
Brenner, Sundaram and Yermack. (2000) propose an alternative approach to prevent 
the longer impact through the repricing of stock options. In regard to this, a number 
of researchers report empirical evidence which suggests that firms usually tie 
executive pay to firm performance, something which shareholders would not object 
to i f  the executive increases the firm's  earnings and create additional value for them. 
As a result, the l inking of stock option plans and the shareholder value is 
straightforward as previous studies report a positive relationship between stock 
option plans and firm value (Core and Wayne, 200 1 ). However, the retentive effect 
on executive decisions to leave the firm is only temporary, which is to say that it is 
only val id until the vesting period ends which implies that the turnover rate would be 
lower during the vesting period. Thus the association for stock option plan, firm 
performance and the probabi l ity of key employee turnover imply that equity-based 
pay would  serve as a mechanism to align interests using al l these proxies. Previous 
studies in this field note that the turnover rate is commonly high when the firm 
performs poorly (Warner, Watts and Wruck, I 988;  Weisbach, 1988;  and Dennis, 
Denis and Sarin, 1 997). 
S ince the initial implementation of stock option plans, stock options have been 
directed at executive employees, therefore, the sensitivity of equity-based plan and 
performance is relatively h igh . In some cases, the benefits received by executives 
have been found to be unsatisfactory, even though firms have been performing wel l .  
Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) for example, suggest that executive turnover 
( i .e .  CEOs) is also affected by internal factors and on how the style of top 
management directs the firm.  Among the attributes are ownership structure and 
board characteristics all of which contribute to determining firm performance. Where 
Malaysia firms are concerned, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) note that 
Malaysian corporations are dominated by fami ly owned firms, which impl ies the 
potential for agency problems to exist. The literature in this area report evidence 
which suggests that family-control led firm tend to give rise to confl icts between the 
principal (shareholders) and agents (management). Thus, the use of stock option 
plans may be one solution to alleviating this problem . 
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As mentioned earl ier, most of the l iterature on the use of stock options places much 
emphasis on executive pay as a means ofhelping to retain and motivate management 
efforts and thereby increase firm value. In this  instance, when the majority 
shareholders approve management to be part of the firm shareholders, it is l ikely to 
affect the executive decision to remain or leave the firm.  Nevertheless, the high 
incidences of a llocated stock options to employees have been reported to have a 
l im ited positive effect on firm performance. One reason for this is the extent of non­
executive employee influence, which is less d irect than a top executive employee. 
Therefore, examining the holdings of stock options by top executive levels might 
engender advantages as they have more control on firm factors and are also directly 
involved in setting up a firm ' s  pol icy of the type of compensation system to use. In 
fact, a large fraction of stock option plans for specific target group make the cost to 
be more obvious on firm performance and also make the turnover price to be costly 
(Core and Guay, 200 I ) . The evidence in relat ion to stock option plans and top 
executive turnover has produce mixed results for firm performance. From our 
discussion, it is also evident that firm value is the most frequently observed ind icator 
of the incentive effects in the use of stock option grants in order to reduce executive 
turnover. Coughlan and Schmidt ( 1 985), amongst other studies, note that the 
sensitiv ity of executive turnover and corporate performance are negatively 
associated. They find that forced turnover is l ikely to be higher when the share 
price performance is low. Simi larly Warner, Watts and Wruck ( 1 988) report an 
inverse relationship between ineffective managers and share price returns, while 
Kaplan ( 1 994) found an association between stock returns, income levels and 
executive turnover. In a related branch of the l iterature, Kang and Shivdan i ( 1 995) 
investigate the effects corporate governance mechanisms have in reducing executive 
turnover in Japanese corporations and finds results consistent with prior U.S .  studies. 
Their findings suggest the l ikel ihood of non-routine turnover is related to industry­
adjusted return on assets, excess stock returns, and negative operating income. 
Moreover, the observed sensitivity for non- routine turnover among executives 
increases when the major shareholder is the institutional investor. However, for 
industry performance, the evidence suggests no impact for non-routine managerial 
turnover in Japanese corporations. 
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Despite the replacement of top executives as firm performance deteriorates, the main 
focus of attention is on the role of stock option plans in helping to dissuade the 
intention of managerial employees to leave the firm. Clearly, inviting managerial 
employees to be shareholders could lead result i n  improvements in firm value due to 
reason of interest al ignment. However, the establ ishment of stock option plan is very 
cost ly  for shareholders in  terms of di lution effects. Thus  the question here is whether 
the i ncentive effects of stock option plans can j ustify ownership and control based on 
the economic  performance of the firm. In relation to this, Mehran and Yermack 
( 1 999) using 452 U.S.  corporations, report a negative association between stock 
option plans and the probabil ity of executive turnover, while Fee and Hadlock 
(2003) found that turnover is not entirely affected by equity-compensation plans as 
part of their earlier results l inking stock option plans  and firm performance. Studies 
by Coughlan and Schmidt (988) and Leonhardt (2000) note that stock option holder 
may leave the firm when the plan becomes less effective as values are worthless. The 
suggestion here is the consequence of stock option p lans on firm performance and 
turnover which are not directly cash pay. In thi s  respect, the loss of stock option 
value to holders may be felt in two ways. The first effect is when the excess market 
price is  over the exercise price at the time they leave the firm and the second is the 
probability of share price increases in the future (Balsam and Miharjo, 2007). Maury 
(2006) concludes that firm performance is sensitive to executive turnover as 
executive departure increases following firm losses, although prior performance has 
no impact on CEO turnover. This also suggests that replacing managers when they 
are inefficient or that they should be punished for fai l ing to maximise efforts when 
exercising their core duty (Huson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2004). In relation to this, 
Denis and Denis ( 1 995) argue that managerial turnover might improve corporate 
performance. Their study of 908 management succession events indicates a positive 
stock return . While Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004)) report results which 
suggests that forced turnover leads to improvements in firm performance through 
increasing managerial efforts is good news for investors. However, the latter findings 
remain unresolved due to the fact that by replacing executives merely signals 
improving by better management. 
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The decis ion to remove ineffective top executives relies on a type of ownership 
structure which agency theory claims conflicts of interests could be aligned through 
separation of ownership and control .  Therefore, using stock option plans  would serve 
as an alternative solution to the imperfection of cash incentive pay. Furthermore, by 
invit ing executive employees to be part of the firm's  shareholders is l ikely to 
incentiv ise managers behave in ways that are consistent with aligning their own 
interest and the interest of major and m inor shareholders. In the context of Malaysia, 
since the main features of u ltimate shareholdings is largely control led by domestic 
shareholders such as fami ly and state-control led (Gibson, 2003)], the fami ly and 
political members are actively involved in business operation and thus serve on the 
boards of firms. To determine this effect, several regional studies offer two 
contrasting v iews on the involvement of fami ly members in the management of the 
firm .  F irst, Lausten (2002) reports that Danish family founding firms are likely 
reduce the number of executive turnover, whi le Volopin (2002) reaches simi lar 
conclusions  for Italian fami ly owned firms. The second view relates to firms 
control led by non-fami ly members. Tsai, Hung , Kuo and Kuo (2006), note that the 
effect here is weakened which there is low sensitivity of top management turnover 
and performance. They reason that the non-fami ly-owned business is less effective 
for monitoring and thus the turnover rate during firm performance is low. 
Most of the empirical evidence relating the effects of stock option plans indicates an 
increase in  managerial ownership. However, the effect on executive turnover is not 
c lear, since different levels of stock option grant size across positions disperse 
shareholdings, which, in turn, alters the incentive effects for ind ividual owners. Th is 
impl ies that enhancing managerial ownersh ip could solve the agency problem, but 
the low stakes for individual executive in the firm constitute limited control and 
participation in decision making (Conyon and Leech, 1 994). Denis, Denis and Sarin 
(1997) opine that the lowest incidence of managerial turnover is associated with the 
number of outside directors on firm boards, but the high stakes of executive 
employees make the effect to be less sensitive to turnover despite the presence of 
independent d irectors whose role is to mon itor managers. The controlling effect, 
however, is  more apparent when executives have stakes of more than 25 per cent. 
Thus ownership structure has an inverse effect on turn over. While granting 
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executive stock options to fami ly members merely increases their stake in the firm 
whi ch is  not good news for existing shareholders' particularly if the board plans to 
appoint an outside candidate to chair the CEO position. With respect to this, 
S uchard, S ingh and Barr (200 1 )) examine the relationship between the monitoring of 
CEO' s  by inside and outside directors in Australian firms and found that non­
executive d irectors are more l ikely  to monitor managers. The turnover of Austral ian 
CEOs is associated with past perfonnance instead of current firm performance as 
found in U.S .  stud ies. Suchard et al .  (200 1 )  further note that the behaviour of 
institutional shareholders for solving corporate governance issues produce different 
resu lts between Australian and U.S .  firms. Shen and Canella (2002) conduct a 
longitudinal study to detenn ine the effect of  CEO d ismissal fol lowing an inside 
successor selection . Their findings indicate a negative relationship between CEO 
turnover and firm performance and a positive reaction following succession. The 
results support the proposition that increasing managerial ownerships through equity 
pay for management in the firm significantly impacts CEO dismissal fol lowed by 
succession, instead of dismissals impacting outside succession . 
Iqbal and French (2007) investigates individual managerial ownership in 260 firms 
facing financial difficulty and report that the fewer voting rights executives have the 
more l ikely were they to be dismissed than their higher-owning counterparts. Also 
retained executives were found to increase their shareholding prior to their removal 
whi ch suggests that such a strategy could be an indication to acqu ire shares duri ng 
financial distress in order to avoid being removed. This also impl ies that high 
sharehold ings might exercise greater control although there is a strategy among 
executives to entrench or shield themselves from turnover during a period of poor 
firm performance (Lu, Reising and Stohs, 2007) . Moreover, the inverse effects 
between performance and turnover could be reduced if stock option plans are 
properly designed, so that a firm might incur the turnover cost on the employees' 
departure (Balsam and Miharjo, 2007). In addition, the cost of leaving the firm 
typical ly defers in the few years ahead after the grant date which amounts to losing 
the high value of unvested stock options. Thus lower turnover rates are usually 
observed during the vested period (Balsam and Miharjo, 2007). 
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S ince the m ain function of boards is to play an agency role to shareholders both 
parties h ave a responsibi lity to practice good corporate governance, particu larly in 
the monitoring of management activ ities. The important role of the board includes 
decision making to ensure healthy corporate performance. However, negative firm 
performance not only damages the reputation of the board but also board members 
expos themselves to the threat of being dismissed or removed. This suggests a direct 
relationship between corporate governance attributes, firm value and executive 
turnover. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) report a positive relationship between good 
corporate governance and firm performance for Malaysian firms, while Black et al. 
(2002) found that better governed firms might have more efficiency in their 
operations which is consistent with conclusion reached by Haniffa and Hudaid 
(2006) who report that good corporate governance has value-enhancing effects on 
the firm. Studies such as Gibson (2003) and Defond and Hung (2004) associate 
corporate governance and executive turnover to performance sensitivity. They found 
that the corporate governance of a firm works well following poor firm performance 
if the managements respond quickly. In other word, when corporate performance 
declines, the board would  react by replacing or removing inefficient top management 
which suggests that corporate governance plays a key role in determin ing top 
executive turnover. Previous studies are in agreement that several board 's 
characteristics such as board structure, board size and board composition are likely 
to influence the probabi l ity of executive turnover. The study by Haniffa and Hudaid 
(2006) report board characteristics such as smaller boards, independent boards and 
the separation of roles between CEO and chairman would result in better monitoring 
functions. Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (2012) also report that high turnover leads to 
poor firm performance. 
In the corporate governance literature, board size is one of the main attributes l inked 
to executive turnover and is widely accepted as a key determinant. Proponents note 
that effective board size might enhance management control, reduce costs, and 
thereby increase firm value. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) contend that smaller boards 
might affect the capacity for monitoring management, wh ile Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993) argue that larger board are l ikely to increase their capabil ities and 
resources in order to solve the problems of the firm . Conflicting views on the size of 
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board of d irectors have created an argument that smaller boards have become more 
successful than larger boards, particularly in making decision concerning the 
replacement or termination of directors. In response, scholars propose an ideal 
number of board members. For example, Jensen (1993) indicates that boards with 
eight or fewer directors are more effective for monitoring CEO activities, whi le. 
Sh ivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that eleven is a more appropriate size for 
firm board of directors. This implies that various numbers of board members might 
vary according to the firms' characteristics. In the case of Malaysia, Wan Nordin 
(2009) notes that the average size of Malaysian board of directors is between 7 to 8 
members which are represented by executive and non-executive directors. This is in 
l in e  with Malaysian legal practices in Listing on Bursa Malaysia, whereby the firm's 
board of d irectors should  represent at least two persons or equivalent to one-third of 
the independent directors (Paragraph 15 (2), 2002) . The requirement has a significant 
impact on the decision-making process for board selection as wel l  as the replacement 
process. On this  issue, Borkhovich, Brunarski, Donahue and Harman (2006) report 
that smaller boards m ight influence executive replacement decisions, whi le larger 
boards find it easier to find a successor. In other words, in the process of selecting 
candidates for board composition, the firm is l ikely to choose an outsider and so 
create the main feature of a two-tier board of executive directors and independent 
directors to balance the board size and work cooperatively with executive directors. 
Accordingly, the effect of executive turnover and board size is an inverse relation . 
Studies by Faleye (2003) and Borokhowich et al . (2006) indicate that smal ler boards 
are more efficient and are therefore more l ikely to change executives as corporate 
performance declines, while larger boards might increase the number of independent 
directors but are less sensitive to underperforming directors. This is broadly in 
agreement with Yermack (1996) who report that CEO turnover is  less sensitive to 
firm performance as the board size increases, whi le executive turnover is more likely 
when the firm has a smal ler board of directors. 
The second characteristic of board attributes is board composition . Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the presence of outside directors may enhance board 's 
effectiveness for the purpose of internal monitoring. The corporate governance 
l iterature reports a sim i lar effect, especial ly when outside directors provide the ir 
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independent expertise and judgment. However, the risk appears to be greater when 
board members have a substantial stake in  the firm . Thus to encourage a high level 
of board independence, at least one-third of board members should be external 
d irectors, s ince they have no relationship with the major shareholders or hold any 
position in the firm. Despite appointing independent directors to achieve the intended 
objectives for monitoring top executive levels, the key question is how outside 
d irector influence the board' s  decision . A lso, since one of the main functions of 
board composition is that of internal control, the presence of outside directors on the 
boards provides a clear d iv ision of executive roles to serve on behalf of shareholders. 
On this i ssue, Renneboog (2000) notes that the appointment of outside directors is 
v ital to the interest of major shareholders through the exercise of their fiduciary duty 
to monitor firm performance, while Weisbach ( 1 988) reports a strong effect between 
turnover and performance in firms with outsider-dominated boards. This impl ies that 
independent board members would respond quickly to underperforming director by 
replacing them. Weisbach ( 1 988) also notes that top executive turnover is l ikely to 
occur when the firm experiences poor corporate performance and forced departures 
among top executives which is considered a form of boards reaction. This evidence 
justifies the existence of an external director on the board of directors as one of the 
solutions to remove poorly performing top management executives, since they 
should be penalised for poor firm performance. Thi s  would also suggest that 
outsider-dominated boards are better at monitoring management performance. Th is 
is an issue taken up by Klein (2002) who report that board independence is inversely 
related to earnings management, indicating that outsider-dominated boards play an 
effective role in monitoring corporate performance. However, the U.S.  findings of 
Bhagat and Black (2002) suggest otherwise. They note that an increasing number of 
independent director on boards do not lead to better firm performance. However, 
Hsu-Huei, Paochung, Haider and Yun-Lin (2008) report strong evidence that 
independent directors have a positive effect on firm value in Taiwan. The next 
hypothesis is  the l ikelihood that top executive turnover is lower when the board is 
less independent or if the management is occupied by an outsider-dominated board. 
The literature also reports the effect of CEO dual ity and performance. For example, 
Anderson and Anthony ( 1 996) report positive effects of CEO duality which 
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improved operating performance, though the firms in the sample were exposed in 
earnings m anipulation activity (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996), while Moscu 
(20 13) notes that CEO dual ity improved performance. However, the agency theory 
l iterature indicates opposite results. The suggestion here i s  that the separation of 
CEO and Chairman of boards is to avoid domination inside the firm. In regard to 
this, Dahya, Garcia and Bommel (2009) report that the title of separation in U.K. 
companies do not lead to superior firm performance, while Goyal and Park (2002) 
found a negative associat ion between turnover and firm performance when CEO and 
chainnan are granted to the same individual role which is consistent with Jensen 's  
(1993) findings relating to the fai lure of the firm to take hold of internal control. 
These arguments i l lustrate that CEO dual ity affects performance and lead to 
turnover. Notably, the d iv id ing role between both positions thus makes it easier for 
the boards to dismiss inefficient managers. Stud ies by Goyal and Park (2002) show 
that CEO turnover is l ikely to be lower when CEO and chairman are granted to the 
same person, while Maury (2006) reports that Finish firms despite having 
supervisory board and board of directors report higher CEO turnover fol lowing low 
stock price performance. However, when the role of CEO and chairman are 
combined, the result shows no difference with effects between two-tier and a single­
tier board structure. A later study by Hou and Chuang (2008) found that turnover is 
sensitive to performance, which is attributable to CEO duality. Most of the empirical 
evidence in this  field suggests that the separation of roles between both positions 
does not imply that firms have weaker monitoring boards that are unable to remove 
inefficient top executive. However, it may be added that the code of corporate 
governance states that the separation of CEO and chairman might ensure the 
intended objectives of balancing power between the two positions, since it helps to 
avoid conflicts of interest and domination by a single person on the board. This 
argument supports the theory that executive turnover increases when there is an 
unclear separation role of CEO and chairman or alternatively that executive turnover 
is l ikely to be lower as CEO serves as chairman of boards indicating that firms apply 
low corporate governance. 
Other than board attributes, demographic factors such as the age of board members is 
an important determinant for estimating the probabil ity of turnover. Age is 
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commonly used to d istinguish between forced and routine turnover. However, the 
test effect of age on turnover is usually  divided between younger and older. In th is 
respect, studies have been conducted using age as an explanatory variable. Among 
these stud ies Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) examined the turnover-firm performance 
effects by using the compulsory retirement age of 64 to differentiate between 
younger and older CEO, whi le Weisbash (1988), Barro and Barro (1990) and 
Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (2012) use age 65, 55 and 60. Lausten (2002) and 
G oyal and Park (2002) also appl ies a simi lar approach to estimate the probabil ity of 
turnover through CEO age. In l inking the age of board members to turnover 
sensitiv ity, Goyal and Park (2002) and Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (2012) report a 
positive relationship, while in an earlier study Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) 
conclude that younger CEOs has a negative relationship on stock price performance, 
since the coefficient of CEO turnover above retirement age indicate a positive and 
weak relationship. In add ition to these studies, Barro and Barro (1990) estimate the 
turnover of bank CEOs and report a strong effect on turnover decisions. They find 
that the probabi l ity of turnover is lower amongst younger CEO and increase when 
they are about to reach the mandatory retirement age. However, Rachprad it, Tang 
and Khang (20 1 2)) report both positive and weak relationships for all CEOs 
turnover, though add itional test on a sub-sample younger and older CEOs find that 
younger CEO are l ikely to be replaced following poor firm performance. 
Prior studies also indicate that firm characteristics may influence the likel ihood of 
executive turnover. One of firm characteristics that could be attributed to executive 
turnover is firm size which is commonly measured by total assets or market 
capital izations. High firm value in place of assets or market capitalization shows the 
firm is categorized as being a mature firm. Earl ier empirical studies indicate that firm 
s ize plays a sign ificant role in determ ining executive turnover. For example Cosh 
and Hughes ( 1 997) report a negative relationship between turnover and large size 
firms, which suggests that larger firms are less l ikely to terminate top managements, 
which is in l ine with Rhim, Peluchette and Song (2006)) who find that large firms 
are expected to enjoy good corporate performance since the benefit from more stable 
income. Therefore, such firms are less l ikely to change their executives compared to 
smal l firms in which turnover is expected to be lower. 
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There i s  also a branch of the literature that justifies high executive compensation pay 
by drawing attention to the need to align the interests of managers and shareholders. 
The consensus is that since top management are an important human resource factor 
attractive pay packages has the abi l ity to attract and retain managerial talents, 
particularly at CEO level.  It has also been argued that the level of pay for executives 
should influence their decisions to remain with the firm. For example, Mehran and 
Y ermack ( 1 997) indicate that alternative strategy designed to change the mix level of 
payments could help to retain executives. They also argue that using solely cash pay 
and bonus for executive appraisals is a subjective decision made by the firm because 
in real labour markets not al l  firms are able to compete for talent using cash based 
compensation, particularly smal ler firms. Those who are broadly in agreement with 
this  view suggest that firms should use share-based payments as a retention 
mechanism (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran , 2000). Accordingly, the use of stock 
options is considered as one way in which the firm can extend an intention to leave 
the firm for several years after the grant date which is normally between three to five 
years. Thus it may be concluded that turnover among executives would be lower 
during the vesting period (when stock options cannot be exercised) and the retention 
effects lead them to stay with the current employer (Balsam and M iharjo, 2007). 
A lso, since the main structure of stock options is to l ink the share price to 
performance, stock options may encourage the firm 's executive to be involved in 
h ighly profitable projects. However, if firm performance declines, the compensated 
value for executives is l ikely to reduce whi lst turnover increases. This has lead 
H assenhuttl and Harrison (2002) to argue that h igh compensation for the purpose of 
retaining loyal CEOs i s  questionable, particularly for signal l ing that they are 
outstanding. Their findings indicate that stock options are negatively related to CEOs 
turnover in large firms. Simi larly, Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that equ ity payments 
play an insignificant role in the retention of CEOs, while Dennis, Den is and Sarin 
( 1 997) indicate that a large amount of share ownership does play a role in 
determin ing executive turnover. The literature further suggests that the 
implementation of stock option plans at managerial levels wi l l  not only increase their 
share ownership but also the level of effects on turnover-performance is twofold. 
The first effect is  that executive with low ownership interest may leave their position 
if the firm records poor performance and the new replacements is expect to enhance 
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firm value. In  this respect, Hochberg and Lindsey (20 1  0) examine the relationship 
between stock option plans and operating performance and found a positive 
relationship, while B lasi, Freeman, Mac kin and Keuse (20 1 0) note that employees 
who receive stock options are less l ikely to find a new job, which suggests that share 
options leads to lower voluntary turnover. Nonetheless, a section of the l iterature 
suggests that the effect of  reduction in turnover is temporary unti l  the stock options 
vesting period, which would seem to imply that stock option plays a role in delaying, 
rather than in preventing turnover (Serdar, Parker, Wesep and Dickersin, 20 1 1 ) .  The 
second resulting effect i s  that where the executive has significant ownership through 
stock option, they might shield their position from poor corporate performance. This 
pmiicular effect is consistent with a study conducted by Finkelstein ( 1 992), which 
found that substantial stockholding is a source of managerial power. Therefore, a 
s ign ificant ownership stake is l ikely  to reduce the CEOs removal by the board and is 
one of the ways through which a large amount of stock option grants can be 
exercised. 
2.8 The effect of stock option on taxation 
Numerous studies report evidence which suggests that firms using stock option plans 
benefit from taxation. One of the earliest studies was carried out by Dil lavou ( 1 945) 
who note that regulators and investors focus more attention on stock option grants, 
particularly for estimating the real effect on tax claims.  At that time courts paid 
attention to the adequacy and motive of equity plans and considered the incentive 
effects for increasing employee efforts and job satisfactions as not sufficient enough 
a legal concern to support tax claims. As a result, some of the incentive 
compensation programmes are set up for the purpose of securing a tax advantage of 
employee which contributes to firm losses. The issue of tax benefits continued until 
the 1 960s and 1 980s as the divisions of stock options are entirely based on the 
Internal Revenue Code and legal cases. This is consistent with Kim ( 1 990) who 
report that tax benefits resulted in the success of stock options in the 1 960s, the 
effect of which increased two-folds in 1 980s and later contributed to the wide use of 
stock options, even though there is  a claim by some accounting practitioners that 
accounting treatments provide more incentive features for stock option grants. 
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I n  tax based U .S .  studies, it has been argued that the tax effect of stock option plans 
( i .e., non-qualified option) is different than cash plan because unlike cash 
compensation payments when the stock option has met the specific criteria of the 
Internal Revenue Code, the gain may be taxed at the time of grant exercise or when 
the stock is acquired u nti l  the shares are sold .  In some countries, when the stock 
option is sold, any resulting gain is taxed at the capital gain rate which is 
sign ificantly lower than the ordinary income tax rates ( i .e. the capital gain tax rate is 
25  per cent while the ordinary income tax rate is between 28 to 70 per cent). Studies 
by Huddart ( 1 998) and Hanlon and Shevl in (2002) note that firm 's usual ly suffer a 
loss in their attempt to gain tax advantages when they fai l  to plan and adjust the 
reported income, while Hal l and Liebman (2000) note that tax benefits have an effect 
on executive compensation, though they found no evidence that tax changes lead to 
increasing use of stock option grants at executive levels in l ieu of cash-based 
payments. 
Arguably, an increasing number of firms apply  stock option plans, which ind icates 
that firm perceived tax benefits m ight be captured through equity plans. 
Nevertheless, the tax advantage of stock option plans relying on tax policies. In 
relation to this, Hall and Liebman (2000) investigate the extent to which various tax 
changes could affect the tax benefit due to the rise of using stock options in the US 
corporations. Using longitudinal data, their finding shows that tax changes have a 
moderate effect on stock option grants. Moreover, due to offsetting effects, stock 
options have made the tax implication not as c lear cut. It may be the cases that stock 
options reduce shareholders profit, which impl ies that tax advantages weaken 
shareholders incentive to motivate executives. In attempting to link the tax effect 
with stock option plans within the spirit of agency theory, the result produces less 
evidence to support tax advantages from the standpoint of cash pay. Core and Guay 
(200 1 )  find that tax benefits are commendable and increases firm value if the tax rate 
in the current period is low and predict an increase in the future. However, the tax 
saving for stock options is less certain and it is more l ikely affected by exercise 
behaviour and share price performance. Moreover, a study by Graham and Rogers 
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(2002) found that managerial stock options are more sensitive to share price changes 
which can lead to an idiosyncratic risk exposure. 
Whi le, the increasing use of stock option plans are connected with advantages on 
internally generated funds, the stock option plan has produced a clear indication that 
it generates no agency cost. These kinds of corporate financing for investment 
activities are more preferred by firms as the fund is less risky as compared of using 
external funds. The effect of stock options plan also indicates the pay contract plays 
an essential role for the manager's capital structure decisions (MaccMin and Page, 
1 996). This particularly show that the existence of stock options contract provides 
the manager with an incentive to make capital structure decisions that do not di lute 
their stake in the corporation . This incentive effect is manifested in the preference for 
internal equity or equivalent to, retained earnings, over debt and outside equity in 
financing an investment. Other main characteristic of stock option plans is that it 
could  defer any tax advantage until stock options are exercised, usually three to five 
years after the grant date. Amromin and Liang (2003) find evidence which ind icates 
that firms use stock option p lans as a tax shelter, and Graham, Lang and Shackelford 
(2004), Kahle and Shastri (2005) and Aier and Moore (2008) note with respect to tax 
shelter and stock option grants, that firms util ise stock option in order to gain the 
maximum tax benefit. In other words, stock option produces a unique non-debt tax 
shield and ignores the effect which may result in overstating tax advantages, which 
leads to erroneous conclusions about the firm status as underleveraged (Hanlon and 
Shevl in , 2002). In relation to the association between stock options and firm debt 
ratio, Amromin and Liang (2003) present two opposing points . First, they 
empirically examine the offsetting effects on debt through the role played by stock 
option grants and stock repurchase. The result shows that employee stock options 
could affect the firm 's debt financing and capital structure after the firm alters the 
taxable income and the expected stream of tax payments. For the second point, using 
panel data from 1 995 to 2001 for nonfinancial firms in the S&P 500, the results 
indicate that employee stock options could serve as a non-debt tax shield to lessen 
debt financing. This is in l ine with Graham, Lang and Shackelford (2004) who found 
that deduction for stock options would serve as a non-debt tax shield which yielded 
less debt financing and thereby reduce corporate tax payment. However, the extent 
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of stock option grants influence on a firm's  debt policy is associated with the 
capab i l ity of size to hav e  an effect on marginal tax rates. Graham, Lang and 
Shackelford (2004) find that in a marginal tax rate, which readi ly incorporated tax 
benefits of exercise gains, the expected benefit from new stock option grants are 
included . Therefore, the relationship between stock options and marginal tax rate is a 
positive one. Other related studies in this area examine the tax benefits associated 
with a firm's  debt policy, stock option grants, and the role of the firm ' s  tax status. 
A ier and Moore (2008) studied the link between tax benefits on stock option with 
debt according to the tax status of the firm (i .e . ,  tax sensitive firm and tax insatiable 
firm).  They report an inverse relationship between the use of debt and tax benefits 
( i .e. , as a tax shield) on employee stock option i n  tax sensitive firms,  which suggests 
that stock options and tax status interact with each other in determining a firm 's debt 
policy. 
A number of studies investigate whether an association between personal income tax 
effects and stock option grants exist. Studies by H ite and Long ( 1 982), Mi l ler and 
Scholes ( 1 982), Hal l  and Liebman (2000) and Katuscak (2004 and 2009) examined 
the impact of personal income tax on compensation pay and the impact of the tax 
system for compensation pay design within the scope of global contract ing. From 
the studies mentioned, Hall and Liebman (2000) find weak evidence that tax changes 
lead to increasing use of stock options. However, when compared to cash pay, the 
tax effect is found to produce a slight tax advantage which implies that us ing cash 
pay i s  preferred to stock options. In some countries different tax rates imply for cash 
and equity pay. For example, in the U .S .  corporations are allowed to use different 
tax rates for any gains arising from stock option grants . Table 1 compares both U.S .  
and Malaysia tax regulation: 
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Table 1 :  Comparison of taxable income between U.S and Malaysia taxation rules 
Compensation types us When taxable Malaysia When taxable 
Salary Personal Payout Personal Payout 
Bonus Personal Payout Personal Payout 
Non-qualified stock option Personal Exercise Personal Exercise 
Stock option gains Capital gains tax Sales of the stock Personal Exercise (Section 25 
( I )  (A), ITA 1 967 
Dividends Personal Payout Personal Payout 
In the context of Malaysia, the one tax rate is imposed for all types of compensation 
and this  is what is currently applied under Malaysia taxation rules. When the tax 
treatment of both countries may be compared for the purpose of determining the tax 
benefits inherent in equity based plans. In this case, U.S .  tax regulation al lows stock 
option plans to be taxed at d ifferent tax rates for gains when sold .  However, it 
appears that capital gains tax is not relevant for the design of compensation contracts 
for Malaysian firms, since stock option plans offer no tax advantage relative to salary 
and bonus. Therefore, the personal tax effects of Malaysian stock option lead to 
ambiguous results. 
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ESSAY 1 
3.0 : THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING 
EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS IN MALAYSIA. 
3.1 Introduction 
A growing body of l iterature offers evidence for the widespread use of stock option 
plans  in Anglo-Saxon countries. Developments in this area as spi l led over into other 
regions as an increasing number of companies develop interest in equity sharing as 
part of a compensation package. The commonly cited examples for the use of stock 
option plans have their origins in the 1 990s, principally for the purpose of gaining a 
tax benefit (Aboody, 1 996). In addition, the expansion in economic activ ity which 
gave rise to the rapid growth of technology based companies helped to escalate 
compensatory stock option plans at the executive levels in a number of countries 
(Hal l, 1 998), whi le the corporate scandals in the US and the excessive value of stock 
options granted at the executive level generated a controversy that forced many 
corporations to extend the granting of share options to non-executive employees. 
Some economic observers provide contrasting argument which questions the 
economic justification for award stock options to all employees (Hall and Murphy, 
2003). Nonetheless, the non-executive levels are stil l  predominantly the main holders 
of stock options of U .S .  corporations albeit Sharma (2006) points out that the trend 
for stock option plans at this level has reduced in size from $ 1 1 9  bi l l ion in (2000) to 
$7 1 bi l l ion in (2002). 
It is conjectured that the efficient functioning of legal frameworks has a substantial 
impact for the shaping, design and operation of stock option plans. However, the 
legal practice adopted in guiding stock option plans might vary from country to 
country. In consequence, the associated legal and regulatory frameworks usually 
require a series of amendments that should be in place before stock plans are 
established . In respect to this, the Malaysian authorities should therefore consider 
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reforming the process for every facet of the regulatory and legal frameworks in order 
to enhance the best legal practice. 
The main aim of this essay IS to assess the legal and regulatory frameworks 
governing stock option plans m Malaysia. In the process of making a coherent 
review, I wi l l  examine the basis and jurisdiction with respect to how the regulatory 
framework operates with in  the capital market, as wel l  as to appraise the legal aspects 
at the international level, principally  among four selected countries - the U .S., U .K., 
Japan and Singapore before turning our attention to the regulatory framework 
guiding the use of the stock option plans in Malaysia. Our discussion, in this  respect, 
h ighl ights the associated issues under which stock option plans operate, noting in 
particular issues specific to accounting and taxation. 
The essay is organized as fol lows. Section 3 .2 reviews the regulatory frameworks 
governing stock option in some developed countries include U .S, U .K. ,  Japan and 
S ingapore. Section 3 .3 provides brief description of Malaysia legal frameworks 
concerning employee stock option plans and discusses the initiative has been taken 
so far to overcome weaknesses in legal structures. The last section i s  3 .4 concludes. 
3.2 The regulatory frameworks executive stock option plans 
The use of stock option plans in Malaysia has a very short history. The first stock 
option plan was announced as recent as 1 989, which indicates that the stock option 
p lan have only been around in Malaysia for almost 20 years. However, there is sti l l  a 
lack of discussion about the practical use of stock options in the corporate sector of 
Malaysia. At present, most applications emphasize the accounting treatment of stock 
options, and because of th is there has been no real need to devise a complex legal 
framework to govern the use of such instruments. According to Obiyathulla et al . 
(2009), the presence of statutory requirements for a central ized government-managed 
retirement fund could be one of the reasons for why there has been lim ited 
discussion regarding the legal effects of stock options. However, and given the 
growing popularity of stock options, the trend for an employee compensatory system 
has changed and the Malaysian government has responded in turn by al lowing the 
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establ ishment of a new scheme for private employees and the self-employed. In this 
respect, the present legal structure requ ires a coherent review and update in order to 
cope with both current and future needs. As a result, updating the Jaws is l ikely to 
produce c learer guidel ines for firms and u ltimately achieve a higher standard for 
practice. For precisely th is reason, the legal structure is commonly designed as lying 
between regulation and complete Jaissez-faire. 
During the process of creating the structure for the legal and regulatory framework 
governing corporate activities, a crucial part of the process has been to consider the 
d imensions that faci litate the business community on the one hand and on the other 
hand,  dimensions that protect corporate directors and stakeholders in l ine with 
international standards. I n  the context of compensation payments, there is no single 
source of regulations governing the operation of stock option plans which are 
commonly contro lled by two types of law: company law and securities law. In 
general, company Jaw serves as a principle of the regulatory frameworks that 
establishes a standard system for adoption by all companies which contain the law 
for, among others, administration, directors ' duties and company audits. Whereas the 
general function of securities Jaw is to regulate the issuance of securities and to 
protect the rights and interests of stakeholders. Therefore, both legal sources function 
simultaneously in order to prevent inequitable and unfair practice on the stock 
exchange. 
Together with the legal structures underpinning stock option plans, the specific 
guidelines in the frameworks play a vital role in setting boundaries that guide the 
duties of directors' .  Thi s  therefore enables stock option plans to operate in an 
effic ient way. In addition, stock option plans usually  require the issuance of new 
shares that would have di lutive effect on the existing wealth of shareholders ' ,  which 
suggests that the process of establ ishing a stock option plan involves a series of 
business activities that requires changing the company' s  capital and information 
disclosure, and financial management practices. Hence, a different set of corporate 
activities is seemingly applied to a different stage of jurisdiction. In this example, the 
establishment of a stock option plan also relates to the issue of corporate governance 
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withi n  the corporation, particularly when the agency problem is widespread in the 
corporation. For that reason, the legal and regulatory frameworks would  seem to 
p lay an important role i n  helping to solve potential corporate governance issues that 
may arise. On thi s  particular issue, it worth mentioning that the corporate governance 
l iterature presents m ixed results on the actual relationship between corporate 
governance practice and stock option plans. For example, a positive association 
could  be found when the stock option plans appear to align the interest of managers 
with those of the shareholders of the corporation, thereby giving the impression that 
the corporate governance framework in place is functioning wel l .  However, the 
contrasting effect could also be generated i f  the corporate governance framework 
fai l s  to exercise its core functions. 
Investigation on a country-by-country basis reveals that the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
specifically, the U.S .  and U.K., apply more comprehensive law which is often cited 
as a main source of reference for Malaysia. The main features of corporate Jaw and 
exchange regulations governing the use of stock option p lans in the both countries 
appear not to be too restrictive. This d iffers from the Jaws applied to stock option 
plans in Malaysia, where the focus is on the stock option plan disclosure and 
procedural guidance. This implies that the law as currently appl ied is overly 
restrictive. Moreover, i n  the U .S ., the design of the regulatory frameworks for 
management compensatory methods is shared between the judicial system and the 
tax authorities. In this way, the regulatory framework is designed to prevent 
excessive compensation at the executive level . Furthermore, the demand for 
information disclosure is given the highest priority by the regulatory body in order to 
overcome the issue of insufficient information. In addition, there appears to be some 
interaction between the strict Jaw enforcement of the regulatory bodies and the 
Companies Acts with the non-mandatory provisions of the Corporate Governance 
Code. This makes it very clear that provision in their main statute. In contrast to 
Malaysia regulatory frameworks underpinning stock option plans, it require for a 
comprehensive of updating of Jaws in order to meet h igh standard of legal practices 
as been appl ied in U.S .  and U .K. This also for fulfi l  current and changing needs. For 
one of example, the provision in the Malaysia Companies Acts that specifies the 
directors ' interest in the share dealings reflects the changes for the l ist of directors ' 
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duties which makes the laws more certain . However, some parts of the l ists are not 
exhaustive; hence the process of changes and amendments to the main laws often 
produce a d irect impact on practices in corporate governance 1 •  Therefore, expanding 
the existing corporate governance code is one of the possible ways to balance its 
effects. There is, however, a dilemma here because changes in the main law of 
M alaysia  are sometimes not ful ly consistent in terms of the company's commercial 
interests and corporate social responsibi l ity. Nevertheless, the effect on the practical 
impli cations is obvious .  In fact, whether the new or expanding existing provision 
pro duces a positive or a negative effect in the Malaysia company's interests crucial ly 
depends on how the top management conducts the company's business. Moreover, 
the behaviour of management with respect to the interests of the firm is generally 
influenced by how they conduct themselves and their relationship with stakeholder 
groups. 
W ith regard to the effect of stock option plans on management behaviour (i .e. 
directors), even part of  the l isted duties are c learly indicated in the Malaysia laws. 
However, among other things, it might discourage the corporate risk-taking so that 
Malaysia directors are become more risk averse when making their judgements. In 
ther instances of duties, as stated, might also produce the effect of discouraging non­
executive director from holding multiple directorships. Therefore, the existing Acts 
note the extent of the changes that might prevent behaviour that conflicts with the 
interests of the corporation in the same way. At this  point, it should note that the 
process of modernizing existing regulatory frameworks and practices in Malaysia 
could be served as examples for major reform . However, the extent to which of law 
changes that would benefit Malaysia as to move closer into line with international 
standards remains on debate. So far, among the Asian countries, Japan and 
S ingapore are show a great progress in their law reforms and in th is example, 
Japanese laws did a major reform for stock option programs at the executive levels in 
order to move closer with the US and European countries2 • This shows their great 
1 For example, in  the U K  Company Act 2006 was superseded the 1 985 act and came into force in  stages, with the tinal 
provision being commenced on I October 2009. Under the current acts, there seven general duties set out in the section 1 7 1  and 
1 77 with some new additions introduced by the Act. 
2 For example, Japanese provides a major reform in 1 997 on the Japanese Commercial Code to allow companies otTer stock 
option plans to d irectors and it also moves closer into line with the US and Europe. See a study discussed by Junko Mon of 
Asahi Law Otlices, Tokyo. "Japan gives green l ight to employee share options, International Financial Law Rev1ew 1 6  .45-46 
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initiative for modernizing the law practices as been applied m most developed 
markets. 
3.2.1 Stock option plans in the United States (U. S) 
Simi lar to other forms of securities, the process of establishing a stock option plan in 
a U .S .  corporation is  under the control of two provisions of the Securities Act. This 
includes Sections 3 (a) and 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1 933,  which require the 
corporation to prepare a registration statement (prospectus).3 Section 3(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1 933  emphasizes that there are exemptions from the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act known as the ' safe-harbour exemption' .  The Act 
provides an exemption to stock option plans in Regulation D, specifically known as 
Rule 5 04, Rule 505 and Rule 506.4 Among other things, these rules ind icate 
restrictions for US employees on the resale of securities5, the offer price and the 
number of purchasers. Regulation D has been criticized because it provides more 
benefit for smal l companies. However, Rule 701  provides exemptions for large 
corporations that make it more attractive to gain an exempted registration, because 
there is no l im itation on the number of securities offered unless for an aggregate 
sales price. Rule 70 1 can be used with exemptions in Regulation D. For the process 
documentation, the company is required to deliver a copy of the contract to all 
e l igible employees6. 
In the event of a stock option plan, major amendment has been made fol lowing the 
incidence of corporate fai lures i n  the U .S .  which led to the introduction of a new law 
- the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SO Act). The SO Act is used to ensure that more 
protection is  provided to employees and so provides restrictions on insider trading 
activity that involves directors (Samsa and Scheidt , 2003) .  In particular, this SO 
Act prohibits the provision by the company of personal loans to directors and 
executive officers to cover the exercise price or income tax obligations, when 
' Section 3(a) and 5(a), of the Securities Act 1 933 ' Section 3(a) of Securities Act 1 933 and Al l  types rule provide exemptions li-om registration requirements of the Securities 
Act which also known as "safe-harbour exemption" 
5 Typically, shares disposal by employees that were required through stock option plan meets the exemption in the Sect1on 4( I )  
of Securities Act 1 933. 
" If  the aggregate sale price exceeds US5,000.000 for the period of 12 months, an additional information such as terms of the 
plan, investment risk and financial statement. 
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exercising the stock option 7. Nevertheless, this prohibition does not apply to 
outstanding loans after the effective date of the SO Act. 
Other than the securities acts, U .S. tax law also play a role in forming the regulatory 
fram ework governing stock option plans. In the U.S., the tax treatment of stock 
options depends on the plan structure. Moreover, the different tax results from 
gain ing  such benefits are dependent on whether companies use an incentive stock 
option p lan (ISO) or employee stock purchase plan (ESPP).8 The tax treatment for 
ISO,  which means that it does not meet the requirements set out in Section 422 of the 
Act, is determined based on the ascertainable value. This shows that the tax 
consequence of the nonqualified stock option with an ascertainable value is sl ightly 
different from that with no ascertainable value. For instance, the nonqualified stock 
option with ascertainable value will be taxed to the extent of the realized gain on the 
sale of the option, whi le  the nonqual ified stock option with no ascertainable value 
wil l  be taxed at the exercise date and fully vested in accordance with the terms and 
cond itions ofthe agreement. From the standpoint of U.S.  taxation, the tax advantage 
of stock option plans for employees, it would seem, greatly  outweighs that of the 
company, since the company is not allowed any deduction for costs incurred. 
3.2.2 Stock option plans in United Kingdom (U. K.) 
The U.K. regulatory framework provides clear prescriptions for the establ ishment of 
stock option plans, although not all equity plans fal l  within the scope of the 
definition .9 In the U .K. ,  there is however a slight advantage for a company offering a 
stock option plans in which it may enjoy the advantage without taking into 
consideration that the rights of shareholders' wil l  be di luted. 1 0  The power to establish 
stock option plans is general ly  contained in the memorandum and articles of 
association . Thus companies intending to offer stock option plans should examine 
7 � 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and the prohibition also include an arranging for credits. 
" ISO is a shareholder-approved plan that satistled the requirements of Section 422 and if the stock is sold without meet the 
qualij)<ing period wil l  be treated as Nonqualified Stock Option (NQSQ). While, ESPP is a purchase right that granted to 
employees for acquiring company shares at particular date under Section 423 Internal Revenue Code of 1 986. 
' Based on the section 743 of Companies Act 1 985, it is detlne as a scheme for encouraging or faci l itating the holding of stocks 
or debentures in a company by or the benetlt of the bona fide employees or former employees of the company, the company's 
subsidiary or holding company or a subsidiary of the company's holding or he wives, husbands, widows, widows or children or 
step-chi ldren under the age of 1 8  of such employees or former employees. 
10 Section 89, Companies Act 1 985 
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both documents concerning the relevant powers associated with the stock option 
plan . The amendment is required for both documents, and if it is not stated in the 
documents, then the relevant powers associated with stock option plans wil l  be put in 
p lace. Accordingly, there are clear guidelines relating to the responsibility of 
d irectors, which under U .K .  regulation is to ensure that prior to the implementation 
of stock option p lans, they have the authority to do so by gaining the approval of 
shareho lder at a general meeting. A simi lar process must be carried out for the 
issuance of new stocks. 1 1  And if agreed, the approval must be communicated to all 
shareholders through a circular, which contains the ful l  description of the p lan except 
for any minor amendments. Unl ike the U.S .  arrangements, there is no general 
exemption provision for the issuing of shares in relation to the stock option plan. 
However, the l isted companies would benefit from the exemption in the prospectus 
rules. This indicates that l i sted companies on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) are 
not required to produce a prospectus, while non-listed companies are subject to the 
requirement of the prospectus as pursuant to the Publ ic  Offers of Securities 
Regulations 1 995 .  In addition, the current implementation of the European Union 
(EU) Prospectus Directive has led to changes in the law in the offering shares to the 
public. The new provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2002 (FSMA) 
have come into ful l  force, along with rules for when a prospectus is required and the 
publication needed for an approved prospectus. 
S imilar to that in other country jurisdictions, the main structure of stock option plans 
is determined by provisions in the Companies Act and l isting rules. Specifically, the 
laws governing disclosure and directors ' duties for managing stock option plans 
indicates that directors are obliged to prepare a report containing all information 
relating to their ownership interests in the company. 1 2  For example, the directors ' 
remuneration report must be prepared for every financial year end and laid down in a 
general meeting by the board of directors for the approval of shareholders. 1 3  The 
report should also be audited by the company auditor and sent to every member 
el igible to attend the meeting within 2 1  days before the general meeting date. 
1 1 Section 80, Companies Act 1 985 Para 1 3 . 1 3, the UKLA. 12 As section 324 Companies Act 1 985 specifies the requirements for listed companies to disclose the informat1on about 
d irectors' interests inside the company in the annual reports. The term of the directors' interests are then been extended to the 
spouses and children as the section 328 or any person enters in the company's register by virtue of section 325. 
" See an new schedule 7 A requirement in  the Companies Act 1 985 (Section 234B[ I ] )  
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Included in  the process are relevant documents, such as the directors' remuneration 
report, the annual accounts and auditor reports, all of which must be filed at the 
Registrar of Companies before the end of the laying and delivering accounts. 1 4  In 
the event of a part implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive, the law 
provides a benefit in terms of reducing disclosure and the record-keeping obligations 
of the company. However, there is a requirement for d isclosure of share dealings by 
directors under the Disclosure and Transparency Rules and the Model Code of 
Listing Rules. And companies must register with the Regulatory Information Service 
information stock option grants to a director or any person connected with a director. 
This seems very clear that disclosure about directors ' interests may be considered as 
corporate governance practices, which are control led by the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (2003) . 1 5 The combined code clearly prescribes the 
requirement for companies to provide sufficient reward to act as an attraction and 
therefore a spur for a company' s success and thus to avoid excessive 
• 16 H compensatiOn . owever, the supporting code contains the requirement that the 
form of compensation packages for executive directors should be associated with 
performance, which is designed to al ign interests. 1 7  Nevertheless, since the combined 
code is not mandatory and interaction with the l i sting rules promotes a 'comply or 
explain ' approach, for that reason a l isted company is  required to insert a statement 
in the annual reports and to explain how and to what extent it has compl ied with the 
principle of the combined code. Effective from the I st July 2005, the combine code 
is no longer attached to the Listing Rules. 
In the U.K. the corporate ownership environment reveals that the institutional 
investor constitutes a substantial shareholder in l isted companies. Therefore, it is 
" See section 242 and 244. Companies Act 1 985 indicate that should be submitted within the 7 month after the tlnancial year­
end. 
15 The Combine Code is not a law or regulation, but it is a set of recommendations guideline for corporate governance practices 
within the listed companies. The code is designed to avoid the directors or any person related to them abuses the price sensitive 
information or place themselves under suspicion of abusing during the period of announcement ( Ferrarini, Moloney and 
Vespro, 2003). 1t applies for all UK l isted companies and it passes a series of amendment to tit with current needs. 
'" The main principle in B. I Code of 1 7. 
17 In the main principle B.2 specifies the procedure of designing the remuneration packages for executive indicates that fixmg 
remuneration packages should be formal and transparent. Hence, the disclosure on directors ' fee are then been extended under 
the regulation of the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002. The relevant information has to reveal including the 
details of stock options on the units exercised, outstanding at the end of financial year and the perfonnance conditions attaching 
the options. Other information should be included in the report about the length and explanation of performance conditions 
under long term plans and the amendment (if any) of the options during the tlnancial year 
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subject to the investor guidelines prepared by the two major lobbying organizations 
such as the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF). 1 8  As indicated earlier, stock option plans need approval 
from shareholders; therefore, institutional investors have an opportunity to vote if the 
company fai l s  to not comply with their guidel ines. Also, because there are significant 
influences on the stock option plans, the company wil l  often conduct a discussion at 
the preliminary l evel by using their voting rights and wil l  only give their support for 
compensation plans that improves firm performance and with the purpose of aligning 
the interests of employees with shareholders. This is  a fundamental principle in a 
recommendation ofthe Greenbury Committee (paragraph 5 .33), whi ch note that: 
"Shareholders should be invited specifically to approve all new long-term 
incentive schemes (including share option schemes) whether payable in cash or 
shares in which Directors or senior executives will participate which potentially 
commit shareholders' funds over more than one year or dilute the equity" 
Similarly, other incentives to provide stock option plans are to gain the associated 
tax benefit. Therefore, in the U.K.,  the scheme subject to law involves four types of 
taxation : income tax, national insurance, capital gains tax and corporation tax. 
Although no tax is imposed on an approved stock option plan by HMRC, shares 
acquired under unapproved plans are subject to such law. 1 9  As with other 
regulations, a series of amendments have been passed to tax law, particularly in 
relation to changes for unapproved arrangements introduced by Schedule 22 of the 
Finance Act of 2003 . The value charged for income tax depends on the type of 
securities and when the shares are ready to convert into assets (called read i ly 
convertible assets) . The employer is responsible for paying the tax through pay-as­
you-earn (PAYE), whereas the employee should reimburse the value to the employer 
within 90 days. The tax paid value wi l l  be treated as a tax benefit, which is based on 
" The both associations represent the institutional shareholder investors through issuing the guideline for their members. Other 
institutions such as Morley Fund M anagement and ISlS Asset M anagement take their ov.n initiative through publishmg thc1r 
ov.n guidelines for corporate governance and voting principles. 
" A HRMC approved scheme covers the company share option plan, share incentive plan and saving related share option plan 
(SAYE). 
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the grossed-up amount. However, when employees sell stock options and receive 
any gains, then these wi l l  be subject to capital gains tax. This treatment provides a 
s l ight advantage when the shares owned by employees qual ify as business assets and 
el igible for business asset taper relief?0 
3.2.3 Stock option plans in Japan 
The development of the law governing stock option plans in Japan has experienced a 
series of reforms in response to current needs. Before the amendment of the Japanese 
Commercial Code, more than 50 companies granted a quasi-stock option plan, 
although this has been prohibited under the law. This prohibition is due to its dilutive 
effects on shareholders '  wealth (Mori, 1 997). The major reform of Japan ' s  
regulations i n  1 997 deregulated stock option plans, al lowing companies to offer 
stock options designed to faci l itate an employee incentive scheme. In addition, the 
Japan ' s  securities law are quite complicated, but an amendment of exchange law was 
made to conform to changes in the commercial code which brought Japanese 
regulations into l ine with international practice. Another significant amendment in 
the provision of the Japan ' s  commercial code involves Articles 2 1 0-2 and Articles 
280- 1 9 .2 1  Under these arrangements, Japanese companies intending to offer stock 
option plans in the form of treasury shares should obtain shareholder approval at the 
ordinary general meeting. The warrant stock option, for example, requires an 
amendment in the article of incorporation and approval of an extraordinary 
resolution.22 Previous restrictions on the number of shares offered to employees, for 
both types of stock option, no than 1 0  percent of the total issued shares, no longer 
appl ies. Although under Japan ' s  securities law, the term of public offering provides 
clear guidelines on the number of share participants in stock option plans, which are 
also considered as a publ ic offering. 
20 As an example, if the business assets hold for one ful l  year, the rate is reduced from 40 percent to 20 percent and 10 percent 
tor two ful l  years. By following the Schedule 23, Finance Act 2003 companies established share plans are able to claun tax 
relief on the cost funding, nevertheless it l imits to the certain circumstances such as it applies for the accounting periods 
beginning or after I "  January 2003. 
2 1  The Article 2 1 0- 1 2  indicate that the stock option plans offer by the means of treasury shares and Article 280- 1 9  emphas1ze 
such plan in the fonn of warrants. 
22 The resolution for warrant stock option must consist of a quorum ofsharel10lders which representing by one-half of the total 
i ssued shares and the two-third of shareholders voting right, represent this resolution. 
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In the case of a publ ic offering,23 securities registration statement must be prepared 
and filed prior to the acquisition of shares wi l l  be deemed a prospectus. In 
accordance with the amended code, the provision in the Securities and Exchange 
Law requires compan ies to make a disclosure about such plans based on the 
aggregate value.24 If companies establ ish a treasury stock option plan through 
repurchase by a tender offer, they are required to prepare a pre facto report and file it 
with the Minister of F in ance. Further, the Tokyo Stock Exchange has published rules 
for treasury stock options so as to encourage timely disclosure and seemingly 
produced an impact on the application of insider-trading provisions. For the warrant 
option plan, a company must provide the information at the time of resolution. 
Moreover, Japanese l isted companies are required to provide information when 
issuing a stock option plan as well as to fi le a report when stock options are 
exercised. 
In relation to a tax qual ification for a stock option plan, Japanese companies are 
allowed to defer tax payment until the time of sale. In contrast, a foreign company 
offering a stock option plan is not el igible to claim the benefit. In addition, the whole 
of the capital gains tax may be imposed on employees when they make the ultimate 
sale of the shares. In terms of the costs incurred for compensatory stock options, 
there is no tax benefit offered by the Japanese government for local and foreign 
companies. It suggests that any expenses related to stock option plans are not eligible 
for a claim for any deduction. 
3.2.4 Stock option plans in Singapore 
The general ru les relating to the offering of shares to the public require the 
preparation of a prospectus in accordance with the Securities and Futures Act of 
200 I (SF A). However, the establishment of stock option plans without a prospectus 
" Under the general rules, public offering of securities for more than 50 persons and subject to certain registration and 
disclosure requirement. However, the stock option grant for one person is also considered as public offering. 
" For example, Para I ,  Article 4 for public offering more than I 00 mi l l ion yen and provide to a 50 person or more must tile the 
securities registration statement with the Prime M inister prior the commencement of the plan. 
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is a l lowed, but only if it fal ls within the exemption requirements?5 Furthermore, a 
company unable to meet the exemption requirements is required to issue a 
prospectus?6 And before the commencement of a stock option plan, the company 
must obtain shareholder approval at a general meeting. With regard to stock option 
grants for directors and employees, the available shares are subject to a restriction 
value of not more than 20% of outstanding shares. The l isting manual of Singapore 
Exchange Securities Trading Limited (SGX-ST) prescribes that shares acquired 
through stock option plans for each controll ing shareholder must not exceed 1 0  per 
cent - and in total cannot exceed 25 per cent - of the aggregate number of shares 
avai lable. However, this event is subject to the approval of independent 
shareholders.27 
Pursuant to Singapore law, companies may issue stock options in two ways : using 
e ither existing shares, or unissued shares. Under the Companies Act, a company is 
not al lowed to buy its own shares unless it is permitted to do so by its constitutional 
documents. Moreover, a company may acqu ire shares equal to a scheme approved in 
the previous general meeting, through agreement by a special resolution or by 
redemption. For a continuing plan, there are no requirements for the same stock 
option plan, apart from the disclosure requirements in the annual reports. 
Included in the Companies Act is a requirement for directors who own a 
shareholding interest in a Singapore company to disclose and maintain a register of 
such plans, particularly on the acquisition and disposal of stock options. In fact, 
d irectors are required to provide notice in writing within days after the appointment 
of al l  interests in the company. Under the companies Act, a company is obl iged to 
update the register with in three days after receipt; the information is avai lable 
through common public announcement on the SGX-ST website. 
" The exemption requirements include the requirement of stock option plans provide by Singapore Company, the employees do 
not receive any inducement to buy shares by an expectation of employment or continued employment and no expenses incurred 
i n  connection with the securities offered unless fees for services rendered. 
2" The contents of a prospectus should contain sufficient provide information that investors or advisers would reasonably made 
assessment on the companies. 
" Singapore Exchange Securities Trading l imited (SGX-ST) listing manual prescribed that shares acquisition through stock 
option plans for each controll ing shareholder cannot exceed I 0% and in total not exceed 25% of the aggregate number of shares 
available. 
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It should be evident on the basis of the increased use of stock options in the countries 
whose regulatory arrangements we have discussed, that there are advantages 
associated with stock option plans. Overall, and because the advantages of stock 
option p lans far outweigh their d isadvantages, this has encouraged the Singapore 
government to put in place initiatives designed to foster greater use of option plans. 
One particular in itiative designed to make the most of stock options is in the area of 
taxation. Such incentives are being extended to other forms of equity with a 
m inimum holding period, which produces a sim i lar effect to the m inimum vesting 
period. Under S ingapore taxation rules, three equity-based compensation schemes 
enj oy tax benefits: qualified, entrepreneurial and company. Each of these schemes is 
subject to different requirements, which is the purpose behind its introduction. 
The current practice where the tax treatment of stock option plans is concerned 
indicates that employees wil l  be taxed on gains during the exercise of the option, and 
when the market value is higher than the exercise price. Private companies also 
provide stock option plans to employees where the market share price is not read ily 
determined, and in such cases the controller of income tax wi l l  indicate the share 
value based on the net asset of the shares. In relation to expenses incurred to bear the 
plan, there is no provision in the income tax legislation that allows for deduction. 
However, it may be argued that expenses on stock option plans improve employees' 
performance and profits, which makes them allowable for deduction. 
3.3 Regulatory framework governing stock option plans in Malaysia 
As mentioned earlier, stock option plans are not a new phenomenon to Malaysia, 
since they were first used as early as 1 99s. Throughout the 1 990s, it is ind icated that 
Malaysian public l isted companies (PLCs) on the Bursa Malaysia began to use stock 
option plans as part of their compensation package for employees (Ariff, Mohamad 
and Nassir, 1 998). The development of employee stock option plans in Malaysia did 
not foresee the Asian financial and economic crisis in 1 997, and although the impact 
of the crisis did not affect the Malaysian economy as deeply as other Asian countries 
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the grant s1ze of Malaysian PLCs with employee stock option plans were 
sign ificantly affected . F igure I shows the varied trend in the size of stock option 
grants for the period 2004-2009. It is evident from figure I that Malaysian 
companies increased the grant size of equity sharing in times of good market 
performance, as indicated by the pattern for the period 2004 and 2007, when the size 
of option grants reached a peak and decreased in 2008 and 2009. This trend was 
primari ly due the slow recovery from the downturn in  economic activity in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis. 
Figure 1 :  Number of existing of stock option plans in Malaysia 2004-2009 
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The information regarding practice of setting up eligibi l ity criteria for stock option 
p lans in Malaysia indicate that the value of stock option plans are heavily allocated 
to employees, instead of management levels .  The evidence shows that managements 
are no longer the predominant holders of stock option plans within Malaysian PLCs. 
However, in view of the fact that Malaysian corporate sector is dominated by a 
significant involvement of owners in management, as represented by family owned 
firms, this may give rise to potential of agency problems which also raises a number 
of corporate governance issue among Malaysian PLCs. One way to prevent such a 
problem is through the establ ishment of stock option plans in the spirit of regulatory 
and public pol icy as set out in local Jaws. While the regulatory framework could 
serve as a gu idel ine on how plans should operate, based on information obtained on 
best practice from variations in stock option plans from one country to another. 
70 
Taking into consideration the role of law in  other countries, it seems that an 
exhaustive regulatory framework would be the best cure for the problems m 
Malaysian corporate governance. And although Malaysian law has developed 
organically, it is physical ly structured on the basis of the Anglo-Saxon model of the 
U .S .  and U .K28 . The present law is largely borrowed from the U.K.  and although 
Malaysian corporate and securities laws have been recently reformed, the actual 
reforms are widely viewed as not going far enough in overhaul ing particular 
provis ions. Unl ike U.S .  and U.K. corporate and securities law, some parts of 
Malaysian corporate and securities law are not applied as strongly and at times are 
not equally enforced. As result, the system in  place gives the impression of being 
unable  to provide very c lear legal guidance and is often quite s low in making 
progress towards law enforcement. And although corporate and securities law has 
undergone a comprehensive reform programme, the reforms are not sufficient to 
ensure the del ivery of strong corporate governance practice. For example, although 
the report on Corporate Governance Country Assessment for Malaysia undertaken 
by the World Bank indicates that Malaysia i s  one of the best ranking countries in 
Asia, in terms of legal frameworks for corporate governance, in reality th is is not 
reflected by its achievements29. Although new initiatives have been put in place by 
the regulatory bodies in order to reap the perceived benefits from the changes; such 
in itiatives are always implemented on 'a piecemeal basis ' .  While the lack of a 
coherent review process often means there is a Jag in the process of legal reforms. As 
response, Pascoe (2008) suggests that the main reason for these fai l ings is due to 
weaknesses in the rule of law in Malaysia and the degree of pol itical influence on 
corporate control . 
Returning to the framework governing stock option plans in Malaysia, the mam 
focus and attention of the underdeveloped legislative mechanism suggests that 
reforming the main statute is not sufficient to ensure exclusive legislation to guide 
the operation of stock options. In fact, the existing regu latory framework on ly 
considers three factors that worth noting with respect to its usefulness. Th is includes 
n In the Anglo-Saxon countries apply a common law system in which more freedom in formulating incorporation acts 
" Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Malaysia, June 2005, World Bank. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ro 
7 1  
the basic conditions, approval procedures and disclosure of stock option plans. As a 
result, a d ifferent source of laws is required aimed at providing a more 
comprehensive l egal structure; one with clear directions on how to successfully 
implement such p lans. 
Other than the Companies Act and the Securities Industry Act of 1 983, which was 
l ater repealed, there are four legal sources governing corporate activities namely the 
Securities Commission Act of 1 993, the Capital Market and Services Act of 2007, 
the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements and the Common Law. Instead of 
reviewing the existing regulatory framework for the purpose of devising regulation 
that can accommodate the requirements of developments in the use of stock options, 
the authorities have always opted to push through initiatives which invariably are not 
consistent with current needs. On this issue, Sheehan (2009) points out that despite 
the piecemeal approach, the Malaysian government are wil l ing to al low sufficient 
room for the market to shape the practice of stock option plans without imposing any 
legislative constraints. 
As the Asian financial crisis of 1 997 provides a useful starting point in helping to 
identify what is precisely the true picture of weak governance practices among 
Malaysian PLCs. The government of Malaysia had already put in place a rel iable 
corporate legal framework; however it has been argued that the reason for the crisis 
in Malaysia was due to the existence of fragi le financial structures, ineffective 
boards, audit committees, and poor quality disclosure of information. Thus the 
corporate collapse and scandals that resulted were primari ly due to a lack of effective 
laws to protect investors, combined with a lack of transparency in the regulatory 
processes. 30 In response to the inherent weaknesses in Malaysian corporate and 
securities regulatory framework, the Malaysian government was forced to put in 
place a comprehensive law reform programme d irected towards enforcing the 
Capital Market Master plan, the Code of Corporate Governance and a revamping of 
the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. To a degree these initiatives had the 
desired effect in helping to improve corporate governance practices in Malaysia, 
10 Phi l ip et al . (2007). Corporate Governance in Malaysia: Regulatory Reform and Its Outcomes, Asian Productivity 
Organization. 92- I 28. 
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though the evidence reveals a less impressive governance culture, since Malaysia 
remain i n  6 position in corporate governance rankings3 1 . However, it is noteworthy 
to note that the evidence indicates that Malaysian corporate governance improved in 
terms of the form rather than in substance of corporate governance arrangements. 
A lthough m uch d iscussion suggests that corporate governance fai lure in widely held 
firms, but the assumption typical ly greater insider ownership leads to better 
corporate governance produces contrasting result for Malaysian corporate sector 
which is h igh-dominated with fami ly-owned firms. This is consistent with Claessens 
et. a! (2000) and Morck et.al (2004) pointed out that firms have dominant 
shareholders m ight ach ieve control resulted in the rent activities where the country 
they operated .  Moreover, Bebchuk et. a! (2000) indicates that in economy, as the 
fam i ly-dominated firms grow and tend to be larger, the benefit in the hand of these 
firms explain why the pyramidal firm is l ikely come to existence in Malaysia. This 
suggests that agency problems cause expropriation of shareholders does exist among 
Malaysia firms as similar to the problem described by Jensen and Meckling 
(Claessens et. a!, 2000). However, in most developed capital market l ike U.S .  and 
U .K. ,  La Porta et.al (1999) find that the role of non-leading fami l ies firms are 
control led not by fami ly members, but by professional managers. Even though, there 
is a concern that professional managers may fai l  in exercising their fiduciary duty to 
act for shareholders. The existence of strong boards committee decreases the agency 
problem through effective monitoring function . Moreover, the non-family firms who 
owned large ownersh ip is more l ikely to take actions that increase the firm value. 
This shows that agency problems might be minim ized in wide held firms than those 
controlled by fami lies. 
In essence, the Malaysian regulation applied stock option plans is very sim ilar to that 
in the U .K., except that some parts of the law tends to be enforced in a preferential 
ways. Table 2 provides a brief guide on the degree to which the Malaysian 
government are push ing through with plans to update the regulatory framework in 
3 1  CLSA/ACGA:"Stray not into perdition: Asia·s CG momentum slows". Available at http://wwwacga­
asia.org/publ iclti les/CG _Watch_ 20 1 0  _ Extract_Final. pdf 
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l ine with international standards. Among the initiatives, the Companies Act of 1 965 
has been passed more than 30 times with amendments. However, some of the 
approaches taken have often been on a piecemeal basis and without their being a 
coherent review, leading to the establ ishment of the Malaysian Corporate Law 
Reform Committee (CLCR). 
Table 2 :  Regulatory initiatives on employee stock option plan (ESOP) in Malaysia 
Subject Action taken Steps Adequacy 
Supervision Supervisory Legislative proposal Legislative proposal High restrictive 
framework and involve 
jurisdiction 
enforcement 
Regulatory gaps Formulating Corporate Code of Practices Mandatory to 
M alaysian Governance Code l isted companies 
corporate and it has to be 
Governance applied as a part of 
Frameworks the listing 
obligation. 
Degree of Establish a capital The Minority The Malaysian Clearly revealed a 
confidence market framework Shareholder Corporate Governance selection score and 
to protect the Watchdog Group (MCG) Index criteria for 
interest of minority (MSWG) achievement. 
shareholders 
through shareholder 
activism. 
Risk Company Ratin g  Approved an Rating Criteria Highly adequacy 
management independent credit and it has been 
research and conducted with 
advisory -Rating collaboration of 
Agency Malaysia intemational 
agencies such as 
Standard & poor. 
Market Strategic Established the Working Group - Corporate Law 
application fi·amework Malaysian Working Group A on Reform 
Corporate Law Corporate Reform Company's Formation. Programme 
Reform Programme Committee (CLCR) Private Companies and 
of the Companies Altemative Forms of 
Commission of 
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Malaysia Business Vehicles 
Working Group B on 
Capital Raising & 
Capital Maintenance 
Rules 
Working Group C on 
Corporate Governance 
and Shareholders' 
Rights 
Working Group D on 
Corporate Securities 
and Insolvency 
Working Group E on 
Sanctions and 
Enforcement 
The CLCR serves as the starting point in the modernization of current practices in 
Malaysian corporate law and other jurisdictions, which allows it to determine 
important benchmark for changes and to decide on how far reaching reforms to the 
law in  Malaysia should be made. To date the CLCR has produced 1 2  consultation 
papers with some recommendations for core provision . Some of the 
recommendations have come into force via the Companies Act.32 And as Pascoe 
(2008) points out, although other significant recommendations for core provis ion 
have yet to be incorporated in the Act, however, some of law reforms may cause to 
become overdue. 
Another issue surrounding the Malaysian regulatory framework that has received 
attention in connection with stock option plans relates to tax concessions. Although 
tax benefit has not been clearly introduced under the Malaysian regulatory 
framework, however, it has received the attention of the Malaysian government 
which has taken steps to promote the growth of such plans. As an indication on how 
far developments have reached, stock option plans may now be cons idered as a tax 
shelter when it defers tax obligation until employees exercise the options. The 
" "High Level Finance Committee, Report on Corporate Governance, February 1 999 
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benefit i s  l i able for tax in the year the option is exercised. Thus the timing of 
exercise i s  important and employees must decide on when they prefer to exercise 
their options. 
Regarding the maJor changes to the tax rules affected the stock option plan in 
M alaysia began in 2006 when the tax ruling on stock options changed . However, it 
less produce incentive for stock option plan establ ishment except for tax treatment 
o n  how to determine tax calculation value. In particular, before the year of 
assessment, which in effect was 2006, any benefits received from stock options by 
employees were deemed as gross income and therefore subject to income tax. The 
value of income from each share was determined based on the d ifference between 
the market price of the share on the date of the offer and the d iscounted price for 
each share. It should be noted that th is does not take account of the market value of 
the stock on the date when the stock option was exercised . Thus n o  tax was imposed 
if the exercise price of the stock option was set at the market price on the grant date. 
However, and given the new tax rul ing which came into effect in 2006, the value of 
the benefit of each stock option is now determined based on the d ifference between 
the market price on the date the stock option is exercised or exercisable, whichever is 
lower, and the discounted price offered by the employer.33 Although there are no 
capital gains tax on equities, except on gains from the disposal of shares in a real 
property company incorporated in Malaysia. With regard to a company's costs on 
the arrangement of compensatory stock options, the deductibility of such expenses 
wi l l  only be permissible if the cost is incurred by the offshore parent company and is 
incurred 'wholly and exclusively' in the production of business income.34 The 
allowable cost also covers the maintenance of the stock option plan or 
reimbursement to the parent company. 
11 Exercisable date means the date when the right shall be exercised, assigned, released or acquired if the right is exercisable on 
a specitied date or otherwise. 
" Section 33 ( l ) of the Income Tax Act 1 967. 
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3.4 Concluding remarks 
The motivation in  th is  essay was to investigate the legal and regulatory frameworks 
govern ing stock option plans in Malaysia and to appraise the regulatory framework 
governing  stock option p lans in  the U.S, the U.K.,  Japan and Singapore to emphasize 
the d ifferences i n  regulatory arrangements. In thi s  respect I have provided evidence 
that confirms that stock option plans in Malaysia  do not produce incentives to the 
target groups which suggests that the role of the regulatory mechanisms is to 
accompl ish that goal . I also noted that the regulatory aspects governing stock option 
plans in Malaysia involved a series of amendments which enabled the Malaysian 
government to respond to current needs. It was noted that since Malaysian laws are 
d iffer from developed countries that parts of the law currentl y  in place is not as 
strong or as equally enforced in  Malaysia. As a result, the legal framework 
governing stock option plans would appear not to provide clear guidel ines, while 
only making s low progress towards law enforcement. As noted in our discussion, the 
regulation applied to stock option plans is quite simi lar to that practiced in the UK, 
though some part of the law as enforced varies in a preferential way. As a result, the 
Malaysian government is always preoccupied with updating the regulatory 
framework in  l ine with international standards. 
In relation to the legal environment a number of initiatives have been carried out, 
although some of the approaches taken have often been on a piecemeal basis and 
without coherent review. Nonetheless, what in itiatives that have been implemented 
have led to the establ ishment of a law reform committee which serves as a starting 
point in the modernization of current practices in Malaysian corporate law. The role 
of the committee in other jurisdictions is also considered a key determinant in 
establ ish ing benchmarks for change and response to what is required in the reform of 
Malaysia ' s  corporate law. However, the fai lure to incorporate in the act some 
significant recommendations for core provision may cause steps taken to reform 
Malaysia's corporate law to fal l  behind schedule. 
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ESSAY 2 
4.0 : THE EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION 
PLANS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
4.1  Introduction 
Our motivation in this  essay stems from the need to ascertain whether the granting of 
executive stock options plans is an effective mechanism that motivates managers 
sufficiently to increase firm performance. In relation to executive stock options, 
success stories concerning stock option plans in developed countries have spurred 
companies in emerging markets to adopt simi lar plans for executives. Prior 
developed countries studies provide evidence which suggests that incentives in the 
way of stock option plans closely align the interest of managers with that of the 
owners of the firm - that is, the shareholders. Thus both managers and shareholders 
share the same goal of maximising firm performance. However, it should be noted 
that stock option plans are not always a perfectly effective method for increasing 
firm value, but are effective nonetheless in dimin ishing agency problems. For 
example, when managerial ownership increases, evidence suggests that agency 
problems are reduced, which further lends credence to the view that stock option 
plans are preferred for reducing agency costs rather than increasing profits. To date 
the empirical results relating to the effects of executive stock options on aligning the 
interest of managers and shareholders in an effort to improve firm performance for a 
number of developed countries are mixed, though the l iterature suggests that the 
benefits resulting from the use of stock option plans far outweigh the perceived costs 
or weaknesses. It is  known that stock option plans do create costs for shareholders. 
And whi le the recipient group gain, the least contribution to the firm is from the 
same recipients. It is argued that an excessive value of stock option grants for 
managerial ownership creates a negative affiliation between stock option plans and 
firm perfonnance. Y ermack ( 1 997) and Ding and Sun (200 1 )  note that one should 
not ru le out the possibi l ity that management behaviour directed towards exploiting 
internal information for the purpose of maximising self-interests at the expense of 
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shareholders may worsen the effects. A particular concern, however, is whether 
managers' goals are truly al igned with those of shareholders thereby leading to 
enhanced firm value. 
Having already establ ished the motivation of our research, it is important to note the 
relevance of the topic analysed in this essay. The effects of executive stock options 
on firm performance have received an increasing share of research effort over recent 
decades. This is in part a consequence of a trend in the use of such instruments as an 
incentive mechanism in  developed countries. A large number of emerging markets, 
including Malaysia has implemented programmes based on the successful  use of 
stock options in  developed countries and as to be expected studies based on data 
from Malaysia. Among the reference study in South-east Asian countries, such as 
S ingapore has examined whether stock option plans do in fact have an effect on firm 
performance. A study by Y eo, Chen, Ho and Lee ( 1 999) find no interaction between 
stock options and improved post firm performance while Ding and Sun (200 1 )  report 
m ixed results for the effects of stock option plans on firm performance, though they 
point out that shareholders react favourably  to stock option plans. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only Malaysian study to have examined the impact of stock option 
plans on market reaction and firm performance is the work of Obiyatulla et al. 
(2009) who found that firm size determines performance level among the broad­
based stock option plan firms, since the Malaysia capital market might anticipate the 
outcomes. There are also find that broad-based stock option plans fai l  to fulfil the 
evidence of interests aligning as predicted because Malaysian shareholders are 
mostly loose while benefits go directly to selected beneficial groups. 
Therefore, in response to the extracted conclusions from prior empirical findings in 
most developed markets as wel l  as the in itial result by Obiyatul la et.al (2009), th is 
essay is  specifically used the Malaysia executive stock option plans dataset wi l l  add 
to a debate on what extent of firm performance plays a good indicator to estimate if 
the specific objective of stock option plan is met. Reviews of previous studies 
suggest a positive financial outcome response for a short-term, particularly in post ­
adoption plan, using a richer Malaysian dataset produce new evidence for the effects 
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of executive stock option plans on the performance. In th is context, emphasis is 
placed on uncovering issue whether the announcement of stock option plans have a 
favourable  effect on firm performance in the short-tenn as wel l  as in  the long-term. 
In al l ,  I examine the nature and characteristics of adopting stock option plans, as well 
as the market reaction to the announcement of stock option plans based on a number 
of performance measures. To progress the study I split the data used into event 
characteristics which al lows us to then make inferences on the difference between 
first-time announcements and seasonal announcements, as wel l  as the target groups 
such as stock option plans to all employees and executive, stock option plan to 
executives and stock option plan to employees only. Al l  variables util ised in the 
study reflects the main features covered by stock option grants. The second 
contribution of this essay is to explore the findings of Obiyatul la et al. (2009) who 
report in his study of Malaysian firms that stock option plans had no effect in 
aligning the interests of agents, which is contradicts the work of Jensen and 
Meckling ( 1 976).Therefore, th is essay differs from and add to the few papers in the 
Malaysia existing l iterature that have tried to examine firms without stock option 
plans are having an effect on their financial outcomes. This vital that this study to be 
carried out to make a distinction for impact of executive stock option adopting firm 
on firm value using dual performance measures (accounting and market-based 
measure) . 
The rest of this  essay is organised as fol lows. Section 4.2 discusses the empirical 
approach used to investigate the effects of executive stock option plans on finn 
performance. Section 4 .3 describes the data used to investigate the effects of 
executive stock option on firm performance, while section 4.4 presents the empirical 
results, in the first instance, for the short-term effects and, second, for the long-tenn 
performance effects of executive stock options and proceed to discuss the central 
findings from our empirical investigation . Section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2 Empirical methodology 
A. The short-term effects of executive stock options 
One of the main  goals of this  study is to assess the response of Malaysia's stock 
market response to the arrival of short-term announcement of executive stock option 
p lans. In this  context, a large number of models have appeared in the economics and 
finance l iterature to investigate such announcements and these models in turn 
provide us with a practical way of assessing factors that move individual stock prices 
and is thus the main reason why I chose the event study methodology which is a 
branch of econometrics to answer our research questions. On the understanding that 
stock prices reflect the underlying economic values of securities, changes in the 
value of stock prices can be expected to capture changes in the profitabi l ity of the 
firm .  This also requires us to accept the hypothesis that stock markets are efficient 
and that prices reflect all relevant publ icly available information relating to the 
prospects of Malaysian firms. Thus the effect of an event, such as the announcement 
of a stock option plan, wil l  be reflected almost immediately in stock prices. For 
when new information reaches efficient markets, share prices can be expected to 
react immediately, though it is noted that information leakages reaching the market 
before the official announcements can also have a damaging effect. 
Event models consist of identifying the event and testing for excess profit. Tests are 
constructed in such a way that they detect abnormal performance. There are two 
broad approaches that have been applied when conducting the tests: parametric and 
non-parametric. The parametric approach is usual ly based on a standard t-test. In the 
case of event studies methodology, standard t-test is used to check whether the 
residuals are statistically different from the normal student t distribution. The 
numerator of the t-test represents the abnormal returns for a particular date while the 
denominator scales the top part by the level of dispersion or the standard deviation of 
a given time series. The present study includes a test which examines whether the 
announcements have content value that provides a signal l ing effect in the market. 
The selection criteria from ful l  sample (n=1 77 firms) for the event are accepted if the 
fol lowing firm holds: 
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a) The announcement clearly indicates the beneficial group of stock option 
p lans (only 83 firms  included). 
b) The announcement date is clearly printed in a press release and the stock 
exchange (only  83  l i sted firms included). 
c) The proposition firm had been I isted for at least 21 0 trading days prior to the 
plan announcement in order to ensure firm contained sufficient information 
and all 83 firms are included. 
d) Further investigation on the selected firms were carried out for ensuring that 
no confounding events leading to share price changes or unrelated events to 
the stock option plan exists. And after removing firms with extreme stock 
option plan announcements, final ly, 58  l i sted firms are fulfil the above 
criteria. Al l  the firms correspond to 4,989 stock option announcements. 
The determination of event dates is a key part in the event study analysis .  Thus based 
on the regulatory guidelines of Malaysia, the establishment of stock option plans 
with listed companies is subject to three event dates. The first event date is an 
approval date from the company's board of d irectors regarding the issuance of new 
shares appl icable to any l isted companies implementing stock option plans. The 
second event date is the in itial consent of the company's board and shareholders 
decision to grant stock options, whether at the annual general meeting (AGM) or 
extraordinary general meeting (EGM). Once approval is obtained, the l isted 
company immediately informs the Malaysia Bourse and makes a public 
announcement about the executive stock option (ESO) appl ication on both its 
website and its stock monitor. Although the listing date on the website might 
consider the third event date, its l isting is subject to shareholders' approval whether 
in the AGM or EGM. However, 2004 requ irements indicate the approval of the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) for stock option plans prepositions are no 
longer effective. Based on the chronology of events, the event dates include a day the 
company has its board meeting to approve the plan, the date of public disclosure on 
the stock mon itor and the dates to allot and implement the plan. The board meeting 
date for stock option plan approval is chosen as an event day and there are 58 
companies included as a clean sample. 
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In respect to non -selected sample firms, this  study excludes firm without sponsor 
stock options p lan or stock option plans that establ ished before 2000. Most of firms 
are call ed as "unknown event date" or "missing data" since the detailed data was not 
avai lable .  As most of the past studies create comparator groups, I use the Bursa 
Malaysia l isting circulars to construct the groups that includes firm that sponsor 
employee stock option plans only, executive stock option plans only and 
combination between executive and employee stock option (broad-based stock 
options). However, the comparators groups cannot be constructed due to same firm 
and same year offer more than one stock option plan, therefore to avoid redundant in 
sample, final ly 58 firms were chosen. A detailed and identified the population on the 
firm with stock option programs, the process of selection of the final sample as 
fol lows: 
Descriptions Number 
of firms 
Firms with stock option programs as l isting in 1 77 
Companies announcements. 
After deduction of unknown event date, sponsor 94 
stock option before 2000 and missing data 
After deduction of firms with extreme 25 
announcements and events leading to share price 
changes or unrelated events to the stock option 
p lan exists. 
Final sample 58  
The standard event study methodology requires that each time a firm 's security i s  
selected an event day is  generated, in  our case the trading day of January 2000 and 
December 20 1 0. The event day is designated as day '0 '  for each security with a 
maximum observation of dai ly return for at least 2 1 0  trad ing days around the actual 
event. The longer observation period for 2 1 0  days might guarantee a more precise 
parameter assessment. The time frame covers the event effect in each security 
around its respective event which commences on day - 1 99 and ending on day +60. 
Estimating the parameter is designated within the period of - 1 99 through -6 1 trading 
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day, and the fol lowing estimation for the event period is determined by a time 
window of 5 trad ing d ays prior to, and 5 days fol lowing the event date. If there is a 
significant event such as the announcement of quarterly earnings or the 
announcement of d ividends at the same time as a stock option plan which is believed 
to impact the capital market, then the event window wil l  be observed for 60 days 
around the actual event day .  
To measure the abnormal return, I use two statistical models. These are the market 
model and the market-adjusted model. Despite their simple representation, these 
models can be effectively used in the event study methodology. For each firm the 
dai l y  abnormal return of each stock) at time t is calculated from the fol lowing: 
( 1 ) 
Where Ri,t is the rate of return on stock j for event day T. To detect the abnormal 
return, it i s  necessary to define the event time, t. In this study, the event date is 
defined as, t = 0, the event window is represented by T = T1+ 1 to t =  T2 and finally, t 
= To + I  to t =  T1 is the estimation window. The length of the event window and the 
estimation window is given by the fol lowing equations: L2 = T2 - T1 and L1 = T1 - T0 
respectively. The post event window is t = T2 + T1 to t =  T3 . The length of the post 
event window is L3 = T3 - T2 . The event window for each firm for each day is just 
the difference between the actual return on day T and the expected return. The return 
of a given stock is  calculated as fol lows: 
(2) 
Where and the is the stock prices of firm j on the day t and LJ . The return on the 
market portfolio ( ) is calculated as: 
(3) 
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Where Pm,t , Pm,H are the market prices on day t and day t 1 , respectively. In 
accordance with the l iterature I make the assumption of the existence of a linear 
relationsh ip between the predicted return and the market index in the market model . 
For each equation, the regression is of the fol lowing form : 
(4) 
where and Rm,t are security and market returns at time t, respectively. and are the 
coeffic ients of the m arket model, and is a statistical error term . To determine the 
signal l ing effects of the release of information relating to the announcement of a 
stock option plan, Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) are used to capture the share 
price movement within the event window [t1 10 !2] of a given stock as fol lows: 
CARt t = r::.t ARl- teARt � = Ltt:_t AR t ·1 2 �..- :t � i '-·z - '1 1:.·� 
For each stock, the average cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as : 
(5) 
(6) 
The significance of calculating CAARs for the stock of each firm is to determine 
whether the announcement of a stock option plan impacts short-term market 
performance. This is accomplished by using the fol lowing: 
(7) 
After determining the announcement effects of a stock option plan I proceeded to 
verify the extent to which the returns abnormally constitute a market reaction to the 
actual announcement. I use the nonparametric rank test specified in Corrado ( 1 989) 
for the excess performance, which has sim ilarities with the standard t-test. However, 
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as opposed to the standard t-test, the rank of the abnormal return is used with the 
estimation period and event period treated as a single time series. 
To comm ence, I consider a sample of observations of abnormal returns in the event 
window for each N firms. To apply the nonparametric rank test, the rank of the 
abnormal returns for the sample period for each security is required. Accordingly, 
the h ighest rank is given to the h ighest price of the security for the sample period and 
v ice versa for the lowest rank (Lehman, 1 975) .  The rank test transforms the securities 
excess returns into a uniform distribution across ranks. Therefore, in the case of the 
nonparametric rank test, it is necessary to convert the given time series into its 
respective ranks. Accordingly, let Ku be the rank of abnormal return (AR1.1) of stock 
i, the Corrado ( 1 989) rank test requires the fol lowing test statistic: 
CT CT (8) 
where is the end of the event period, the rank of abnonnal return of stock i in 
t, the number of stocks, , the number of observations in the estimation and event 
period, and the average rank for all observations. I also apply the Wi lcoxon sign 
test, as the length of event window increases, which provides us with a more 
powerfu l  tool to assess the positive and negative abnormal returns to support the 
mean value [Cowan ( 1 992)] . 
B. The long-term effects of executive stock option plans 
As wel l as examining the short-term effects of executive stock option plans, I also 
examine the long-term effects in the use of such instruments. In the latter respect, 
there i s  substantial evidence on the assessment of stock option plans on long-term 
firm performance and the most common performance indicators apply in many 
studies use stock market return, asset return and equity return (Hall and Liebman, 
1 998; and Abdelaziz, Amine and Lanour, 201 1 ). In estimating the effects of the 
adoption of stock option plan on the firm level of performance, this study fol lows a 
86 
similar approach taken by Triki and Ureche-Rangau (20 1 2) who use panel data for 
three year before and after stock option grants. In specific, their study applies return 
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin ' s-Q for estimate the relation 
between performance and stock option plans.  
As previously mentioned, the accounting and market -based measures to represent 
performance, I choose a multivariate regression analysis in which the performance 
measures are calculated. Accordingly, the return on assets (ROA) is calculated with 
earnings before interest, tax and depreciation to total assets by percentage before and 
after stock option grants, while the return on equity (ROE) is set equal to net income 
before ordinary items divided stock option grants, and Tobin 's  Q is the ratio market 
value of share capital to the book value of total assets following stock option grants. 
Note that Tobin ' s  Q measures whether the firm 's market value is equal to 
replacement cost. If the ratio finds greater than 1 ,  then it implies that the company's 
share is  overvalued and vice-versa (see Defusso et.al, 1 990; Hi ll egist and Penalva, 
2004; and Langsman,2007). 
For eexplanatory variables employed, the size of stock option grants corresponding 
to the number of stock option awards at the time of the board meeting date divided 
by the number of outstanding shares at the closest fiscal year. S ince the expected 
effect of stock option grants may lead to improved firm efficiency through 
allev iation of the agency problem between managers and shareholders, the firm 
performance can be expected to improve (Triki and Ureche-Rangau, 201 2). It has 
been suggested that by isolating the consequences of the adoption of executive stock 
options and broad-based stock options that th is produces advantages (Hil legeist and 
Penalva, 2004). However, the effects between the beneficial groups might differ 
because executive levels have direct influence for decision-making and risk-taking 
behaviour. As a result, the prediction signs for ROA and ROE are positive in the 
following year of stock option grants, whi le Tobin's Q is expected to increase 
fol lowing the adoption of executive stock option plans, which can be expected to 
impact firm value (Triki and Ureche-Rangau, 20 1 2) 
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Regarding the effect of broad-based stock option grants to increase firm value, the 
expected coefficient sign could be a positive and negative because employees are 
less d irectly influenced by firm policy (Blasi et al ,  20 1 0) .  As a result,I also include 
further add itional variables in the regression equation to control for potential effects 
on firm performance. These control variables which are l ikely to affect the 
performance of firms  in our sample are spl it into firm characteristics and event 
characteristics (Triki and Ureche-Rangau, 20 1 2). The firm characteristics include 
leverage, the size of the firm and the growth of the firm . While the event 
characteristics proxy are by announcement types (first-time and seasonal) and 
beneficial or target groups (executive stock options and broad-based stock options) 
(see Landsman et,al,2007 ; Langmann, 2007; and Triki and Ureche-Rangau,201 2). 
The more specific control variables are a leverage variable equal to the log of total 
debt divided by total assets, which contends that high debt ratios might affect the 
firm 's growth and therefore result in less firm specific profit. It is generally argued 
that firm with large debt tends to reduce the s ize of their stock option plan .  From the 
debt holder's perspective, stock option plans are v iewed as monitoring instruments 
used to keep an eye on management incentives to m islead free cash flows, which is 
expected to improve finn performance (Triki and Ureche-Rangau, 20 1 2) .  The sim ilar 
predicted sign for the coefficient of the impact of stock option plans on the leverage 
ratio can be expected to have both positive and negative effects for Malaysian firm .  
The second control variable, the size of the firm, i s  measured b y  the logarithm of 
total assets. Prior studies report the size of the firm an important predictor of stock 
option grants which is relevant to firm performance and is frequently observed as a 
maj or determinant in compensation payments. Following studies by Mehran ( 1 995), 
Core,Holthausen and Larker ( 1 999) and Hi l legeist and Penalva (2007), the size of 
stock option is also used for examining the relation between stock option and 
performance. S ince larger size firms generate higher profits, as a result of benefit 
from economies of scale, it is argued that this  not only provides greater opportunities 
to create internal funds but also access to external sources of finance for undertaking 
investment projects (Obiyatul la et.al, 2009). Therefore, I would expect the size of the 
firm to have a positive on the adoption of stock option plans. The growth opportunity 
of the firm is measured by the log of market-to-book ratio, as many studies suggest 
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that h igh growth opportunities frequent ly indicate higher finn performance. 
Therefore, firms with h igh growth opportunities tend to allocate a large fraction of 
stock options i n  order to enhance managerial efforts towards generating profitable 
projects, especially firms that operate in the h ighest volati le industry (De Fusso et.al, 
1 990; and Hassan and Hoshino, 2007). From an agency theory perspective, firms 
with stock option p lans are l ikely  to implement them to reap the benefits from 
al igning the interests of employees and shareholders, which would also encourage 
m anagers to m ake better decisions to invest in  h ighly profitable projects on behalf of 
shareholders. Therefore, the ratio M/B is  used to capture the incentive effects, which 
is expected to generate a positive sign for stock option plans. 
For study the event-characteristic, the announcement of a stock option plan is  
represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 i f  the firm advertised the plan for the 
first-time, and 0 otherwise. The expected sign for coefficient is a positive, since the 
stock option plans granted to beneficiaries at the first-time of announcement can be 
expected to serve as an incentive for employees ' thereby resulting in improved firm 
performances (lkaheimo, et.al, 2004; and Triki  and Ureche-Rangau, 201 2). Whereas 
for target group is  also represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 ,  if the firm 
allocates the stock option plan to employees and 0 otherwise. The coefficient sign is 
expected to be negative since employees are less control by firm specific factors 
designed to increase firm value. 
In add ition, the intra-industry d ifferentiation of firms is an immediate concern, since 
stock option grants may reflect industry-based trends. In regard to this, the literature 
identifies industry membership  as a key factor in  broad-based stock option use which 
correlates to a firm ' s  performance. In particularly, firms issuing stock options with 
an intensity of retaining talented and skilful employees are viewed as high priority, 
and the same effect to firms involved in intensive research and development (R&D) 
activities. In a similar area of studies by Ittner, Lambert and Larker, (2003) argue 
that the retention of key employees is more crucial to technological firms and firms 
with a rapidly growing labour force. For this reason competition for employees 
among firms within the same industry is more volatile. Thus the granting of stock 
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options m i ght e l iminate the necessity of firm to adjust cash payments in order to 
reflect the state of the labour market. Nonetheless, Oyer (2004) notes that firm value 
is sti l l  essential for determining the value of stock option-based pay packages. 
A ccord ingly, industry-adjusted performance measures for ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q 
are measured three years after the announcement of a stock option plan .  
S ince our purpose is  to  assess the effects of stock option plans on firm performance, 
I employ the following performance production function: 
where i s  the accounting performance measures for firm i at t time (i = 1 ,  . . . .  , N; t = 
I ,  . . . .  , T), are respectively the size of stock option grant, leverage, firm size and 
growth of firm i at t time, and are the respective dummy variables relating to 
announcement types and target groups, represents firm-fixed effects, 's are slope 
coefficients and is a d isturbance term . A variety of specifications is estimated for the 
purpose of analysis using panel data of the announcement years of stock option 
grants. In the l iterature, this approach produces evidence of positive and negative 
performance outcomes associated with plan adoption decisions. 
4.3 Data descriptions 
Stock option p lans have been in operation in Malaysia since they were introduced by 
public l isted companies in 1 989 and since then plans have become more pronounced, 
particu larly in 2004 and 2007. Figure 2 shows the size of stock option grants, in 
percentage, over a twenty year period . As can be seen stock option plans for non­
executive employees, who are the predominant holders within Malaysian 
corporations, peaked in 2004 to approximately 1 6  per cent in 2004 and dramatical ly 
decl ined in size in 2009, while in contrast the compensatory stock option plan at the 
executive levels reveals very l ittle difference in the awarding trend over the same 
period . 
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A lthough data on the use of stock option plans have been around in Malaysia since 
1 990, I find it necessary to l imit the observation period due to l imited data and post­
performance analysis  requirements. The event window used in the present study 
covers the periods January 200 1 to December 20 1 0. The sample size consist of 1 77 
l i sted compan ies in  the Malaysia Bourse, regardless of the trading board and 
excludes companies engaged in merger and acquisition (PN 1 7, finance industry and 
m issing data). From the l ists, 83 firms have complete information and these are 
included in our sample.  All  financial information was col lected from the firms' 
annual reports and includes information on stock option grant sizes extracted from 
d irector reports and balance sheets. Stock option plans are evaluated based on the 
information on corporate performance. Data relating to the announcements of stock 
option plans were obtained from Investors Digest (Malaysia Bourse magazine) and 
the stock exchange website consisting of 7,945 proposition announcements. 
� 
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Fignre 2 :  Classification of stock options plan according to the hug et 
groups 
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Table  3 ,  Panel A d isplays the distribution of stock option plan announcements by 
Malaysia- l i sted companies for the period 2000-20 1 0. There are a total of 1 77 
companies that comprise the ful l  sample, which i s  approximately 2 1  per cent of all 
l i sted companies at the end of 20 1 0 . From the sample, I excluded companies with 
confounding events, which leaves 58 companies as our clean sample, which is 33 per 
cent of the ful l  sample which have implemented stock option plans. Analyses of the 
d i stribution of stock option plans, based on the max imum size of shares that could be 
awarded under this plan are shown in Table 3 ,  panel B, and as can be seen the 
maj ority of companies have 1 0  per cent of their issued capital . Panel C summarises 
the d istribution of stock option plans by option period under the ful l  sample, which 
ind icates that 43 per cent of the beneficiary groups are exercised within a one year 
period. From the clean sample it is clearly noticeable that 48 per cent of recipients 
purchased company shares after two years from the grant date. 
92 
Table 3 :  Employee stock option plans (ESOPs) by year of announcement, size of plan and 
option period 
PANEL A : Distribution by year of announcement 
Full sample Clean sample 
Announcement Year N % N o;o 
2000 12 6.8 3 5.2 
2001 0.6 1.7 
2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 
2003 92 52.0 26 44.8 
2004 38 21 16 27.6 
2005 9 5.1 2 3.4 
2006 10 5.6 3 5.2 
2007 13 7.3 7 12.1 
2008 0 0.0 0 0.0 
2009 0.6 0 0.0 
2010 0.6 0 0.0 
Total 177 100 58 100 
PANEL B :  Distribution by the size of the plan based on issued capital 
N o;o N 0/o 
5% of issued capital 4 2 3 5 
10% of issued capital 149 84 44 76 
I 5% of issued capital 16 9 9 16 
20% of issued capital 3 2 2 3 
25% of issued capital 5 3 0 0 
Total 177 100 58 100 
PANEL C: Distribution of option period (Month relative to grant date) 
N o;o N o;o 
0 to 12 76 43 26 45 
13 to 23 0 0 0 0 
24 to 36 74 42 28 48 
37 to 60 27 15 4 7 
Total 177 100 58 1 00 
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Further analysis of the data in  Panel A indicates that the distribution of stock option 
p lan announcements by Malaysia-l isted firms in each of the years from 2000 and 
20 1 0  in which the ful l  sample comprises 1 77 firms, while firms with compounding 
events (PN 1 7  and finance firms) are excluded from the clean sample. Panel B 
summarises stock option plan distribution by size, which refers to the maximum 
number of shares that can be issued under this plan,  and Panel C presents stock 
option p lan d istribution according to the option period ( i .e., the period over which 
the option can be exercised). 
The descriptive statistics summarised in Table 4 shows the event characteristics 
which identifies whether the firm establishes stock option plans for the first-time or 
seasonal announcements for any group of employees. Table 4 also shows the 
distribution of announcements and the conditions required for employees to be 
el igible included in a stock option program. Panel A also show that the percentage of 
firms with seasonal announcements is h igher than new stock option plans wh ich 
indicates that there are about 33 per cent of the firms with equity-based p lans in their 
compensation structures. For the new adoption plans, the results are marginally low 
with the h ighest percentage value observed in 2003 consisting of 1 6  per cent. A 
carefu l  examination of the data suggests that for eligib i l ity groups to which stock 
option plans were a l located, the majority recipients (80%) were targeted employees, 
which also suggests that non-executive employees were the predominant holders 
within Malaysian corporations as stock option plans evolved.35 
15 Detailed data on stock option plans distribution granted to various levels of executives is not available or d isclosed in annual 
reports or press releases announcements. 
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Table 4: Distribution of stock option plans over time of firms' exists and according to 
announcement events 
Year Initial "/o Seasonal % 
2000 0 0 2 
200 1 0 0 2 
2002 0 0 2 3 
2003 9 1 6  1 9  3 3  
2004 8 14 5 9 
2005 4 7 2 3 
2006 5 9 0 0 
2007 7 12 4 7 
2008 0 0 2 
2009 2 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 0 
Management 
(n=495) 
0 
0 
1 2  
23 
40 
44 
75 
1 00 
79 
1 22 
0 
% 
0 
0 
2 
5 
8 
9 
1 5  
20 
1 6  
25 
0 
Employee 
(n=3994) 
228 
1 79 
3 3 2  
424 
564 
48 1 
469 
727 
248 
342 
0 
% 
6 
4 
8 
1 1  
1 4  
1 2  
1 2  
1 8  
6 
9 
0 
Distribution of Malaysian stock option from the time of firm exists. And the announcement types 
indicate the firm establishes stock option programs at the first-time, while seasonal plan indicates that 
firm continues existing plan. Target groups refer to the recipient of stock options provided for executive 
position includes CEO, Chairman of boards, President, Chief Operating Officer, non-management board 
members, vice president, chief financial officer and divisional manager. Other than stated as executive is 
treated as employee. 
Regarding the price of Malaysian stock option plans, the resu lts show that most 
companies offer a stock option plan at a price below or close to market value. Table 
5 provides descriptive data which i l lustrates the results for exercising stock options, 
in contrast to the percentage of maximum shares allocated to firms announcing stock 
options plans within  a range of 5 per cent and 25 per cent of paid-up capital . 
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Table 5: Distribution of size of stock option plan and time to maturity 
Number of company Percentage of capital Average of maturity periods 
issued 
3 5% 6.67years 
44 1 0% 6.02 years 
9 1 5% 6 . 1 1 years 
2 20% 7.5 years 
Whi le the time to maturity of stock option plans comes within a range of 5 and I 0 
years on average, the maturity of plans to expiration is 6 . 1 2  years. Moreover, most 
granting firms have maturations of 5 years. These observations are consistent with 
previous studies which reveal the standard average time to maturity to be 6.2 years 
for Finnish companies, 5 .6  years for Japanese companies and 6.6 years for German 
companies (Ikaheimo et.al, 2004; Kato et.al, 2005 ;  and Langmann (2007). F igure 3 
shows that stock option plans based on business classi fications on average consist of 
30  per cent of the sample that employ compensation payments have been companies 
involved in industrial products. 
Figure 3 : Percentage of firms within each b usiness sector with 
stock option plans 
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It may be  argued that the nature of these businesses require talented staffs, given that 
such firms tend to operate on very short product l ife cycles. As a result stock options 
are used to recrui t  h igh ly talented workers for innovation and long-term business 
success. Other types of business classifications including trading-services comprise 
approximatel y  23  per cent of compensatory stock option plans, followed by 
construction ( 1 6  per cent), property ( 1 3  per cent) and consumer products (8 per 
cent). Business plantation, technology and IPC contribute less than 5 per cent. 
4.4 Empirical results for short-term market reaction to executive stock 
option plan announcements 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the results from our application of the event 
study methodology relating to the market's  reaction, in the short-term, to 
announcements of executive stock option plans. Table 6 report abnormal gains 
around stock option p lan announcement dates. Included are the mean, median and 
standard deviation which allows us to detect whether there are outl iers in our data. 
The standard deviation indicates how much variation exists fi·om the mean. A low 
standard deviation would indicate that the data is c lose to the mean, whi le a high 
standard deviation would indicate that the data is spread out over the mean. To 
determine the significance of abnormal gains, the study employs the Corrado and 
Wi lcoxon-sign rank test, which is a non-parametric test. 
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Table 6 :  Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) Surrounding the announcement day of stock 
option plans 
Event Days AAR (%) Z-Statistics Median CAR Wilcoxon % positive S .D 
p-value 
Day 1 0  before -0.84 0.05 1 6  0.0342 0.7 1 23 59 0.3508 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 9 before -0.85 0.7065 0.0356 0.8826 60 0.3526 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 8 before -0.25* I .6370 0.0288 10452 64 0.371 I 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 7 before -0.69 1 . 1 373 0.0304 0.7897 57 0.3777 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 6 before -0.80**  1 .792 I 0.0373 0.8904 60 0.3922 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 5 before - 1 .78 0.8788 0.0371 0.5497 59 0.3937 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 4 before - 1 6 1  0.5342 0.0345 0.5962 59 0.3904 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 3 before -2. 1 8  0.000 0.0382 0.6271 62 0.3902 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 2 before -2. 1 9  -0.448 0.0304 0.5497 59 0.3945 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 1 before -2.60 - 1 .4647 0.0348 0.5652 59 0.3979 
stock options 
announcement 
Announcement -2. 1 8  -0.603 1 0.0328 0.9 1 9 1  57 0.4050 
day 
Day 1 after - 167 -0.3 1 02 0.0395 0.7355 57 0.4083 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 2 after - 1 .77 -0.0689 0.0353 0.5807 55 0.4 1 05 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 3 after - 1 .34 0.5342 0.0407 0.0407 62 0.4066 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 4 after -0 . 86 1 .2234 0.0373 0.8 1 29 62 0.4020 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 5 after - 1 .34 -0.3446 0.0355 0.6 1 94 59 0.40 1 9  
98  
stock options 
announcement 
Day 6 after - 1 47 -04997 0.0338 0.5033 55 0.4064 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 7 after - 1 .34 - 1 .0339 0.0405 0.5653 57 0.4 1 1 8  
stock options 
announcement 
Day 8 after - 1 .6 1  - 1 .48 1 9  0.0443 0.5033 55 0.422 1 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 9 after - 1 . 85 - 1 .7404 0 0228 0.3949 52 04307 
stock options 
announcement 
Day 1 0  after - 1 .36 -0.4997 0.0350 0.5342 53 0.4301 
stock options 
announcement 
Notes: The modified test statistics follow Langmann (2004 ), where the abnonnal returns are independent and the relative efficiency of the 
Corrado rank test is equivalent to 95.5 % of the efficiency of the !-test. Therefore, the critical value for the Corrado rank test fol lows the table 
of the normal distribution as well as for the Wilxocon rank test.. ***,** and * indicate significance levels at I %, 5% and 1 0% on a one-tailed 
basis. The p-values for the m eans are based on the Corrado test, and the medians are based on the Wilcoxon Signed test SD is the standard 
deviation around the mean values. Announcement day refers to the day of stock option plans approved by shareholders at Annual general 
meeting. 
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Table  6 reveals a number of findings on share price reactions. F irst, on the day of 
announcement stock option p lan, there is no significant share price reaction in which 
the mean (median) return is -2 . 1 8  (3 .3)  per cent. The second analysis is share price 
performance before and after the announcement of stock option plans in which the 
results d isplay a negative reaction to the pre-announcement. It is quite noticeable that 
on the basis of the Corrado rank test that share prices generated a loss in returns from 
0 .84  to 2.60 per cent, indicating negative returns that are statistically significant at 
day-6 and day-8 before approval by shareholders at AGM. The abnormal returns 
show a slight decrease in loss of returns. In  regard to this, the negative mean value is 
documented at the day- 1 (- 1 .67 %) and day- 1 0  (- 1 .36 %) subsequent to plan 
announcements which suggests that if the share price movement does not respond 
favourably to the equ ity-compensation pay, the market would  anticipate negative 
news. It is  observed that the standard deviation is quite large relative to the mean 
values in  the range of abnormal returns which vary from the lowest of 0.35 on day-
1 0 before and the h ighest of 0.43 at day-9 after indicating that the result is 
insign ificant at to which is explained by the variabil ity of returns. 
The insigni ficant and negative share price reactions for pre- and post-announcement 
day may indicate for several reasons. First, the announcement of a stock option plan 
does not carry any good news to the market, whi le the negative values might be as a 
response of managerial behaviours to decrease share prices before the official 
announcements and push them afterward. Second, there is often quite a long process 
relating to the establ ishment of a stock option plan and if this  information become 
known to the market or there has an information leak before an official 
announcement the response may not be as expected, since the information would 
have already been factored by the market into share prices at the time of 
announcements (Ikaheimo et al., 2004; and Langmann, 2007). This finding also 
confirm conclusions reached by Kato et al .  (2005) and Langmann (2007), which find 
a positive reaction between share prices and stock option plan announcements, wh ich 
might reflect the content value of released information . This is very clear the stock 
option plan would seem to have an effect on share prices which is consistent with the 
previous find ings of Yermack ( 1 997) and Chauvin and Shenoy (200 1 )  who report 
some association with the timing of the announcements. Whereas, the insignificant 
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effect on returns at the event day might explain that stock options are for internal 
staffs do not have content value for the market. However, the observed negative 
mean values for the 2 1 -day event period does seem to suggest that the market 
anticipates good news of stock option plans for the particular groups, though clearly 
the shareholders would mostly lose due to the di lutive effects [Obiyatulla et al . 
2009)] . A plot of the AARs around the announcement date of stock option plans is 
shown in  F igure 4. 
Figure 4 :  AARs around the announcement day of stock option plans 
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To assess whether the announcement of stock option plans convey favourable news 
to the capital market, I consider the total impact of announcements released. For th is 
reason cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are used to capture the entire share price 
movement within the event window. The results reported in Table 7 displays the 
entire event period of 1 2 1  days from t = -60 and t = + 60 for the various event 
windows of share price reactions around the event date. The sample is disaggregated 
under different sub-announcement types as shown in Panel A, B and C. Panel A l ists 
the results for the ful l  sample, while Panel B provides the results for first-time 
announcements and Panel C shows the results relating to seasonal announcements. It 
can be seen that multiple event windows provide different effects over share prices 
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on  the announcement of stock option plans. For the entire event window of 1 2 1  days, 
the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs) for the ful l  sample announcement 
are insignificant for a l l  the event windows in which the highest return is 3 .26 per 
cent. When the CAARs value is spl it into two event windows before the [-60; 0] and 
after the [0; + 60] announcement, the CAARs remain insignificant although a 
positive return is observed before the announcement day. 
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Table 7 : Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) in the event window 1-60;+60) 
Event window CAAR Z -Statistic Median Wi lcoxon sign % positive 
rank 
Panel A : Full sample 
[-60; +60] 3.2633 0. 1 1 65 0.2702 0.8708 50 
[-5;+5] -0.0705 -0. 1 393 -0.0020 0.6271 45 
[-2;+2] -0 0887 -0. 1 6 1 4  -0 02568 1 .4245 4 1  
[-60,0] 3.2273 0. 1 1 52 0.2029 0.0774 48 
[-5,0] -0.0829 -0. 1 52 1  0.0025 0.9523 47 
[0,+5] -0.0823 -0. 1 597 -0.0256 I .3007 40 
[0;+60] -0.0588 -0. 1 1 97 -0.044 1 0.5729 45 
Panel B :  First-time announcement plan 
[-60; +60] 4.3773 0. 1 340 0.2036 0. 1 625 49 
[-5;+5] -0.0796 -0. 1 3595 -0.0020 0.3876 46 
[-2;+2] -0. 1 034 -0. 1 6237 -0.0270 I 1 253 39 
[-60,0] 4.3448 0 . 1 33007 0. 1 857 0.2250 48 
[-5,0] -0. 1 00 1  -0. 1 5852 -0.0175 0.8377 46 
[0,+5] -0.0904 -0. 1 5 1 29 -0.0344 0.8 1 27 43 
[0;+60] -0.0078 -0. 1 373 1 -0.05084 0.4376 44 
Panel C : Seasonal announcement plan 
[-60; +60] 0.3389 0.0467 03673 0.6464 53 
[-5;+5] -0.0468 -0.2432 0.0021 0.6464 4 1  
[-2;+2] -0 0498 -0.2702 -0.0 127 0.80 1 4  44 
[-60,0] 0.2938 0.0403 0.3273 0.5429 50 
[-5.0] -0.0377 -0.20 12  0.0321 0.3878 47 
[0,+5] -0.06 I 3 -0.3 3 1 4  -0.0 1 35 1 .2 1 5  I 38 
[0:+60] -0.0071 -0 0498 -0.0 1 14  0.336 I 47 
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The sample of cumulative abnonnal returns (CARs) comprises 58 companies using the beta market model for the estimation 
periods of day - 1 99 and day -6 1 .  The event day is the date the board approves stock option plans by shareholders. The 
significance level employs the generalised sign test, which is described in a study by Cowan ( 1 992). The Wilcoxon sign rank 
test for the median and the percentage (%) of positive CAR is also reported. 
From the table, one inference that could be drawn from the statistics is that the 
market has already incorporated the information in the share prices. It is for thi s  
precise reason why the event window [0; + 60] indicates a small share price reaction 
of 0 .06 per cent which may also be attributed largely to high returns before the event 
day. The results also show that for the event window of 1 1  days, the statistics 
indicate no positive share price reactions to the announcement of stock option plans.  
The findings relating to CAARs are negative suggesting that nothing was earned 
over several days in which the share price performance generated a loss in the range 
o f  0.07 and 0.09 per cent. 
Table 7 also show the Median values and percentage for the firms in our sample with 
positive abnormal returns during the event window. The statistics of median values 
are found not to be significant over the period examined. The results suggests, in 
terms of the overal l effects, that when Malaysian companies launch stock option 
plans they tend to have negative impacts on the capital market. Table 7 shows that in 
the event window of 1 2 1  days that 50 per cent of the firms in our sample have 
positive abnormal returns, and 60 days before the announcement day this was 48 per 
cent, compared to 45 per cent 60 days after the announcement. When compared to 
other regional studies in th is area, the results are in sharp contrast to those reported. 
For example, Kato et.al (2005) found positive market reactions, so too does 
Langmann (2007) who found that the percentage of positive abnormal returns among 
the sample of German firms included in his study on announcement day were about 
57  per cent, which is lower than the 7 1  per cent. The weak evidence of positive 
market reacti on is observable on announcement day, which suggests that stock 
option plan propositions have a negative signal ling effect on the market which 
represents a loss for shareholders. l n  regard to this, the findings of Yeo et al. ( 1 999) 
and Obiyatul la et al . (2009) note that the negative market reaction to stock option 
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plans i s  short-l ived whi le in  contrast, Langmann (2007) finds positive trends within 
the same event period.  
The reported weak evidence surrounding the market' s  reaction to the announcement 
of stock option p lans woul d  seem to argue against the hypothesis that the share price 
effects d iffer between announcement types. The hypothesis asserts that firms with 
first-time stock option plan announcements generate a positive effect on share price 
performance, compared to seasonal announcements. Previous studies in this area, 
such as for example, Yermack ( 1 997), Aboody and Y aznik (2000) and Chauvin and 
Shenoy (2005) report that stock option plans at the first-time sponsor have content 
value i n  markets conveying information about company performance. This suggests 
that first-time announcements should lead to favourable downward market reactions 
from the share price before the event day and upward thereafter. This is consistent 
with the results of the ful l  sample of this study, because we find no significant value 
in the reported median statistics between first-time and repetitive stock option plan 
announcements in Malaysia. This result can be concluded that the long process 
between the board approval date and the official announcement date lead to the 
result of information leakages before an official announcement. When the stock 
option plan is already known in the market, then the information is processed and 
factored through share price. The manager as potential shareholder through stock 
option plans might use any selective approach for increasing personal interests such 
release good news in order to influence the share price performance. 
Recently, there is an increasing trend of stock option plans allocation at managerial 
levels, which is more pronounced in a number of countries such as the U.S .  and UK 
and some Asian countries. This could be the reason behind much public criticisms 
directed towards the over-subscriptions of stock options among managerial levels 
being an immediate cost to shareholders (Ikaheimo, Kjel lman,Holmberg.and Jussila, 
2004). Because allocating a large fraction of stock options concentrated with specific 
target groups might cause a free-rider problem . Thus to exam ine the effects on 
Malaysian capital market the target groups are divided between the executive 
(managerial levels) and non-executive employees (non-managerial levels). For 
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executive employees this covers executive positions consisting of chief executive 
officer (CEO), chairman of the board, president, chief operating officer (COO), non­
management board member, vice president, chief financial officer (CFO) and 
d ivisional m anager (Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon, 2005). Non-executives encompass 
al l  employees other than the five most h ighly compensated executives, who are 
i dentified in  the proxy statement (Core and Guay, 200 1 ;  and Kedia and Mozumdar, 
2002; and Landsman, Lang and Yeh, 2007) split option grants between executive 
and non-executive, based on the nature of publ icly available data. Therefore, stock 
option plans are identified as broad-based i f  the substantial proportion of options is 
granted to al l  emp loyees. However, clarification to explain di lution effects on 
shareholder wealth might vary substantially. This study examines whether there is a 
d ifference in wealth effects associated between executive stock options and 
employee stock options. 
Table 8 d isplays test statistics relating to announcement types according to beneficial 
groups. For announcements of stock option plans  targeted to executive employees, 
the results d id not show statistically significant stock market reactions for any length 
of event windows. S im ilar evidence holds for stock option plans awarded to non­
executive employees. Panel A and B shows the entire event period under study [-60; 
+60] which indicate that the CAARs reacted positively for all target groups. Th is 
suggests that Malaysian investors responded optimistical ly  to stock option programs. 
However, the cumulated average of returns for the shortest period [-2; +2] reveal a 
negative reaction to the stock market as it resulted in a loss in returns of 0.002 per 
cent for executives and 0.097 per cent for non-executive employees. 
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Table 8: Test statistics for share price reaction to stock option plan announcements. 
Event window CAAR Z -Statistic Median Wilcoxon sign % positive 
rank 
Panel A :  Target group - executive levels 
[-60 ;  +60] 0.7880 0.2 1 03 0 .5090 0.0000 60 
[-5 ;+5] -0.044 1 -0.2302 0.003 1 0.0000 40 
[-2;+2) -0.00 1 9  -0.0 1 09 0.0 1 34 0.0000 40 
[-60,0] 0 .8205 0.2 1 82 0.4484 0.0000 60 
[ -5 ,0] -0.0330 -0. 1 739 0.0422 0.0000 60 
[0,+5] -0.0075 -0.0544 -0.0 1 42 0.0000 40 
[0;+60] -0.0289 -0. 1 765 -0.008 1  0.0000 60 
Panel B: Target group - non-executive levels 
[-60; +60] 3.4968 0. 1 1 94 0.2543 0.0797 49 
[-5 ;+5) -0.0730 -0. 1 385 -0.0072 0.5 1 35 45 
[-2;+2] -0.0969 -0. 1 692 -0.0278 1 .4784 4 1  
[ -60,0) 3 .4544 0 . 1 1 79 0 . 1 792 0.0000 47 
[-5,0] -0.0876 -0. 1 543 -0.0027 0.9030 45 
[0,+5] -0.0894 -0. 1 662 -0.03 1 0  1 .2748 42 
[0;+60] -0.06 1 6  -0. 1 203 -0.0451  0.5 1 3 5  43 
* * *, * * and * indicate a statistical significance at the 1 %, 5% and 1 0% levels. The significance level 
employs the generalised sign test, which is described in a study by Cowan ( 1 992). The Wilcoxon sign 
rank test for the median and the percentage (%) of positive are also reported. 
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Using the same event window length also generated results which are inconsistent 
with previous findings based on European market data (Ikaheimo, et al., 2004; and 
Thouraya and Ereche-Rangau, 20 1 2). When comparing the CAARs value for 60-day 
to announcement d ay, the results indicate that the loss in returns are relatively small ,  
particularly for 60-day after the announcement. Simi lar resu lts for both of  the 
sampled target groups may be attributed to higher returns before the event date. 
From the results, it appears that stock option plan announcements do not reveal any 
content value  to the stock market. Therefore, neither positive nor negative observed 
resu lts impact Malaysian stock market returns which is in l ine with the findings of 
lkaheimo et al . (2004) us ing Finnish stock market data. 
4.5 Empirical results for long-term effects of stock option grants on firms' 
performance 
This section presents and discusses results relating to the long-term effects of stock 
option plans on firm performance for three years fol lowing the announcement of 
stock options. The study fol lows Yeo et al . ( 1 999) by employing accounting 
performance measures such as the return on asset (ROA), the return on equity (ROE) 
and Tob in ' s  Q. The reported median value measures operating performance, while 
industry-adjusted performance is used to control for industry effects. The analysis of 
the long-term effects of stock option plans on firm performance highl ights the 
pattern of firm performance fol lowing the announcement of stock option plans, 
fol lowed by an analysis l inking firm characteristics and event characteristics. Table 9 
shows the pattern of performance measures for a sample of firms and industry, 
including a summary of the unadjusted and industry-adjusted year-on-year changes 
in which t_1 (one year before the announcement of stock option plan) is chosen as the 
base period . The overall analysis covers five (5) accounting years, which includes t1 
to t +  3 (three years before the announcement of stock option plans). 
The overall results provide an unclear pattern in accounting performance measures 
fol lowing the announcement of stock option plans. Compared to the base period 
(year- 1 ), the median firm change values are lower and weakly significant and 
suggests that the use of stock option plans by Malaysia-listed firms do not have a 
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strong influence on firm performance. If anything, the findings suggest that l isted 
firm s  with stock option p lans do not increase operating performance. This particular 
observation i s  consistent with the findings of Yeo et al . ( 1 999) who report no 
sign ificant change in the performance of Singapore l isted firms fol lowing the 
adoption of stock option plans. It is worth noting that the h ighest median changes 
observed in  year-2, and the negative in year-3 ,  indicate that the perfonnance of 
firm ' s  are not enhanced by the adoption of stock option plans but instead result in 
poorer firm performance. From the test results, the statistics for the median value is 
insign ificant and suggest that awarding stock options do not entirely reflect a firm's  
performance. However, i t  i s  also noticeable that when the median to industry­
adj usted change is replaced the results improve, since the number of positive median 
change is h igher than the negative value. This therefore tel ls us that the use of stock 
option plans does have an effect on firm performance. For example, it is evident 
from the stat istics that the industry-adjusted median changes from the base period of 
three fiscal years fol lowing the adoption of stock option plans are all positive. The 
result is somewhat inconsistent to earlier findings on the positive impact hypothesis 
in U.S .  studies such as Larker ( 1 983), Brickley, Bhagat and Lease ( 1985), Defusso, 
Johnson and Zorn ( 1 990) and Cresson (2007). Consistent results on positive returns 
are also shown in European studies offering stock option plans (Langmann, 2007; 
and Thouraya and Ereche-Rangau, 20 1 2).  
Nevertheless, going on the basis of the conclusions of studies on Asian countries 
there are positive share market reactions to stock option plans (Yeo et al., 1 999; Ding 
and Sun, 200 1 ; and Kato et al., 2005). However, the first Malaysian study carried out 
by Obiyatul la  et al. (2009) finds contrasting results between market reactions and the 
granting of stock option plans. However, the negative significant statistics for the 
median industry-adjusted change in ROA in year-3, as compared to the base period, 
indicate poor levels of profitabi l ity for the firms in our sample or that cash-strapped 
firms are l ikely to use stock options in place of cash pay. This particu lar result 
support the findings of Yennack ( 1 995) and Core and Guay ( 200 1 ), perhaps because 
the actual grant ing of stock options defer the impact of compensation on earnings 
since ROA reflects earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation to total assets. 
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Table 9 :  Accounting performance measures of firms for three years before and three years a fter 
stock options plan a doption 
Results of the change in operating performance 
Year - ]  to 0 Year - !  to I Year - I  to 2 Year - I to year 3 
Return on assets 
Firm median year- 1 - 4 . 1 266 
Industry adjusted median year] 1 .2226 
Median firms change -0.03 1 0.804 1 .234 -0.367 
Median industry-adjusted change -0.285 -0.684* 0.378 - 1 .243**  
Number of Observations 77 77 77 77 
Return on equity 
Firm median year 1 - 9. 1 479 
Industry-adjusted median year- ] - 1 .5323 
Median firm change -0.2 1 7  -0.539 1 .3 80 0. 1 82 
Median industry-adjusted change 0.88 0.81 1 .49 2 . 1 1 **  
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 
Tobins's Q 
Firm median year 1 = 0.996 1 
Industry-adjusted median year- I =  -0 . 1 148 
Median firms change 0.0 1 1 0.023 -0.003 -0.076 
Median industry-adjusted change 0 . 1 49*** 0 . 1 4 1 ***  0.045* 0.0 1 8  
Number o f  observations 77 77 77 77 
This table indicates the change in the accounting performance measures of tirms represented by return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE) and Tobin's Q from the one year before stock option plan announcement (year- ] ). Year 0 is the fiscal year in 
which the stock option plan i s  announced. The signiticance levels are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test *,** and *** 
describe statistical significance at  the 90, 95 and 99% levels, respectively. 
1 1 0 
4.5.1 Determinants of stock option plans 
The literature on stock options plans provides evidence which strongly suggests that 
firm level characteristics and event characteristics may have a potential effect on the 
long-term performance of firms. The results for both firm characteristics and event 
characteristics are d isplayed in Table 1 0 . The overall results, reported in Panel A, 
indicate positive statistical mean for al l  performance measures prior to and fol lowing 
the adoption of stock option plans. For examp le, fol lowing the adoption of stock 
option plans the m ean values for both ROA and ROE increase, suggesting that 
Malaysian finns are optimistic that the adoption of stock option plans will result in 
improvement in  corporate performance. Panel B indicates that when l inked to event 
and firm characteristics that on average firms with stock option plans issued 
1 1 ,258,668 shares fol lowing plan approval, which is approximately 7 per cent of 
outstanding shares. It is noticeable that the standard deviations for most 
characteristics are relatively high which also indicate the significance of observed 
factors influencing firm performance. 
I l l  
Table 1 0 : Average levels for three years before adoptions and three years after plan adoptions 
Variable Before Grant After 
N Mean Sd M in Max N Mean Sd M in Max N Mean Sd M in Max 
Panel A :Performance measures 
ROA 227 1 .72 1 .27 -3.47 5.09 249 1 .89 1 .20 -2.75 4.58 
ROE 227 1 .05 1 .1 6  -4.25 3.30 249 1 .25 1 .1 6  -3.1 8 3.88 
TO BIN'S 227 0. 1 0  0.39 0.02 2.40 249 0.05 0.40 -0.82 2.06 
Q 
Panel B :Event characteristics and Firm characteristics 
Grant (N) 83 I 1 ,258,668 1 2,278,1 64 477, I SO 52,590,000 
Size(%) 83 7.94 6. 1 4  0.2 1 44.1 5 
Leverage 227 2.92 1 .36 -3.54 5.9 1 249 2.77 1 .21 -2.36 4.6 1 
Size 227 5.79 1 .31 1 .99 9.27 249 6.12 1 .38 3. 1 9  10.27 
Growth 227 0.05 0.66 -2.09 2.48 249 -0.0 1 0.76 - 1 .75 4.08 
The tables reports summary statistics for ROA,ROE and Tobin's  Q which correspond to firm performance variables at three years before and after stock option grants at the I of announcement date (EGM date ),divided by the number of outstanding shares at the closest fiscal year. Leverage is equal to the log of firm's total debt divided by assets value, size is measured by log of total assets and growth is measured by M/B ratio.  
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4.5.2 The long-term effects of stock option grants on firm performance 
Table  1 1  d i sp lays the results for the fixed effects model for performance measures 
and stock option grants. Panel A shows the resu lts based on the raw performance 
measures, whi le Panel B summarises the findings of industry-adjusted performance 
measures. Each column corresponds to specifications for the long-term effects of 
performance which represented by ROA, ROE , Tobin ' s-Q , Industry-adjusted for 
ROA, Industry-adjusted return for ROE and Industry-adjusted return for Tobin-Q to 
stock option grants. The equation for the fixed effect models for raw performance 
measures as fol lows: 
Perf; 
Grant: 
Lev : 
Size: 
Growth: 
Ann : 
Tg: 
A performance measure is represented by ROA, ROE and Tobin-Q. 
Equal to the number of stock option grants at the time of announcement 
(EGM date) divided by the number of outstanding shares at the closest 
fiscal year. 
Is a firm ' s  l everage that equal to the finn 's total debt divided by the total 
assets. 
Firm size which is measured by the log of total assets value. 
Growth opportun ity is calculated based on market to book ratio (M/B 
ratio) is calculated the company's market capitalization divided with the 
company's total book value. 
is a dummy variable for announcement types, which is equal to 1 if the 
firm establish stock option plans for the first-time,O otherwise. 
Tg is a dummy variable for target group, which is equal to 1 ,  if the stock 
options are provided to employee, 0 otherwise. 
is a disturbance term. 
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The equation for the fixed effect models for industry-adjusted performance measures 
as fol lows :  
Ind-Adh Ind-adjusted is represented by Industry-adjusted ROA, ROE and Tobin-Q 
Grant: equal to the number of stock option grants at the time of announcement 
(EGM date) divided by the num ber of outstanding shares at the closest 
fi scal year. 
Lev : i s  a firm' s  leverage that equal to the firm 's total debt divided by the total 
assets. 
Size: F i rm s ize which is measured by the log of total assets value. 
Growth: Growth opportunity is calculated based on market to book ratio (M/B 
ratio) is calculated the company's market capitalization divided with the 
company's total book value. 
Ann : is a dummy variable for announcement types, which is equal to 1 if the 
firm establ ish stock option plans for the first-time,O otherwise. 
Tg: Tg is a dummy variable for target group, which is equal to 1 ,  i f the stock 
options are provided to employee, 0 otherwise. 
·8:it Is  a disturbance term. 
Results of the first specification in Panel A for ROA produces R2 value = 0.4752, F = 
86.62, with p = 0.00. The second specification, using the performance variable of 
ROE, reveals R2 value = 0.5 824, F = 7.2 1 0540 with p = 0.00 and Tobin 's  Q 
generates R2 value = 0.4569, F = 4.3490 with p = 0.00. The generated R2 values in 
the fixed model indicate that 48 per cent of the independent variables can be 
explained the dependent variable of ROA, which is 47 per cent for ROE and 46 
percent for Tobin ' s-Q. 
The overall results, usmg the raw performance measures, show the grant size 
coefficient to be positive. However, the column indicates that the ROA model 
generates significant interaction, while the columns for ROE and Tobin 's-Q report a 
weak association, indicating evidence that stock option size does not lead to 
increased firm performance levels. Prior studies reveal the variables of firm 
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characteristics and event characteristics as generating potential effects in influencing 
the firm ' s  decision to establ ish stock option plans. The test results relating to firm 
characteristics show the prediction signs are fulfil led and strongly significant. 
Particularly, the three independent variables of leverage, firm size and firm growth 
are significantl y  related to al l  performance measures at the 1 and 5 percent levels. In 
contrast to the variables of event characteristics, the overal l coefficients are found to 
be weakly significant except the target groups in ROA model show a strong 
interaction . It is noted that non-significant variables in event characteristics closely 
related to stock option grants, authenticating  first-time announcements, do not lead 
to a firm' s  improvement in performance. The findings also indicate that stock option 
grants do not entirel y  benefiting employees. 
S ince the overal l  results in panel A revealed weak performance effects among 
Malaysian firms with stock option plans, al l  regressions were rerun using adjusted 
accounting performance measures. The industry-adjusted performance measures are 
examined for three (3) years after the stock option plans have been established with 
no changes in the firm and event characteristics. The findings of Panel B are 
included in Table 1 1  for the purpose of comparison only. At first glance, the 
regression results in Panel B show that R2 values are lower when using the raw 
performance measures, while the industry-adjusted fixed effects models produced an 
R2 of 0 .26, F = 1 .8 1 57 with p = 0.00, an R2 of 0.28, F = 2 .0 1 3 6  with p = 0.00 for 
ADJROA and ADJROE, respectively. The highest generated R2 is for ADJTQ of 
0 .44, F=3 .992390 with p = 0.00. The results ind icate that all independent variables 
are exp lained as 26, 28 and 44 per cent for the dependent variables ADJROA, 
ADJROE and ADJTQ, respectively. 
The regression coefficient values for grant size are found to be insignificant. The 
weak evidence suggests the industry membership of firms with stock option plans 
are not reflected exclusively on account of industry-based trends. Prior studies in this 
area strongly suggest that technology or R&D based firms adopt more stock options 
for retaining or attracting skilfu l  staffs; however, the negative impact for industry­
adjusted ROA provides l ittle support to this conclusion. When industry-adjusted 
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specifi cations are extended with finn characteristics, it is found that the coefficients 
of firm growth i s  positive and h ighly sign ificant in the ADJROA (� = 0. 1 7 1  062), 
ADJROE (� = 0 .207232) and ADJTQ W = 0 . 1 64505). In addition, all variables of 
event characteristics have non-significant effects on a finn ' s  performance, except the 
leverage ratio which is found to have a s ignificant coefficient value in the industry­
adjusted Tobin' s  Q .  Similar patterns are reported for event characteristics using raw 
performance measures in which all variables are shown to have non-significant 
coefficient values. 
Table 1 1  provides a summary of the results relating to the effects of stock option 
plans  on return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin 's-Q. The 
statistics show that there are no differences in results using raw performance or 
industry-adjusted measures, since all performance measures are not significant with 
stock option grants. The results provide l ittle evidence of the existence of an 
association between stock option grants and firm perfonnance levels. In particular, 
the characteristics of firms with stock option p lans generating results based on raw 
performance measures strongly authenticated the study's arguments. However, the 
findings of using industry-adjusted performance measures provide less support to the 
study's conclusions. The variables represent that event characteristics construct 
simi lar patterns, resulting from non-significant relationships to finns '  perfonnance, 
which suggests that additional characteristics of stock option plans do not lead to 
improvements i n  firm performance. Thus the non-significant effects of the models 
might be a direct result of mis-specification in the estimator. Therefore, I use 
Hausman statistical test, which is more rigorous, to address the i ssue. The purpose of 
Hausman test is to determine no mis-specification exists in the estimator based on its 
differences with the random effects estimator. The resu lts reported in Table 1 1  show 
that the test statistic of ROA is 79.46 1 8  with p-value of O.OOO; ROE is 45 .7269 with 
p-value of 0.000 and Tobin ' s-Q is 2 1 . 1 4 5 1  with p-value of 0.000. Thus it may be 
concluded that there is a difference between random effects and fixed effects models 
with fixed effects models being better estimators for determining the long-term 
performance effects on stock option grants . The analysis for all specifications and 
stock option plans closely follows the fixed effects estimator. Simi lar to the test 
employed in the sample reported in Panel A, the Hausman tests for Panel B reports 
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contrasting results. Two out of three specifications show there are m is-specifications 
in the fixed effects est im ator, based on its differences with the random effects 
estimator. And thi s  suggests that random effects estimators for industry-adjusted 
ROA and ROE are better. 
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Table 1 1 :  Summary of results for return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin's·Q for stock option plan a doption 
PANEL A 
ROA 
(ROA ;, � � "  + �' 
1grant ,, + J3 2lev ,, + � 
,, size " + � ,growth ;, 
+ (3 sann it + � r.tg ,, + 
Ptt +;;t l 
Explanat01y Variables Pred iction 
sign 
Constant -0.364398 
Grant size + 0.480902* * *  
Firm-characteristics 
Leverage ') -0.082609* * *  
S i ze + 0. I 47763 * * *  
Gro'A1h + 0. I 78934 * * *  
Event -eh a racter i sti cs 
Announcement + -0.22 1 1 66 
Target groups " 1 . 47 1 465 * * *  
R' 0.475 1 9 1  
F-value 86.62 1 77*** 
Durhin-Watson I 1 78232 
Firm 83 
Data point 5 8 1  
Fixed Effects Panel Model 
ROE 
(ROE ,, � I> " + I>  
,grant ;1 + � ,lev ,, + � , 
size ,, + P 4growth " + 
.P' sann ,, + � 6tg ,, + 
tJ.,t -hejt l 
0.442756 
0.046534 
-0.0 8 1 094* * 
0.08 I 356** 
0.20580 1 • • •  
-0. I 82302 
-0. 238750 
0 .582399 
7.2 1 0540 * * *  
1 .5 1 42 1 7 
83 
58 1 
TOBJN'S Q 
[Tobin ,, � �  0 + I> 
,grant " + �, ,lev ,, + � 3 
size ,1 + � ,growth " + p: 
sann " + p 6tg ,, 
!ltt �t l 
-0 022636 
0.032965 
0.045029* * *  
-0. 0 1 2740 
0. 1 8609 1 * * *  
-0 04 1 228 
0.0 I 2684 
0.456868 
4.349048 * * *  
1 . 383540 
83 
5 8 1  
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+ 
PANEL B 
INDUSTRY -ADJUSTED INDUSTRY-
ROA ADJUSTED ROE 
lnd-Adj_ROA,, � �' o +  p [lnd-Adj_ROE,, � �'" 
,grant il + � ,lev " + � ,  size + [) ,grant,, + [1 21ev ,, 
it + .�· 4gro\Vth it + � ;ann it + � 1 size " + �,,growth " 
+ � "tg ,, + Jltit +Ejt l + �'sann 11 + � 6tg i, + 
f!rt, +�t l 
-0.249465 -0.230 I 94 
-0.022 7 1 9  0.005674 
-0.0305 1 7  -0.0597 1 0  
0.0433 1 6  0.05 7 1 07 
0. I 7 1 06 2 * * *  0 . 207232 • • •  
-0.056 7 1 2  0.000827 
-0 0 4 1 544 0.000280 
0.2599 1 7  0.2807 1 7  
1 . 8 1 5780* * *  2 . 0 1 3642 * * *  
1 .65 1 807 1 . 5 1 36 1 9  
83 83 
5 8 1  58 1 
!NO-ADJUSTED 
TOB!N'S Q 
lnd-Adj_ Tobin" � r. o 
+ P ,grant ,1 + f"i 21ev ,, 
+ � 3 size it + .� 4growth it 
+ J3· sann it + �, Gtg ,, + 
J:l,jt +Ejt: 
-0 0 1 1 0 1 4  
0.036992 
0.0423 1 5 * * *  
-0.0 I 2234 
0 . 1 64505* .. 
-0 069726 
0.025 I 43 
0.435727 
3 . 992390 * * *  
1 . 353487 
83 
5 8 1  
Hausman Test 1 1 79.46 1 8***  1 45. 7269***  1 2 1 . 1 45 1 *** I 1 1 . 1 1 44* 1 4.934 1 I 2 1 . 0462 • • •  
The reported results employ a fixed effect model. The dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) Tobin 's=Q (TQ) and industry-adjustedfurROA, ROE and Tobin 's-Q. Both 
dependent variables are measured three years after stock option plans were established. Grant size is equal to the number of stock option grants at the time of announcement (EGM date), divided by the number 
of outstanding shares at the closest fiscal year. Leverage is equal to the firm's total debt divided by the total assets. Firm size is measured by the Jog of total assets value. Growth opportunity is calculated based 
on market to book ratio (M/B ratio) is calculated the company's market capital ization divided with the company's total book value. Announcement is a dummy variable, which is equal I for first-time adoption 
and 0 otherwise. Target group is a dummy variable, which is equal to I, if the stock options are provided to employees, 0 otherwise. * , • •  and * • * illustrate significance levels at the 90, 95 and 99%, respectively. 
P-value in parenthesis. 
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4.6 Summary and implication of prior findings 
The mai n  objective of this essay was to examine whether stock option plan 
announcements release good news for the capital market and how long-term firm 
performance influences the adoption of stock option plans. Using a standard event 
study methodology, in the short-term, the findings reveal a negative share price 
before an announcement, fol lowing a positive effect, is consistent with the 
conclusions of prior stud ies. However, it is fou nd that such announcements do not 
carry any surprise to the market. The resu lts indicate that in the short-term, the weak 
share price before the event days confirm the claim that early information releases 
before official announcements can be ruled out. Moreover, the results of positive and 
negative market reactions m ight be associated with opportunistic managerial 
behaviour  such as using stock option plans to increase their personal wealth. This is 
accomplished by selectively delaying bad news and releasing good news in order to 
lessen official announcements of share prices while increasing share prices later on. 
Furthermore, the insi gnificant effect in returns at the event day may be due to 
beneficial groups of stock options being all for internal staffs. Therefore, the market 
anticipates that news of stock option plans do not carry good news to generate 
market impact. However, it provides a s ignal to shareholders that they wi l l  mostly 
lose in the form of di lution effects (Obiyatulla et al . ,  2009). In addition, the 
somewhat slow progress on share price increases after the announcement day may be 
because Malaysian investors lack knowledge about the beneficial effects of stock 
option plans, particularly for aligning interests and reducing agency problems. The 
second explanation for this  result reveals that estab lishing stock option plans at first­
time announcements does not lead to h igher share returns, and similar results are 
generated for beneficial groups (i .e. ,  executive levels). The third explanation for why 
stock option plan announcements do not reveal any information value to the stock 
Malaysian stock market may be that stock option plan propositions provide less 
positive signal l ing impact to the market. Moreover, there is a loss in returns for the 
beneficial groups, which could be explained as a large fraction of stock options being 
an immediate cost to shareholders. For the long-term effect, stock option plans do 
not entirely lead to improvements over firm value in Malaysia, as the results indicate 
no significant effects on long-term firm performance. In fact, based on the study's 
results, stock option grant 's  size does not lead to good share performance. 
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These findings may however spur debate about the role stock option plans play in 
enhancing fi rm performance and as mentioned earlier, in the few years that stock 
options have been in use in Malaysia, stock option plans gained popularity, but at the 
same time manipulation in accounting measures and stock prices such as creative 
accounting and earnings management, led the public to question the practicality in 
adopting stock option plans at least for reducing agency problems. 
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ESSAY 3 
5.0 : THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION 
PLANS ON MANAGERIAL TURNOVER. 
5.1 Introduction 
The issue of corporate structures and the potential agency problems it generates has 
given rise to a stream of research on a variety of ownership issues. The prior 
l iterature on corporate structure, particularly the work of La Porta, De-Si lanes and 
Shleifer ( 1 999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) observed that most public 
companies are heavi ly  dominated and controlled by fami ly ownerships, a scenario 
that has shaped the structure of Malaysian firms. As a result, there is a h igh 
incidence of major shareholders who actively participate in management decision 
making that may lead to agency problems. In this example, when greater ownership 
concentration among top executives, th is  lead to more of the conflict are between 
majority and minority shareholder, rather than seen a conflict between principal and 
agent as emphasized in most developed markets (Zahiruddin and Fauziah, 20 1 2).  
This would sign ificantly appear when the shareholders use their position in the 
boards and gain the benefits through power and abi lity to make decision. By the 
same token, there is also the temptation for manager to pursue their own interests 
instead of the interests of the firm, one which u ltimately places pressure on 
shareholders to act by controll ing the actions of executives. In the context of this 
issue, the reason for the dominance of fami ly owned Malaysian firms is largely due 
to firms being dependent on the legal system to monitor the behaviour of executives 
which is not sufficient to counter extreme cases and unlawful acts committed by top 
management, which then make the legal system seem less effective. On the sim ilar 
issue, as pointed by Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006) which emphasise that if the 
large shareholder is dominated by a fami ly member, there has a greater incentive for 
agency problem as the major shareholders are fully governed through legal right as 
shareholder and mandate them as firm's management. In addition, Rachpad it et al. 
(20 1 2) argue that the trust between family members could partial ly eliminate the 
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problem between shareholders and managers. Under this condition, most notably, 
fami ly-control led firms are in sharp contrast to firms that are managed in developed 
countries b y  independent executives in which the granting of stock options is the 
mechanism that enables executives to become part owner of firms' in order to al ign 
the interest of owner and management and thereby share the common objective of 
maximising firm value. Therefore, granting stock option for executive levels in 
fam i ly-dominated firms have become a corner-stone in addressing the issue of 
agency problem, particularly when in previous l iterature is  wel l  documented that 
Malaysia i s  p lagued by a high ownership concentration (Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). In fact, there is h igh occurrence of major 
shareholders are also being members of the board of d irectors. 
Stock option plan s  might also be used to retain management talent as noted by Kole 
( 1 997) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005), who report evidence indicating that 
management retention is a significant reason behind the issuing of stock option 
plans. The use of share options is more apparent in highly competitive labour market 
in which employee turnover can be very costly in terms of termination, hiring, and 
training which, in consequence, results in a loss in productivity. Brenner et al . (2000) 
suggest that underwater (i .e. , options far out-of-the money) stock options will 
increase the probabi l ity of turnover because firms usually  choose to reprice the stock 
option, even though research evidence report that this  practice is normally done by 
under-performing firms. However, since firms usually tie executive pay to 
performance shareholders are more l ikely  to accept stock options if executive 
employees in turn increase their earnings by adding value to them. Thus I would 
expect the relationship between the use of stock option plans and firm value to be 
positive. A few studies such as Warner et al .  ( 1 988), Weisbach ( 1 988) and Dennis et 
al . ( 1 997) report that poor corporate performance usually result in increase turnover, 
which suggests that the relationship between the use of stock options and firm value 
is negative. 
In the context of Malaysia, the use of stock option grants is h ighly concentrated at 
the non-executive employee level. Thus, I would expect the sensitivity of 
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compensation pay to performance to be qu ite low. Since executives have control 
over firm specifi c  factors, i f  they are unsatisfied with the benefits they receive the 
l ikelihood i s  that they m ay leave voluntarily .  The reason behind this is due to the 
notion that intrinsic dissatisfaction has a strong influence on the intention to leave 
the job. Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) point out that executive turnover is also 
influenced b y  h ow management lead the firm, which suggests that management 
attributes such as board structure and ownership does play a role in determining 
turnover. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) also note that the characteristics of 
Malaysian firms are influenced by fami ly-controlled firm which imply that fami ly 
participation on board of directors leads to widespread agency problem in the firm. 
This observation is consistent with economic  theories which contend that fami ly­
control led firms have a tendency to generate conflicts between principal (i .e., 
shareholders) and agents (i.e., management). Thus the use of stock option plans is 
seen as one of the solutions to counter such problems. 
Up to now very l ittle detailed evidence on the effectiveness of stock option plans has 
been provided using data on Malaysian firms. The few studies that exist put 
emphasis on the incentive effects of executive pay in retain ing and motivating 
management efforts towards enhancing firm value. For example, Obiyatul la et al. 
(2009) notes that such incentives would not only enhance the value of the firm but 
also shareholders' wealth, though the h igh incidence of allocated stock options to 
employees have resulted in l imited positive effects on firm performance. A possible 
reason for thi s  may be due to the extent of capabil ities to influence firm specific 
factors which are less direct for non-executive employees. Therefore stock options 
held by top executives might engender advantages as they may bear more influence 
on firm specific factors, since they are directly involved in putting in place a firm' s  
program on  executive compensation . Core and Guay (200 1 )  claims that a large 
fraction of stock option plans for specific target group tend to make the cost effects 
on firm performance more obvious whi le also making the turnover price more costly. 
However, without the intense scrutiny of shareholders, increasing the size of 
packages may provide less of an impetus for managers to enhance firm value. 
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Research examining executive compensation remain a key issue in the field of 
corporate governance, especially since stock option grant size at executive levels are 
known to be  obtained under questionable conditions, which suggests a fai lure of 
executive compensation pay to motivate good practices in corporate governance. 
Therefore, b y  exam ining the relationship between firm performance, stock option 
plans and executive turnover in Malaysian l i sted finns wil l  enable us to discern 
whether the effects of executive stock option plans have a m itigating effect on 
unplanned m anageria l  turnovers. The study also explores the effects of moderating 
factors such as corporate governance characteristics and ownership structure on 
executive turnover. Thus the consequences of executive turnover as considered in 
thi s  study are focused specifically on firm perfonnance and the l ikelihood that top 
executives would depart when nearing retirement age. 
The rest of the essay is organized as fol lows. Section 5.2 provides a brief review of 
the l iterature relating to top executive turnover, firm performance, ownership and 
corporate governance. Section 5 .3 present an econometric methodology and also 
discusses the data used in the empirical analysis while section 5 .4 presents analyses 
the empirical results. F inal ly, Section 5 .5 summarises and discusses the impl ications 
of prior findings. 
5.2 Previous Literature and Hypotheses Development for Executive 
Turnover Study 
5.2.1 Executive turnover and corporate performance 
Firm performance is often used to reflect the firm incentive for adopting stock option 
p lans, as one of alternative ways to reduce executive turnover. In regard to this 
issue, several studies report the relation between executive turnover and firm 
performance is  a negative. In this example, Warner et.al ( 1 988) reports an inverse 
relationsh ip between ineffective managers and share returns. Other work in sim ilar 
area of studies by Kang and Sh ivdani ( 1 995) investigate the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms during the event of executive turnover among the Japanese 
corporations and report the l ikel ihood of non-routine turnover is to be related to 
industry-adjusted returns on assets, excess stock returns, and negative operating 
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mcome .  It i s  also found that the observed sensitivity for non-routine turnover amona b 
executives i ncreases when the major shareholder is the main bank. However, 
industry p erformance was found to have no impact on non-routine managerial 
turnover in J apanese corporations. 
It is general ly acknowledged in many studies that stock option plans are costly for 
shareholders in terms of di lution effect. Therefore, a key issue here is whether the 
incentive effects of stock option plans can be justified on the basis of firm specific 
performance. In this respect, studies include Mehran and Yermack ( 1 999) using data 
from 452 U .S .  companies report a negative association between stock option plans 
and the probabil ity of executive turnover. However, Fee and Hadlock (2003) in their 
stud y  of the associated effects of stock option plans have on firm performance and 
m an agerial turnover note that the negative association is a clear indication that 
turnover was not entirely affected by equity-compensation plans. Also Coughlan and 
Schm idt ( 1 988) and Leonhardt (2000) using data from a number of U.S. firms report 
a consistent results indicating a relationship between turnover and firm performance 
and though it is also noted that stock option holders are l ikely  to leave firm when the 
plan becomes less effective as stock option values become worthless. Similarly with 
Maury (2006) finds that finn performance and top executive turnover in Finish 
companies are very sensitive to firm conditions and that the l ikel ihood of a top 
executive departures increase fol lowing firm specific losses, however past 
performance has no impact on CEO turnover. In later study, the l iterature suggests 
that the generated loss relating to stock option value impose a loss for the option 
holders in two ways. The first way is when the excess market price is over the 
exercise price at the time the holder leaves the job and second, the probabil ity that 
the share price wi l l  increase (Balsam and Miharjo, 2007). 
While, Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) indicate that poor performing 
executives should be pun ished for their fai lure to maximise efforts and exercising 
their core duty. They note that forced turnover could lead executives improve firm 
performance through increasing managerial efforts and the news is welcomed by 
investors. However, th is  particular finding remains unresolved due to the 
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replacement of executives by boards which may also a signal the need for improving 
management. Thus ,  based on the above arguments, it is  hypothesized that: 
H 1 Executive turnover is l ikely  to increase fol lowing poor firm performance. 
5.2.2 Executive turnover and ownership structure 
The decision of executive turnover, particularly firm to remove ineffective top 
management would  seem to depend on the type of ownership structure as one which 
agency theory posits a conflict of interests could be aligned through the separation of 
power and ownership .  In  this regard, the use of stock option plans may be one 
solution to the imperfection of cash incentive pay because by increasing executive 
ownership and inviting them to be part of the firm minor shareholders is l ikely 
decrease the potential conflict with major shareholders. Although the nature of 
shareholdings of Malaysian l isted firms are largely controlled by domestic 
shareholders such as state-controlled (Gibson, 2003), the fami ly and pol itical 
members also tend to be actively involved in business operation and serving on the 
firm boards. To determine the effects of ownership structure, several studies provide 
contrasting views about the agreement of involvement fami ly  members and · non­
family members in the management of the firm. In the example of Danish firms, 
Lausten (2002) reports that fami ly-based firms are l ikely to reduce the number of 
executive turnover, while Volpin (2002) using data for Italian firms report simi lar 
results. Thus I would expect the effects of family-based firms on l ikelihood of top 
executive turnover to be negative due to strong fami ly-management ties. There has 
another v iew, as seen from non-fami ly controlled firms, note that the effects of top 
management turnover are weaker which thus indicating a low sensitivity to corporate 
performance (Tsai et. al (2006). This is clearly indicates that the non-fami ly­
dominated business appears less effective for monitoring the turnover rate during 
low firm performance. 
With regards to simi lar issue on managerial turnover, Denis et.al ( 1 997) posit a 
lower incidence of executive turnover, especially when outside directors play roles in 
monitoring manager due to the high stakes of executive employees which then 
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makes the effect to be less sensitive to firm performance. In particular, they note that 
the control l ing effects are significantly observed when top management have stakes 
m ore than 2 5  per cent. Therefore, m anagerial decision to leave the firms might be 
contro l led by the cost forgone of equity and cash-compensation pay. Thus, if family 
ownership has inverse effects on turnover it is l ikely that granting stock options to 
fam i ly  members wi l l  not only increase their stakes i n  the firm, but also the news of 
the award may not be favourably received by existing shareholders, particularly if 
the boards plan to appoint outside candidates to lead the CEO position. For example, 
S uchard et. a! (200 1 )  examine the relationship between the monitoring of CEO's by 
inside and outside d irectors and CEO turnover among Australian firms and find that 
non -executive directors are more l ikel y  to monitor the management. This is observed 
that CEO turnover in Austral ian firms is associated with past performance rather 
than to current firm performance as found in the U.S.  stud ies. The behaviour of 
shareholders in solving corporate governance issues generates different results 
between Australian and U.S.  firms. 
The similar area of research by Shen and Canella (2002) using a longitudinal study 
to determine the impact of CEO dismissal on firm performance, and the impact on 
performance fol lowed by inside successor selection . They report that CEO dismissal 
has a negative effect on firm perfonnance and a positive effect if it is inside 
succession. The results support the preposition that increasing managerial 
ownerships through equity pay for management in the firm has a significant impact 
on CEO dismissal due to inside succession, instead of the d ismissal impact of 
outside succession . Also, Iqbal and French (2007) examine the managerial 
ownership of 260 firms in financial d ifficulty and find that the less voting rights 
executives have, the more l ikely they are to be dismissed rather than their higher­
owning counterparts. It is noted that retained executives tend to increase their 
shareholding prior to removal which suggest that such strategy could be an 
indication to acquire shares during financial d istress to avoid being removed . On this 
issue, Lu et al. (2007) notes that high shareholding executives m ight exercise greater 
control by entrenching or shielding themselves from dismissal in a poor performing 
firm . Notably, the inverse effect between firm performance and executive turnover 
could be reduced if stock option plans are properly designed, which would see a firm 
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incurring turnover cost on the employees' departure (Balsam et al . ,2007), since the 
cost of leaving defers in a few years following the grant date. And as Balsam and 
M iharjo (2007) n otes, the lower turnover rates within firms are usually observed 
during the vested period . Therefore, I would expect that h igh stakes in the firm by 
executive, particu larly i n  fami ly-owned firm to be less affected by executive 
turnover when stock option plans  are granted. Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H2 : Executive turnover is l ikely lower i n  the firm with high stakes of managerial 
ownership in fam i ly-dominated firm. 
5.2.3 Executive turnover and corporate governance 
Since the main function of boards is to act as agents of shareholders, both parties 
thus play a crucial role in the practice of good corporate governances, particularly in 
the monitoring of managerial activities. The role of a board includes decision 
making, to ensure the portrayal of a healthy corporate performance image, though a 
negative performance might at times b e  detrimental to the corporate governance 
structure. In particular, the negative reputation of a board may lead them to be 
removed which suggest a direct relationship between corporate governance 
attributes, firm value and turnover. Using Malaysia data, Han iffa and Cooke (2002) 
report that corporate governance has a positive effect on firm performance, while 
Black et al. (2002) note that better governed firms might have more efficiency in 
their operations, and Haniffa and Hudaid (2006) note that good corporate governance 
has value-enhancing effects on firm. When linking the corporate governance 
structures and executive turnover, studies by Gibson (2003) and Defond and Hung 
(2004) are associated to firm performance. They find that the corporate governance 
of a firm works wel l  following poor firm performance if the managements respond 
quickly. In other words, when corporate performance declines, the board would react 
by replacing ineffic ient top managers suggesting that corporate governance does 
have a crucial role in determining top executive turnover. Studies in this area also 
note that several board 's characteristics such as the board structure, board size and 
board composition are l ikely to influence the probabi l ity of executive turnover. In 
th is example, Haniffa and Hudaid (2006) note that board characteristics include 
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smal ler boards, m ore independent boards and clear separation role between CEO and 
chairman. 
5.2.3.1 Executive turnover and board size 
The l inking of managerial turnover to board s1ze features prominently as key 
determinant in several studies. This has been argued that effective board size might 
have an effect on enhancing managerial control, reducing cost, and thereby increase 
firm value.  In thi s  example, Lipton and Lorsch ( 1 992) note that a smaller board 
m ight affect the capacity for monitoring managements, whi le Haleblian and 
F inkelstein ( 1 993) point out that larger board are more l ikely to increase their 
capabi l ities and resources in order to solve finn problems. The conflicting views on 
the effectiveness of board of directors ' size have presented an argument that smal ler 
boards have  become more successful than larger boards, particularly in decision 
making for d irectors ' replacement or termination. Scholars suggests various of 
board size to affect its roles on monitoring, control ling and decision making as 
Jensen ( 1993) notes that eight persons or less create more effective board. While, a 
study by Shivdasani and Yermack ( 1 999) claim that eleven is a more appropriate 
size for a firm 's board of directors . However, Beiner et al. (2004) and Coles et al . 
(2005) point out that the number of board members might vary according to the size 
of the finns ' .  In Malaysia, it is to be noted that the average size of a board of 
directors is seven to eight as represented by executive and non-executive directors. 
This is according to Malaysian legal practices in the Listing of Bursa Malaysia; the 
firm board of directors should  be represented by at least two persons or one-third of 
the independent d irectors (Paragraph 1 5  (2), 2002). This clearly emphasised that 
base on evidence the size of board has a significant impact in decision making 
involve executive matters. Though th is  issue of whether size of board of directors 
should be formed in  small and larger size has been wel l  researched . However no 
clear conclusion is reached. For example, there is a claim by Khurana ( 1 998) 
indicates that smaller board has l imited sources of information regarding potential 
successor, thus the effect on changing top executives should be less. In the latter 
respect, Borkhov ich et al . (2006) argue that a board size might influence executive 
replacement decisions with larger boards are more likely to find it easier to choose a 
successor. They also note that since smal ler boards are more efficient in terms of 
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executive replacement decisions, they are l ikely  to change executives as corporate 
performance decl ines. Therefore, it may be that when selecting candidates for board 
composition ,  that finn s  prefer to choose outsider and generate the main feature of a 
two-tier board of executive directors and independent directors in order to balance 
board size and to be able to work cooperatively. Due to l imited number of literature 
that discusses executive turnover and board size except in  the area of changing 
executive as response of poor performance, thus the effect of executive turnover in 
rel at ion to board size is an inverse relation and so the hypothesis is 
H3 Executive turnover is to be h igh when firms have a smaller board of 
d irectors. 
5.2.3.2 Executive turnover and board composition 
Earlier studies have put much emphasis on the presence of outside directors in 
enhancing the board' s  effectiveness in internal monitoring. In fact the corporate 
governance l iterature argues that outs ide directors can be useful as they offer 
independent expertise and judgment. Nevertheless, the risk appears to be greater 
when board members have a substantial stake in the firm. Thus  to encourage a high 
level of board independence, it is recommended that at least one-third of board 
members should be external directors that have no relationship with the major 
shareholders or hold any position in the firm . However, aside from appointing 
independent directors to achieve the intended objectives for monitoring the top 
executive levels, the important question is how outside director influence the board' s  
decision . Another a key function of  board composition is internal control, hence the 
presence of outside directors on boards provide a clear division of executive roles to 
serve on behalf of shareholders. Renneboog (2000), for example, notes that the 
appointment of outside directors is to represent the major shareholders by exercising 
their fiduciary duty to monitor firm performance. Weisbach ( 1 988) reports a strong 
association of turnover-performance effect in firms with outsider-dominated boards, 
which suggests that independent board members respond quickly to terminate 
underperform ing executives. It is also noted that top executive turnover is l ikely to 
occur when firm ' s  experience poor corporate performance and the board reacts by 
enforcing the departure of top executives. 
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The evidence on the existence of an external director on the board of directors could 
be one of the solutions to the removal of poor performing top management. And, in 
turn, these m anagers would be expected to be penali sed by the firm for poor firm 
performance. This also indicates that outsider-dominated boards have better 
monitoring for management. In respect to this, Klein (2002) finds that board 
independence i s  inversely related to an earnings management, suggesting that 
outsider-dominated boards play an effective role in monitoring corporate 
performance. In contrast, Bhagat and B lack (2002) find that an increasing number of 
independent d irectors on boards do not necessarily lead to better performing firms. 
However, Hsu-Huei et al. (2008) using firm level data on Taiwan firms finds that 
independent director have a positive effect on firm value. Thus, the fol lowing 
hypothesis is  suggested : 
H4 : Executive turnover to be lower when the board IS less independent on 
outsider-dominated board. 
5.2.3.3 Executive turnover and board leadership structure 
There is also an extensive literature on board leadership structure which posits the 
effect of CEO dual ity and corporate performance in two opposing ways. First, 
Anderson and Anthony ( 1 996) report that CEO duality has a positive effect on 
improving operating performance, while Deochow et al . ( 1 996) find that CEO 
dual ity result in earnings manipulation activity. Similarly, Moscu (20 1 3) using 
stewardsh ip theory finds that CEO dual ity improves firm performance. However, 
Dahya et al .  (2009) find that the title of separation in companies U .K.  between CEO 
and Chairman does not lead to high performance and this thus forms the second 
argument which, as a result, leads to management turnover. As empirical evidence 
ind icates that the poor corporate performance increase management turnover which 
emphasis in a study by Goyal and Park (2002). They document a negative 
association between the executive turnover and firm performance declines when 
CEO and chairman are granted to the same person. This study conclusions support 
the preposition that less monitoring efforts by a dual board structures, particularly 
when making decision to d ismiss the underperforming management. In later study, 
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Maury (2006) notes that Finish firms have a supervisory board and a board of 
directors and report evidence that CEO turnover is l ikely h igher fol lows low stock 
price  performance. However, it is found that when the role of CEO and chairman are 
combined that there are no difference with effects between two-tier and a single-tier 
board structure. A study by Hou and Chuang (2008) finds that executive turnover is  
sensitivite to firm performance appears to be attributable to CEO duality. In this 
case, it also supports Jensen ' s  ( 1 993) findings which suggest that a fai lure of the firm 
to exercise firm i nternal control has much to do with CEO duality which affects 
performance and lead to h igh turnover. However, a c lear division role between both 
positions that have formal power makes it easier for boards to d ismiss inefficient 
managers. In all ,  the empirical evidence indicates that no separation in the roles 
between both positions suggests that firms  have weaker monitoring board's  that 
make no effort to remove inefficient top executives. We should also mention that the 
code of corporate governance state that the separate role of CEO and chairman might 
ensure the intended objectives of balancing power between the two positions. Th is 
suggests that firms  can avoid conflicts of interest and domination by a single person 
on the board . Thus, the hypothesis is :  
H5 : Executive turnover is l ikely increases when there is  a separation role 
between the CEO and chairman ofthe board during poor corporate performance. 
5.2.3.4 Executive turnover and board members age 
Demographic factors such as the age of ind ividual board members have an important 
role in estimating the probabi l ity of turnover which is why age is commonly used to 
d istinauish between forced and routine turnover. The test effect of age on turnover is b 
commonly d ivided between young and old. For example, in examining turnover-firm 
performance effects, Coughlan and Schmidt ( 1 985) use the compulsory retirement 
age of 64 to split the sample between younger and older CEOs. Other studies use 
different retirement age such as the age l imit of 65 (Weisbach, 1 988), 55 (Barro and 
Barro, 1 990) and 60 (Rachpradit, Tang and Khang,20 1 2) to categorise younger and 
older CEOs. Whi le, Lausten (2002) and Goyal and Park (2002) also apply a sim ilar 
method to estimate the probabil ity of turnover through the age of CEOs. In 
particular, Goyal and Park (2002) and Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) report a 
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positive relationship between the age of board members and turnover, whi le 
Coughlan and Schmidt ( 1 985) report that although younger CEOs have a negative 
and significant i mpact on stock price performance, the coefficient of CEOs turnover 
above retirement age is positive. Barro and Barro ( 1 990) estimate the turnover of 
CEOs and report a strong effect on turnover decisions. They also find that the 
probabi l ity of turnover is lower in younger CEOs and that this  increases when 
nearing  mandatory retirement age. In a recent study by Rachpradit, Tang and Khang 
(20 1 2) report both a positive and weak relationship for all CEOs turnover. However, 
further tests for a sub-sample of younger and older CEOs revealed that younger CEO 
was more l ikely to be replaced fol lowing poor firm performance. In contrast, when it 
comes to older CEOs, Lausten (2002) notes that turnover fol lowing the retirement 
age is not solely related to poor performance since benefits are a result of previous 
achievements. Empirical evidence also shows that the risk of turnover is h igher when 
a younger person holds the position than an executive who is nearing retirement. 
Based on the above findings, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H6 : Firms with older executives wil l  be more l ikel y  increase the turnover. 
5.2.4 Executive turnover and firm-specific characteristics 
Several studies report evidence which indicate that firm characteristics can influence 
the l ikel ihood of executive turnover. One of the firm attributes is firm size which is  
commonly measured by total assets or market capitalisation . Cosh and Hughes 
( 1 997) find that there is a negative relationship between turnover and large firm, 
which leads us to believe that large firms are less l ikely to terminate top 
managements. Also, Rhim, Peluchette and Song (2006) find that large firms are 
expected to enjoy good corporate performance since they benefit from having more 
stable income. The expected result also indicates that executive turnover is not 
welcome when firms are having healthy corporate condition that will disturb work 
pattern (Boeker, 1 992). Therefore, large size firms are less l ikely to change their 
executives compared to small firms in which the turnover process would be lower. 
The hypothesis is :  
H7 : Firms with larger size wil l  less l ikely to dismiss their top executives. 
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5.2.5 Executive turnover and levels of managerial payments 
Numerous academic studies that justify h igh compensation pay usually focus 
attention on al igning the interests of managers and shareholders. The consensus is 
that s ince top m anagements are an important human resource factor and an attractive 
pay package has the ability to attract and retain managerial talents, particularly at 
CEO level .  It has been argued however that the level of payments for executives 
should  influence their decisions to remain with their firms. For example, Mehran and 
Yermack ( 1 997) indicate that alternative strategy designed to change the m ix level of 
payments could help to retain the executive. They also argue that using solely cash 
pay and bonus for executive appraisals is a subjective decision made by the firm 
because in real labour markets not all firms are able to compete for talent using cash 
based compensation, particularly small er firms. In addition, the l iterature emphasis 
argument for incentive effects of using cash pay to reduce executive turnover is 
straightforward . This particularly occurs for firms  without financial distress. 
Instances of low cash payments are facing in firms to shut down or firms with severe 
l iquidity constraints, the turnover is l ikely high ( Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). 
Urged by the cash constraint as the crucial of retaining h igh-ski lled personnel and in 
firms where human capital are competitive, the firm seeks and designs compensation 
structures that allow to defer the current payment using future profits. This is 
consistent with those that are broadly  in agreement with this view suggested that 
firms should  use equity payments as a retention mechanism (Anderson, Banker and 
Ravindran, 2000). Accordingly, the use of stock options is considered as one way in 
which the firm can extends an intention to leave the firm for several years after grant 
date which is normal ly between three to five years. Following this reason, it may be 
concluded that turnover among executives would be lower during the vesting period 
(when stock options cannot be exercised) .  This shows that the retention effect lead 
them to stay with the current employer is l im ited [Balsam and Miharjo (2007)] . 
Consequently, the argument on the optimal combination of cash and equity 
payments to keep talent employees has received attention. In this  respect, a study by 
Gonzales and Gurtov iy, (2008) find that renegotiating in itial contract for amount of 
cash firm might offer and a corresponding share of equity pay (i.e. stock option) 
plays a crucial roles for preventing executives from leaving. 
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This  i s  very c lear that the relation between market wages and equity payments is not 
new since the m ai n  structure of stock options is l ink the share price to performance 
(Oyer, 2004) . M oreover, by tying to firm value, it helps firm to devise 
compensation schemes that retain  executives facing uncertainty in market wages and 
where turnover costs are relatively high.  However, if firm performance decl ines, the 
compensated value for executives i s  l ikely to reduce whi l st turnover increases. This 
has lead Hassenhuttl and Harrison (2002) to argue that h igh compensation for the 
purpose of retaining loyal executives ( i .e .  CEOs) is  questionable, particularly for 
signall ing  that they are outstanding. Their findings indicate that stock options are 
negatively related to CEOs turnover in  large firms. Simi larly, Fee and Hadlock 
(2003) find that equity payments play an i nsignificant role in the retention of CEOs. 
As response to conclusion by Denis, Denis and Sarin ( 1 997) which indicate a large 
amount of share ownership does play a role in determining executive turnover. In 
th is respect, the l iterature further suggests that the implementation of stock option 
plans at managerial levels wil l  not only  i ncrease their share ownership but also the 
level of effects on turnover-performance is twofold. The first effect is that executives 
with low ownership interest may leave their position if the firm records poor 
performance and the new replacement is expected to enhance firm value. Hochberg 
and Lindsey (20 1 0) examine the relationship between stock option plans and 
operating performance and found a positive relationship, while B lasi et al . (20 1 0) 
note that employees who receive stock options are less l ikely  to find a new job, 
which suggests that stock options leads to lower voluntary turnover. Nonetheless, a 
section the l iterature suggests that the effect of reduction in turnover is temporary 
unti l  the stock options vesting period, which wou ld seem to imply that stock option 
plays a role  in delaying, rather than in preventing turnover (Serdar et al ., 201 1 ). The 
second resulting effect is that where the executive has significant ownership through 
stock options, they might shield their position from poor corporate performance. 
Th is particular effect is consistent with a study conducted by Finkelstein ( 1 992), 
which found that substantial stockholding is a source of managerial power. 
Therefore, a significant ownership stake is l ikely to reduce the CEOs removal by the 
board and is one of the ways through which a large amount of stock option grants 
can be exercised. The fol lowing hypothesis is :  
1 36 
Higher compensation pay m the form of stock options to increase 
managerial ownersh ip and thus lead to lower turnover. 
For better u nderstanding, detai ls of all hypotheses to be tested are summarised as 
fol lows: 
Coefficient Sign Expected 
Sign 
Executive Turnover a n d  Corporate Performance 
Warner et. a! ( 1 98 8 )  Executive turnover and corporate perfonnance t o  b e  Negative 
negative 
Kang and Shivdani ( 1 995) The role of corporate governance mechanisms Negative 
during the turnover of top executive in Japanese 
corporations the likelihood of non-routine turnover 
(forced tumover) to be related to industry-adjusted 
returns on assets, excess stock returns, and negative 
operating income 
M eh ran and Yermack ( 1 999) Negative association between stock option plans and Negative 
the probabil ity of executive tumover, 
Fee and Hadlock (2003) The et!ect of stock option plans on finn Negative 
performance and managerial tumover note that the 
negative association 
Gibson (2003) The managements respond quickly when corporate Negative 
Defond and Hung (2004) 
performance declines by replacing inefficient top 
managers 
Goyal and Park (2002) poor corporate performance increase management Negative 
tu mover 
Huson, Malatesta and Poor performing executives should be punished for Negative 
Parrino (2004) their failure 
Maury (2006) Top executive departures increase fol lowing !Inn Negative 
specitlc losses and prior performance has no impact 
on CEO turnover 
Balsam and Miharjo (2007 Negative share price increase turnover decrease Negative 
H I Executive turnover is I ikely to increase fol lowing poor !Inn perfonnance. Negative 
Executive Turnover and Ownership Structure 
Den is et. a I ( 1 997) Lower incidence of executive turnover when high Negative 
stakes of executive employees which then makes the 
etlect to be less sensitive to tlnn perfonnance. 
Lausten (2002) Family-based !Inns are l ikely to reduce the number Negative 
of executive turnover 
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Volpin (2002) Less executive turnover in Italian family-dominated Negative 
companies 
Shen and Canel l a  (2002) Increasing managerial ownerships through equity Negative 
pay for management in the tirm has a significant 
impact on CEO dismissal due to inside succession, 
instead of the dismissal impact of outside 
succession. 
Tsai et. al (2006 N on-fami ly-dominated business appears less Negative 
effective for monitoring the turnover rate during low 
firm performance. 
lqbal and French (2007) Less voting rights executives have, the more likely Negative 
they are to be dismissed rather than their higher-
owning counterparts. 
Lu et al .  (2007) High shareholding executives m ight exercise greater Negative 
control by entrenching or shielding themselves trom 
dismissal in a poor perfonn ing finn. 
H, Executive turnover is likely lower in the tirm with high stakes of managerial ownership in Negative 
family-dominated tinn. 
Executive Turnover a n d  corporate governance structures 
Board size 
Li!lton and Lorsch ( 1 992} A smaller board might affect the capacity for Negative 
monitoring managements 
Haleblian and Finkelstein Larger board are more likely to increase their Negative 
( 1 993) capabil ities and resources in order to solve tirm 
problems of inefficient manager. 
Khurana ( 1 998) Smaller board has l imited sources of infonnation Positive 
regard ing potential successor, thus the effect on 
changing top executives should be less. 
Borkhovich et al. (2006) Board size might influence executive replacement Negative 
decisions with larger boards are more l ikely to find 
it easier to choose a successor. 
H, Executive turnover is to be high when firms have a smaller board of directors. Negative 
Board Com12osition 
Weisbach ( 1 988) Independent board members respond quickly to Positive 
terminate underperforming executives. 
Renneboog (2000), N ote that the appointment of outside directors is to Positive 
represent the major shareholders by exercising their 
fiduciary duty to monitor t1rm performance. 
Bhagat and Black (2002) I ncreasing number of independent directors on Positive/Neeative 
boards do not necessarily lead to better performing 
firms 
Klein (2002) Board independence play an effective role in Positive 
monitoring corporate perfonnance. 
Hsu-Huei et al. (2008) Independent director have a positive effect on tirm Positive 
value. 
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H, Executive turnover to be lower when the board is more independent on outsider-dominated Negative 
board. 
Leadershig structure 
Anderson and Anthony CEO duality has a positive effect on improving Positive 
( 1 996) operating perfonnance, 
Deochow et a l .  ( 1 996) CEO duality result in  earnings manipulation activity Positive 
Maury (2006) Finish tlrms have a supervisory board and a board Positive/Negative 
of directors and report evidence that CEO turnover 
is  likely higher follows low stock price 
performance. 
role of CEO and chairman are combined that there 
are no difference with effects between two-tier and a 
single-tier board 
Hou and Chuang (2008) Executive turnover is sensitive to finn perfonnance Negative 
appears to be attributable to CEO duality as they fail 
to conduct internal control 
Dahya et a l .  (2009) Title of separation in companies UK between CEO Positive/Negative 
and Chairman does not lead to high perfonnance 
Moscu (20 l 3) CEO duality improves tlrm performance. Positive 
H; Executive turnover is l ikely increases when there is a separation role between the CEO and Negative 
chairman of the board during poor corporate performance. 
Executive turnover and board members age 
Coughlan and Schmidt Older CEOs have a significant impact on Positive 
( 1 985) performance and the coefticient of CEOs turnover 
above retirement age is positive. 
Barro and Barro ( 1 990) Probability of turnover is l ower in younger CEOs Positive 
and that this increases when nearing mandatory 
retirement age. 
Goyal and Park (2002) and Positive relationship between the age of board Positive 
members and turnover 
Lausten (2002) Turnover tbllowing the retirement age is not solely Positive 
related to poor perfonnance since benetl ts are a 
result of previous achievements. 
Rachpradit, Tang and Khang Positive relationship between the age of board Positive 
(20 1 2) members and tumover 
H, Finns with older executives will be more likely increase the turnover. Positive 
Executive turnover and !Inn size 
Boeker ( 1 992) Executive tumover is not welcome when !Inns are Negative 
having healthy corporate condition that Vvi l l  disturb 
work patterns 
Cosh and Hughes ( 1 997) Large !Inns are less l ikely to tenninate top Negative 
managements. 
Rhim, Peluchette and Song Firms are expected to enjoy good corporate Negative 
performance since they benefit trom having more 
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(2006) stable  income. The expected result also indicates 
that executive turnover is not welcome 
H, Finns with larger size will less likely to dismiss their top executives. Negative 
Executive turnover Level of managerial Qa)LS 
Adams, ! 965 An attractive pay package m the industry that Positive 
crucial for human resource factor has the ability to 
attract and retain managerial talents 
Finkelstein ( 1 992), A substantial stockholding is a source of managerial Positive 
power. 
Mehran and Yennack ( 1 997) A strategy designed to change the mix level of pays Negative /Positive 
could help to retain the executive. However, using 
solely cash pay and bonus for executive appraisals is 
a subjective decision made by the tlrm because in 
real labour markets not all firms are able to compete 
for talent using cash based compensation, 
particularly smaller tlnns. 
Anderson, Banker and Firms should use equity pays as a retention Positive 
Ravindran, (2000). mechanism 
Hassenhuttl and Harrison High compensation for the purpose of signalling Negative 
(2002) that loyal executives (i.e. CEOs) are outstanding , 
the tlnding indicate that stock options are negatively 
related to 
turnover in l arger firms. 
Fee and Hadlock (2003) Stock options play an insignificant role in the Negative 
retention ofCEOs 
Balsam and Miharjo (2007 Stock options produce retentive effect that lead Negative 
executives to stay with the current employer, but 
l imited 
Gonzales and Gurtoviy, Renegotiating initial contract for amount of cash Positive 
(2008) firm m ight offer and a corresponding share of equity 
pay (i .e. stock option) determine executive turnover. 
Blasi et al. (20 1 0) Received more stock options are less l ikely to find a Positive 
new job that leads to lower voluntary turnover. 
Hochberg and Lindsey The relationship between stock option plans and Positive 
(20 1 0) operating performance and found a positive 
relationship 
Serdar et al. , 20 I 1 Stock option plays a role in delaying, rather than in Negative 
preventing turnover 
H, Higher compensation pay in the form of stock options to increase managerial ownership and thus Negative 
lead to lower turnover. 
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5.3 Econometric Methodology and Data 
The main interest of thi s  study is to examine the consequences of stock option plan 
on executive turnover. Thi s  relationsh ip  is examined using the fol lowing regression 
model : 
Exec_turn= /(perf, ownership,governance,size, stock option_ cash) ( 1 )  
Variables Explanation for top executive turnover 
Dependent variable 
Following the study of Maury (2006) in which executive turnover is based on types 
of turnover whereby the dependent variable if the top management is replaced in a 
given year for reasons of forced turnover. 
Control variables 
The independent variables in the estimated model employ four proxies to determine 
the probabi l ity of executive turnover. The variables include firm performance, 
ownership structure, board attributes, firm size and level of payments (stock options 
and cash). Corporate performance is a crucial factor and l ikely to influence decisions 
to remove inefficient executive employees, particularly due to poor corporate 
performance. While, other control l ing factors such as ownership structure, board 
attributes, firm size and level of managerial pay might have an effect on turnover­
performance sensitivity. 
Furthermore, former studies indicate a negative association between performance 
and probabi l ity of top management turnover. Fol lowing this agreement firm 
performance measures using accounting and market measures are employed in th is 
study. However, using the market measures may underestimate the effects on 
turnover, particularly when top executives serve the purpose of controll ing 
shareholders (Weisbach, 1 988)] . This also indicates that market-based measures may 
not be the best indi cator, but are nonetheless appropriates to explain management 
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efforts. A ccording  to Shen and Conel la (2002), poorly performing firms suggest that 
managements are vis ible i n  not maximising their wealth. G iven the drawbacks 
associated with m arket measures, the estimated model uses the accounting measure 
of Return on Assets (ROA) to proxy firm performance by fol lowing Goyal and Park 
(2002) in  which ROA is estimated by the ratio of earnings before interests and tax to 
book value of total assets . 
In add ition, a further test is conducted to validate whether the probability of 
executives leaving the firms are as a result of firms extreme poor performance. Thus, 
creating a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative operating income in 
both preceding and year turnover is used to capture the effect. Using a single form of 
accounting measure is not, however, sufficient to val idate the results of the turnover­
performance sensitivity. Other studies in th is area emp loy market-based indicators to 
examine the relationship between unadjusted and market-adjusted return to executive 
turnover. Unadjusted return is calculated using the firm 's stock returns in one year 
adjusted by the expected returns on FTSE Kuala Lumpur over the same period. 
Analysis of firm performance takes into account each year under the top executive 's  
watch. Thi s  approach ensures that the overall performance of the firms in the study is 
considered for determ ining turnover (Shen and Canella, 2002). 
Another control variable is included to test the effect of ownership structure on 
executive turnover. The variables added in each model are managerial ownership and 
a dummy for fami ly control . A number of studies in thi s  area discuss methods to 
determine fam ily-control led firms including La Porta, De-Si lanes and Shleifer 
( 1 999) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) which suggest that the family gains power by 
exercising voting rights when it has at least 20 percent support and this value is 
sufficient in making decisions, wh ile Anderson and Reeb (2003) associate the 
founding fam ily firm if it is run by the fami ly member, hence, a family-owned firm 
is identified based on fam ily ties on the board. Similarly to approach carried out by 
Maury (2006) uses the surname to find fam ily founding firm. A dummy variable is 
added in each model equated to 1 if the fami ly member occupies the board and 0 
otherwise. This produces new evidence if the top management has stakes in the firm 
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through stock options. Furthermore, add ing variables for managerial ownership and 
fami l y  control generate an advantage to determine whether the fami ly-owned 
business h as col lectively voted to remove their fami ly members who have served as 
an executive employee due to i nefficiency or underperformance. In respect to this, 
Den is  et A l .  ( 1 997) report that managerial equity structure affects the probabil ity of 
turnover negatively which suggest that stock option plans could serve as an agent to 
i ncrease insider ownership, even though it is less sensitive to firm performance. In 
real ity, firm performance is widely used as a proxy in compensation payments. Thus 
a dummy variable of I is used for top executives who have stakes in the firm and 0 
otherwise. 
The next focus i s  to examine the role of corporate governance on executive turnover 
which is represented by board attributes. Using this variable might capture the 
potential determinants that have an impact on the probabi l ity of executive turnover. 
The components include board size, leadership structure and board compositions 
which are used to investigate their l ink with executive turnover, which is crucial for 
emphasising aspects of corporate governance. The variables are as fol lows: 
a) Board size i s  the variable to represent the number of board members and 
when the board size increases, it shows that monitoring capacities could be 
enhanced (Yermack , 1 996). 
b) CEO dual ity is a dummy equal to 1 i f the chairman ofthe board and the CEO 
is performed by the same individual. Splitting the roles between the 
Chairman and the CEO generate advantages for reducing agency problems 
and improved independence in decision making, thereby enhanced corporate 
value. 
c) Board independence is measured by a ratio of outside d irectors on board. As 
mentioned earl ier, the presence of outside directors m ight reduce the confl ict 
of interests between shareholders and managements through its monitoring 
function on the management activities. According to Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny ( 1 9 89), mon itoring non-executive directors might evade the executive 
directors ' control over their manipu lative actions, particu larly by increasing 
their compensation pay. 
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d) For directors' characteri stics, age is observed as a significant impact on 
executive turnover which is determined as at the end of the accounting period 
i n  which they are being replaced by the firm (Goyal and Park, 2002). 
Retirement age i s  used to proxy between older and younger director which is 
controlled by a dummy variable with l if the executive director is age 70 or 
older in  turnover year. 
Other control variables l ikely to have an impact on executive turnover are firm size 
and level of compensation payments. F i rm size is measured as the natural log of 
market capital isation for the turnover year. The study also investigates the l ink 
between turnover-performance with stock option plans; the key independent variable 
for level of pay is stock option grant received and held by top management in 
relation to cash pay. Thus, the indicator used to represent stock option compensation 
is used which according to Mehran and Yermack ( 1 997) is defined as a ratio of 
stock option grants for executive director divided by cash payments. The total of 
cash pay includes salary, bonus and other types of cash payments. Further 
investigation whether there is an association between stock option holdings and 
executive turnover as an incentive to remain in their position in the firm I create an 
inventory of stock options granted by collecting data on unexercised stock options 
that had never been vested prior to the year of turnover events. The variable was 
expressed as the percentage of firm shares. 
The Data 
The initial sample of this  study consists of Malaysian l isted firms which offer stock 
option plans from 2000 to 201 0. S ince the purpose of the study is to examine 
executive turnover, the sample l imits observation to stock option plans that are 
targeted at executive levels as in Fee and Hadlock (2003). From the original sample 
1 77 listed firms with establ ished stock option plans, I omitted firms with missing 
data. These firms were chosen as a clean sample in which the firm's  operate across 
various business sectors. The sample selection derived from the above criteria is as 
follows: 
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Clean sample (2002-2010) 
Initial dataset 1 77 
Less: 
MESDAQ companies 0 
Del isting I 
Financial Institutions 0 
Missing Data 3 
Merger and Acquisitions 0 
Full dataset for executive turnover 1 73 
Data regarding stock option plans were col lected annual ly from multiple sources 
such as company annual report, the Malaysia Bourse website under company 
announcement section and Investor Digest magazine, whi le  accounting data were 
extracted from B loomberg and the information for corporate governance and 
ownership structure are obtained from annual reports. The data used identifies all 
h igh level management for each firm included in the sample. 
The study focuses on executive turnover during the interval year of 2000 and 20 1 0, 
but due to the avail ab i l ity of date preceding 200 1 ,  I used 2002 as the base starting 
year for data col lection. Moreover, 2002 may be considered as the year that the 
Malaysian economy began to recover from the Asian financial crisis and the 
introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), while 2005 
is the effective year when Malaysian firms were subjected to the new Financial 
Reporting Standards (FRSs) that have an impact on accounting ratio calculation 
(Rokiah Ishak, 20 1 1  ) . The length of the period covered in this study is sufficient to 
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determine m anagerial turnover through comparing the names of top management 
over the sample period. W ith regard to the dependent variable for top executive 
turnover, I i dentified a number of top executive replacements and reasons of 
turnover as suggested by Weisbach ( 1 988) and Denis and Denis ( 1 995). 
I fol low a s imi lar approach to Parrino ( 1 997) who examine the number of managerial 
turnover based on news reports from local newspaper and through the bourse 
website. Accord ingly, a director' s age is chosen as the cutting off point for 
compulsory retirement to d istinguish between forced and routine d ismissal . Directors 
can be appointed i f  they are within the age of 1 8  to 70 because according to legal 
requirements thi s  age range is considered "fu l l  age" as stated in Section 1 29 (1 ) ,  of 
the Company's  Act 1 965 (CA 1 965). The cut off point for the official age of 
Malaysian director retirement is 70. A lthough, there has been an additional clause 
which allows d irector above 70 years old to be re-appointed as a board member by a 
resolution passed through a three-fourths majority of all those entitled to vote at a 
general meeting (Section 1 29 (6), CA 1 965). The study analysis of executive 
turnover process could be enhanced by identifying whether individual directors left 
their position at the age of 70 as routine (retirement) or replaced by board members 
is treated as forced turnover. This method is consistent with Goyal and Park (2002) 
who emphasised that there is a significant association between director age and 
turnover. 
The initial summary statistics indicate that 1 0.27 per cent of executive turnover 
events occur during  the sampling period. This frequency is sl ightly similar to 
Coughlan and Schmidt ( 1 985) and Mehran and Yermack ( 1 997) who report 1 2.7 per 
cent and I 0 . 8  per cent respectively. The percentage value provides a clear 
description of the sample including business sector and stock option target groups. 
However, there are some cases, where several firms combine the plan group 
al location, thus it is not possible to determine exactly the target groups due to 
und isc losed information. For these cases, the categories were treated as broad-based 
stock options in order to avoid further reduction in sample size. 
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5.4 E mpirical results 
This section presents the results of this  study which examine the effects of executive 
turnover-performance on M alaysian l i sted firms. I n  specific, the main study analyses 
the extent to which executive turnover is l ike ly influenced by firm performance, 
ownership structure, board characteristics, firm characteristics and total 
compensation. The findings are organi sed into three sections. The first section 
d iscusses the descriptive statistics of sample and fol lowed with a multivariate 
analysis and d iscussion of the findings in the second section. The last section 
provides a summary of the results. 
The sample for executive turnover includes al l the l isted firms in the Main and Ace 
market of Bursa Malaysia with employee stock option plans between 2000 and 20 1 0 . 
Over the period studied, there are 1 73 l i sted firms which implement stock option 
plans. The main feature of the sample constitutes executive turnover which has been 
classified into two categories between forced turnover (unplanned turnover) and 
routine turnover (planned turnover). The sample selection explains the 
characteristics of the firms according to the industry types and turnover year as 
presented in Table 1 2 . 
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Table 1 2 :  Sample characteristics 
Forced turnover (%) Routine turnover {%) Total (%) 
Panel A: Boar·d of exchange 
Main market 79.59 1 5.70 95.29 
Ace market 4.34 0.37 4.71 
Panel B: Business Sector· 
Construction 7.66 I 57 9.20 
Consumer Product 10.34 2. 1 2  1 2  47 
Industrial Product 25.02 4.89 29.92 
IPC 0.92 0.09 1 . 02 
Plantation 4.43 0.74 5. 1 7  
Properties 7.4B 1 .29 8.77 
Technology 7.94 1 .94 9.88 
Trading-Services 20. 1 3  3.42 23.55 
Panel C: By ye:w 
2002 1 .85 0. 1 8  2.03 
2003 10.34 1 .75 1 2. 1 0  
2004 12. 1 9  1 . 1 1  13.30 
2005 1 1 . 1 7  1 . 3 9  12.56 
2006 10 06 2. 1 2  12. 1 9  
2007 1 0.34 1 .85 1 2. 1 9  
2008 9.70 3.23 1 2.93 
2009 9.33 2.22 1 1 . 54 
2010 8.96 2.22 1 1 . 1 7  
Panel D:Perfor·mance 
High performance 64.08 12.83 76.92 
Low performance 19.85 3.23 23.08 
Panel E: By size 
Below average (< RM790 miJJ,on) 44 32 7.85 52. 1 7  
Above average (>RM790 million) 39.52 7.85 47.65 
Forced turnover refers to unplanned termination and routine turnover is a planned turnover- includes early retirement or achieved compulsory retirement age 
1 48 
Panel A ,  B and C i l lustrate the selection of sample firms according to the l isting, 
business sector and turnover year events. The data displayed in Table 1 2  suggests 
that the m ajority of l isted firms are from main market in which the event of 
executive turnover is largely from industry and trading services. When executive 
turnover i s  split across the year, the h ighest event of turnover is in 2004 and 2008, 
whi le the lowest is 2002. In addition, more than 75 per cent of executive turnover 
have positive performance which suggest that firms enjoy healthy performance. In 
terms of firm size, as measured by m arket capitalisation, it has been reported that 
approximately 5 2  per cent of the l isted firms is below the average of RM790 
m i l l ions. 
A detai led statistical summary of control l ing variables used in the study concerning 
executive turnover i s  displayed in Table 1 3  and 1 4. On average, the top executive 
turnover is 0 .84 with no d ifference to mean value between family founding and non­
fam ily found ing firms. Further examination of descriptive statistics for performance 
indicating that accounting measures show the mean value is positive under the fu l l  
sample. However, when using the market indicators, the results for the full sample 
revealed a negative mean value for al l samples which suggest that top executive 
turnover is l ikely to be higher suggesting that removal top managements convey bad 
news to the market, even though the firm removes inefficient managers. In addition, 
to validate the former agreement with previous studies about poor corporate 
performance leads to high turnover, the variable for negative operating income is 
analysed . H ence, the positive mean value for firms with negative performance 
confirmed study conclusions that top managements would leave the firm due to poor 
corporate performance as one of the possible reasons. 
At a glance, ownership and board characteristics emphasise that there has been a 
sim ilar frequency in means value between ful l  sample and sub-sample groups. As for 
ownership structure, the findings ind icate that 59 per cent of the sample firms are 
controlled by non-fami ly members, despite prior studies indicating that Malaysia 
firms are heavi ly dominated by family-founding business (La Porta, De-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 1 999; and Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000). The means value of 
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ownership i n  al l  types of firms are s imi lar, but the fam ily-founding firms enjoy more 
healthy corporate performance, wh i le their counterparts report negatively to mean 
ROA. In add ition, for board attributes, on average, board size contains eight 
members and citing a m inimum number of independent d irectors as three, which 
indicate that size i s  equal to one-third of normal board size in Malaysia. This finding 
is  s l ightly l ower than the recommended s ize of nine to eleven (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1 992; and Jensen, 1 993 ; and Rachpradit, Tang and Khang, 20 1 2). As mentioned 
earl ier, there h as been no significant d ifference in board size for all firm types; 
perhaps one of the reasons is the nomination process for board members, which is  
strictly subject to legal requirements. Lipton and Lorsch ( 1 992) suggest that keeping 
up a smal l board s ize would increase firm efficiency, whi le Faleye (2003) argues that 
large board size m ight affect the board ' s  monitoring abil ity to perform its function . It 
is noticeable that the mean of CEO d uality in founding family firms is relatively 
higher than their counterparts with an equal percentage of independent directors in 
the firm . 
Demographic characteristics, such as d irector age is commonly used to determine 
turnover events. The results show that on average, Malaysian directors leave their 
job approximately at the age of 54, which impl ies that executive replacements in 
Malaysian firms are far below normal retirement age. As indicated earlier, an 
individual who is above 70 is not eligible to be appointed as the company's director 
in publ ic  or subsidiary company. W ith regard to executive turnover age between 
family-founding and non-family founding firm, the result shows that there is no 
significant difference in  turnover age as the mean value are 53 .77 and 54. 1 9, 
respectively. This finding is consistent with studies conducted in the U .S .  which 
indicate the mandatory retirement age for American CEOs to be 55 years old 
(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1 985;  and Goyal and Park, 2002) . In relation to firm­
characteristics, an examination ofthe mean value ofthe firm size is about RM790.49 
mi l lion. The finding for sub-sample groups indicates the mean value of firm size in 
family control is relatively higher as opposed to non-family firms. This suggests that 
family-owned business may be classified as a matured firm due to the long history of 
Malaysian firms being heavily dominated by family founding business. 
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With regard to the total pay structures, other than salary, stock options make up the 
second biggest component of remuneration in awarding incentive to executives. 
Similar evidence i s  observed among the sub-sample groups. Perhaps, the stock 
option plan i s  appropriate for retaining top executive for at least three to five years 
unti l  the vesting period ends. According to Kang (2002), there is a provision in the 
company's articles of association that indicate that shareholders are allowed to 
review al l d irectors ' performance every year and there i s  a possibi lity that at least 
one executive may retire in every three years. An add itional test were conducted on 
all variables, since the main purpose of the study is to examine whether there is a 
d ifference in mean value between fami ly-control led and non-fami ly control led firms. 
Abidin (2006) suggests that the mai n  criteria for selecting the matched firms are 
commonly based on l isting market, industry and market capitalisation. Thus if  one 
matched criteria was not ful ly  achieved, then the selection criteria were relaxed. In 
this case, the match for firm size between fami ly and non-fami ly controlled would be 
acceptable if it fal ls with in the range of 30 per cent upper and lower l imits. Al l  
matching resu lts are presented in Table 13  which shows that firm size in  the fami ly­
based firm is  larger than its counterparts. However, the mean result indicate no 
significant difference between firm types. The difference in  mean value is  observed 
for unadjusted returns, board size, board independent and salary in which all 
variables are significant at 5 and 1 0  per cent level . 
Correlation analysis 
Since the dependent variable is a forced turnover and routine turnover, a set of 
predictors for the regression model is used to examine its impacts. In regression 
model, the common problem is the high correlation between independent variables. 
Therefore, a d iagnostic test has been performed. Following Brook (2008), the 
presence of multicoll inearity would be detected in a way of testing for a matrix of 
correlations. For this purpose, the detai led resu lts of the correlation analysis are 
presented in Table 1 4  to i l lustrate the relationship between variables based on 
Pearson and Spearman rho correlation. The Pearson correlation is widely used for 
analysing the relat ionsh ip between continuous variable and Spearman-rho to 
dichotomous variable. In fact, there is a d ifference between results using Pearson and 
Spearman-rho, thus the findings are reported based on both correlation analyses. 
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The strength of  the relationsh ip  between variables are determined according to the 
guidelines of Cohen ( 1 988) and Pallant (2007) who suggest the relationship is small 
if the correlation is between 0. 1 0  and 0 .29, medium if  i t  is between 0.30 and 0.49 
and large for correlation above 0 .5 .  
Table 1 4a provides the results of the correlation between independent variables 
which indicate that cash pay and firm s ize have a strong relationship among them, 
while the positive relationship of 0 .569 between bonus and firm size reveal that 
larger firms offer more cash compensation while a strong correlation is found 
between bonus and salary. As expected, l arger firms have good performance and 
more stable growth of income. Therefore, such firms are capable of providing 
attractive compensation pay for their employees. The multicol linearity was suspected 
among these variables. However, there is strong significance for fami ly-ties 
business, board characteristics and performance measures as well as between firm 
size and board attributes . 
ln evaluating stock option plans, the result indicates a negative relation with stock 
option plans and unadjusted returns and a positive relation with stock option plans 
and cash pay. The result thus suggests that fami ly-tied firms which commonly 
participate in business operation are less l ikely to generate healthy performance, 
which is consistent with Rokiah Ishak (20 1 1 )  who found that firms with high 
domination by institutional investors or by b lockholders, the performance has to be a 
positive relation . In add ition, based on guideline by Cohen ( 1 988) and Pallant 
(2007), there is also a medium and small correlation for other explanatory variables 
such as in Pearson correlation analysis, the market performance measures, board 
characteristics, fi rm size and salary are considered as having medium and significant 
correlation . Whereas in Spearman-rho correlation test, the explanatory variables 
produces a small correlation between ownership, loss in operating income (LOSS) 
' 
and CEO dual ity specify that family-contro lled firm has an effective board, less 
likely to generate good performance, although it is supported with a clear separation 
roles between CEO and chairman. W ith regard to the assumptions underpinning 
logistic regression models, Pallant (2007) point out that the presence of 
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multicol l inearity problems could be detected if the variance inflation factors (VIP) 
are more than 5, whi le other researchers use 1 0 . As a result, a form of the auxi l iary 
regression model  i s  run for all variables to calculate their VIFs. Table 1 4b indicate 
that there are no  m ulticoll inearity problems s ince the VIF is  less than 5 .  
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Table 1 3  : Descriptive statistics for All Variables 
Family (n-102) Non-family Paired t-test 
Full sample (n=l73) (n=7 1 )  
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
Turnover 0 .84 1 .000 1 .00 0 00 037 0.94 0.94 0 28 0 78 
ROA(Return on assets) 0.76 3.24 63 3 1  -354.70 22.38 0.67 - 1 2 7  1 . 1 4  0.26 
Unadjusted returns -0 004 0.03 2 . 1 6  -4.6 1  0.96 -0. 1 5  -0.0 1 * * *  -2 . 1 7  0.03 
Market-adjusted returns -0.07 -0.06 2.72 -6.77 0.75 -0. 1 3  -0.07 -1 1 7  0.24 
Loss 0.26 0 00 1 .00 0 00 0.44 0.23 0.27 - 1 .49 0. 1 4  
Ownership 0.03 0.00 4 .88  0 00 0.22 0.03 0.03 -0.09 0 .93 
Board size 8 . 1 8  8 1 7  3 230 8.38 8 . 1 0* 1 . 8 5  0.06 
Board Independence 0.4 1 0.40 0 . 83 0. 1 1  0. 1 1  0.40 0.42** -2.06 0.04 
CEO Duality 0.75 1 .00 1 .00 0.00 0.43 0.74 0.72 0 .68 0 .49 
Age 53 .78 54 89 23 1 0.68 53 .77 54. 1 9  -0.56 0 .57 
Firm Size (Mi l l ions) 790.49 1 63 09 45,727.25 0.00 2,832.06 797.83 739.27 0.32 0.75 
Stock options (unit) I , 1 1 7,457 0.00 36,5 2 1 ,650 0.00 3,822, 1 05 1 ,575, 1 98 1 ,3 0 1 ,772 1 .09  0.28 
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Salary (RM) 1 ,839, 1 9 1  955,638 68,85 1 ,000 43,776 4,365,570 2 , 1 93,576 I ,638,679* 1 . 86 0 .06 
Bonus (RM) 7 1 0. 1 05 203,000 4 1 ,469,000 2.000 2,582, 1 84 747,768 . 1 0  827,462.20 0.07 0 .95 
* * * Signi ficant at I per cent  level; * * Sign i ficant at 5 per cent  level: *Significant at  10 per cent level I 
- --- - ---- ---·-- - - _I 
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Table 1 4a : Correlation matrix (n"'1 73) 
Pearson Correlation 
M ARKET- FAMILT- FIRM 
ROA UN ADJUSTED RETURN TIES OWNERSHIP BOARD !NO AGE SIZE ESO SALARY BONUS 
ROA 1 .00 
UN ADJUSTED -0 03 1 .00 
MARKET -RETURN 0.004 0 . 36* * *  LOO 
FAM ILY-TIES -0 . 1 2* *  -0. 1 1 * *  0.03 1 .00 
OWNERSHIP 0.07 -0.03 -0 03 -0.03 LOO 
BOARD 0.26* * *  -0.07 -0.02 -0 01 -0 03 LOO 
IND -0 .25 * * *  0 . 0 1  -0. 1 1 * *  -0.09* -0 08 -0.34* * *  1 .00 I 
AGE 0. 1 2 * *  0. 1 0 * * 0.0 1 -0.02 0.09* -0 04 0.02 LOO 
FIRM SIZE -0.05 0 .38 * * * 0.02 -0.06 -0 08 -0. 1 5 * * *  0.06 0. 1 I * * LOO 
ESO (LOG) 0.01 -0. 1 2 * * 0.02 0.08 -0 02 0.0 1 0.04 0.04 -0 04 1 . 00 
SALARY 0.0 1 0. 1 0 * -0 08 0.09* 0.002 -0.2 I * * *  0 05 0.07 0.46 * * *  0 03 1 .00 
BONUS -0.04 0.28 * * *  -0. 1 0* 0.03 -0.02 -0. I 8* * * 0. 1 0  0 . 1 5 * * *  0. 57* * *  -0.07 0.66 * * *  LOO 
- - - -
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Spcnrman-rho 
FAMILY- CEO 
TIES LOSS DUALITY 
FAMILY-TIES 1 .00 
LOSS -0.07* * 1 .00 
CEO DUAUTY -0.00 1 -0. 1 2 * * *  1 .00 
* * * Significant at 1 per cent level; ** S ignificant at 5 per cent level 
*Sign1f1cant at 10 per cent level 
Table 1 4b: Collinearity Statistics - Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs). 
Variables Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs 
ROA 175 
Unadjusted return 2.07 
Market return 1 7 0  
Loss in operating income 1 .34 
Ownership 1 .04 
Board size 137 
Board independence 1 40 
Finn size 2.02 
Stock options 104 
Salary 1 .92 
Bonus 242 
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Regression model results 
The present study  concerns itself with examining the effects of top executive 
turnover on firm performance. The empirical research on the impact of firm specific 
factors on turnover is based on the regression model previously stated as fol lows: 
Exec_turn= f(perf, ownership,governance,size, stock option_ cash) (2) 
Where P is the dependent variable  for executive turnover and the independent 
variables are represented by performance, ownership, board characteristics and total 
of compensations. The regression model of equation is used to test all hypotheses 
previously outl ined to assess the effect of executive turnover on firm performance. in 
this  study also testing performance interactions require both accounting and market 
perfonnance measures. Furthermore, since the precise reason for the replacement 
executive replacements is not entirely d isclosed during announcement releases, the 
study distinguish between forced turnover and routine turnover. 
The present study is informed by the work of Weisbach ( 1 988) who excluded 
executive turnover around the retirement age from his sample selection. Malaysia 
directors are required to retire when the reach the age of 70 years old, but there is 
high incidence of early retirement cases which is below the compulsory age. Within 
the sample, there are 1 74 cases of directors that have been replaced due to retirement 
and there are 47 cases above 70 years old.  This m eans that m ore than 70 percent is of 
directors are classified as early retirement. Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) 
indicate that excluding executive turnover below retirement age denotes that we 
excluded the forced turnover data. Therefore, for better determination, this  study 
reclassifies the true reason of each executive turnover whether it should be treated as 
a part of forced turnover or treated as routine turnover. For both types of turnover 
groups, we run separate regression models to examine the turnover-performance 
effects. This allows us to avoid the problem of estimation effects. 
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Each of the regression models include the main control variables earlier mentioned 
including ownership structure, corporate governance and compensation pay 
structures. I n  each of the regression models, we also make use of a dummy variable 
to account for the event of executive turnover which is set equal to one if top 
managements are replaced during the sample period. Table 1 5 , 1 6, 1 7, 1 8, 1 9  and 20 
present the results for the d ifferent models used in the study. First Table 1 5  report 
the results for top executive turnover and firm performance, Table 1 6, Panel A and 
B, regression est imates for executive turnover in all ages, Table 1 7, Panel A, the 
regression estimates for spl it sample by board size and Panel B board size and 
executive turnover performance sensitivity, Table 1 8  presents regression to estimate 
of spl it sample by board independence, Table 1 9  presents regression estimates of 
split sample by firm size, and Table 20 estimates of sample by levels of pay in form 
of stock options. 
For the base m odel ,  model 1 ,  the resu lts of which are reported in Table 1 5, includes 
performance measures of return on assets (ROA), unadjusted returns and market­
adjusted returns and firms with loss operating income (LOSS) for different sample 
groups. The first sample group includes all turnover events, while the second group 
excludes top executive retirements around the age of 70, whi le the third group covers 
the case of retirement at the age of 69,70 and 7 1  years old. The overall results for all 
ages presented indicate that poor corporate performance leads to high turnover. This 
finding is in the l ine with prior findings, as the study finds a negative relationship 
between turnover and firm performance. However, such effect is more sensitive to 
current performance as three out of four performance measures are al l significant at 
both the 5 and I 0 per cent level . It  i s  evident from the results that the market­
adjusted return is positively related to firm performance but insignificant across the 
sample groups, which suggests a weak effect in determining executive turnover. The 
coefficient value  for ROA and unadjusted return in the ful l  sample is negatively 
associated with corporate performance which indicates a inverse relationship is 
supportive of the assumption that firm experiencing low performance leads to 
turnover among executive increases sign i ficantly. The analysis of turnover effects of 
prior performance, the result finds insignificant relationsh ip and the finding is a 
sl ight contrast to the conclusion drawn from studies by Suchard et al. (200 1 )  and 
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Tsai et al . (2006) which indicate that Jagged performance plays a crucial role in  CEO 
turnover. Moreover, poor performing firm replaces top executive based on previous 
performance, instead of current year performance (Boeker and Goodstein, l 993)] . 
The results also indicate that estimating the turnover effects for current firm 
performance us ing accounting and market-based measures are logically more valid 
than the preceding year 's  performance. The study finds both the ROA and 
unadjusted returns to be sign ificant for al l  executives turnover age and forced 
turnover groups which suggest that accounting measures are better than market 
based return measures which, as noted by G ibson (2003), has flaws due to the 
inefficiency of emerging capital markets such as Malaysia. 
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Table 1 5 : Regression estimates for executive turnover and performance in al l  turnover events and sub-sample groups (Forced turnover and Routine turnover) 
Model \ Sub-sample I Sub-sample 2 
All  top executive turnover Non-retirement age executive directors Only retirement age executive d i rectors 
Current year (1) Preced ing year (t-1) Current year (I) Preceding year (t-1) Current year (1) Preced ing year (t- 1)  
ROA, -0. 0 1 7  . .  -0.001 -0.0 1 5**  0.00 1 7  -0.076 -0.071 
(0 0253) (0 89) (0.05)  (0. 8 1 )  (0 1 1 ) (0 22) 
Intercept 1 .697 1 .655 1 . 823 
J 
1 .78 1 0.244 0322 
(0 00) (0 00) (000) (0.00) (0.45) (0 .37) 
Number of Observations 1 083 1 083 1 029 1 029 55 55  
Number of turnovers 909 909 88 1  8 8 1  2 8  28  
R' 0.008 0.00002 0.0067 0.000 1 0  0.076 0.02 1 3  
U nadj usted return -0. 2 1 4* *  -0. 1 20 -0. 169*  -0.072 -0.367 -0.559 
(0 0 1 7) (0 1 45) (0.08) (0. 4 1 6) (0 23) (0. 1 3 )  
1 6 1  
Intercept I 664 I 667 I 788 I 79 1 0 1 49 0 .2 1 5  
(0.00) (0.00) (0 00) (000) (0 6 1 )  (0.47) 
Number of Observations 1 0 8 1  1 083 1 027 1 029 55 55 
Number of turnovers 907 909 879 8 8 1  28  28  
R2 0.006 0.002 0.0038 0 .000794 0.005 0.03 1 7  
Market-ad.rusted return 0 1 70 0.005 0. 1 87* 0.024 0. 1 95 -0.393 
(0 1 0 1 )  (0.82) (0 09) (0.62) (0,67) (0.30) 
Intercept 1 .669 1 .653 1 . 803 1 .784 0.027 0. 1 64 
(000) (0.00) (0.00) (000) (0.92) (0.58) 
Number of Observations 1 0 8 1  1 083 1 027 1 029 55 55 
Number of turnovers 907 909 879 88 1 28 28 
I 
R' 0.003 0.000008 0.0033 0.000260 0.0023 0.0 1 42 
Loss in operating income 0.365 * 0.045 0.395* 0.053 0.34 -0.539 
(0 07) (0.8 1 )  (0.07) (0.79) (0 59) (0.45) 
-
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Intercept 1 .567 1 .642 1 .693 I 77 1 -0.05 0 . 1 34 
(0.00) (0 00) (0 00 (0. 00) (0 87) (0.66) 
Number of Observations 1 083 1 083 1 029 1 029 55 55 
Number of turnovers 909 909 88 1  8 8 1  2 8  28  
R� 0.004 0.000057 0.004 0.000078 0.0023 0.007670 
Return on assets (ROA) is  calculated by d ivid ing a company's annual earnings by 1ts total assets and ROA is d isplayed as a percentage. Unadjusted return is the firm share price actual returns in  one year and 
market-adjusted return is actual stock returns less the expected returns on FTSE Kuala Lumpur over the same penod. LOSS is a dummy variable that is  equal to I if the firm has negative operati ng income. 
Exclude executive turnover at the age of 69,70 and 71 years old and include executive turnover only at the age of 69,70 and 7 1  years old. *** and * md1cate the level of sign i ficance at the I %, 5% and I 0%, 
respectively. 
1 63 
The results for turnover-performance effects based on the sub-sample groups find 
that forced turnover strongly influence executive replacement decisions which 
impacts current firm performance. The statistics also suggests that routine turnover 
weakly i mpacts previous and current firm performance. The coefficient value shown 
in Table 1 5  indicates improvem ent i n  firm performance in the current year for all 
executive turnover ages and excluding the retirement age group between turnover 
and ROA, wh ich are -0.0 1 7  and -0.0 1 5 , respectively, in addition to both turnover and 
unadjusted return which were respectively -0.2 1 4  to -0. 1 69 .  The results also show 
some sign ificance at the 5 percent level ind icatin g  that executive turnover is sensitive 
to firm performance. In a s imi lar way, the relationship  between turnover and market 
performance measures is  found to be s ignificant at the 1 0  percent level. The results 
for the sub-sample of force turnover are consistent with results obtained by 
Rachpad it et a l .  (20 1 2) but d iffers s l ight for the results obtained for routine turnover 
groups. The presence of replacement cases in routine turnover above the retirement 
age may be attributed to the legal framework which al lows directors to be 
reappointed after retirement through a resolution of three-fourths majority of 
shareholders at a general meetin g. 
The resu lts also point to the effects of turnover-performance generating negative 
operating income (LOSS) both in the current and previous year and across the sub­
sample groups. It is noticed that there i s  a positive association between current and 
preceding year performance which is significant at the 1 0  percent level for all 
executive turnover and sub-sample excluding turnover for the retirement age. For the 
sub-sample, which also includes the retirement age, the statistics indicate an 
insign ificant relationship for turnover and performance. These results also establ ish 
that estimating turnover-performance effects in a single model is not appropriate . For 
th is reason 1 extended the estimated model to incorporate a number of control 
variables that are li kely to influence d irector replacement decis ions. These as earlier 
mentioned include managerial ownership, fam i ly control ,  board attributes, firm size 
and compensation pay structures. Thus  the turnover-performance effects in
 each 
model are substituted with accountin g  and market measures, respective
ly. The 
results of the est imations are d isplayed in Table 1 6, Panel A, for top 
executive 
· h · 1  p 1 B display the results for the turnover of all ages for the precedmg year, w I e ane 
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impact of executive turnover on the current year. The results in Panel A reveal the 
executive turnover coefficients for current performance to be insignificant for both 
ROA whi le  the unadjusted return indicate a negative association. The result are in 
l ine with results obtained using single models which imply weak evidence for the 
hypothesis  that executive turnover are m ore l ikely to be higher when corporate 
performance is low. In this  case, it m ay be that current performance is not as 
important a factor in determining executive turnover. Further, substituting firm 
specific performance measures into the models do not improve the results, since all 
variables, except ROA, are insign ificant. The coefficients relating to ROA are 
positive and s ignifi cant at the 5 percent level ,  indicating that good firm performance 
for the year preceding executive turnover has no impact on the decision of director 
with respect to future replacements, as show in Panel B. These findings are 
supportive of the findings of Warner et al .  ( 1 988), Denis and Den is ( 1 995), Den is et 
al. ( 1 997), Lausten (2002) and Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2), which all report 
an inverse relationship between corporate performance and executive turnover. 
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Ta ble 1 6 : Reg•·ession estimates for executive turnover in al l  ages 
Variables Model I Model 2 
Model l Model 4 
Panel A : Currcnl Year Turnover 
Intercept 6.39* " *  (0.0 I )  5.09* (0.06) 6 . 1 1 * * (0 02) 6 3 3 * *  (0 .0 1 2) 
ROA -0.0 I (0 27) 
Unad_iusted -0 1 7  (0 24) 
Return 
Market- 0.09 (0.57) 
adjusted Return 
Loss in 0 . 1 3(0.65) 
Operating 
Income I 
Managerial 0.47 (0.68) 0 . 3 1  (0.78) 0.49(0.66) 0.48 ( 0.67) 
Ownership 
Fami ly 0.24 (0.34) 0.24(0.32) 0.26(0.29) 0.24 (0.32) 
Dummy if  age - 1 .98*** (0.00) - 1 .98***  (0.00) -2 .0 1 * * * (0 00) - 1 .99*** (0.00) 
>7 1  
Board size -0.3 1 (049) -0.39 (040) -0.36(0.43) -036 (0.44) 
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Board -0 86 (0 42) -0 7 1 (0 50) -0.73 (0.49) -0.88 (0 4 1 )  
Independence 
CEO duality -0 .74** (0  02) -0 79* * *(0 0 I )  -0.77* *(0.0 1 2 )  -0.75* *  ( 0  0 1 4) 
Firm size -0. 1 4(0 27) -0 07(0.62) -0. 1 2  (035) -0. 1 3 (0 29) 
S toe k -based 0.0 I (0 86) 0 02(0.77) 0.002 (0.97) 0.0 I (0 .87)  
compensation 
Cash-based -0.05 (055) -0 05(0.56) -0 04 (059) -0.05 (0.56) 
compensation 
Number of 6 1 8  6 1 6  6 1 6  6 1 8  
observations 
Number of 508 506 506 508 
turnover 
-2 Log 264.5 1 264 . 1 9  264.75 265 . 1 8  
l ikel ihood 
Model p-value 0 00 0 00 0 00 0.00 
McFadden R' 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.08 
Panel B: ]'receding Year Turnover 
I ntercept 6.46*** (0.0 I )  6 .08* * *  (0 .0 1 )  5 .99** * (0.0 1 )  
6.26***  (0 0 1 )  
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ROA 0.03 .. (0 02) 
Unadjusted 0 . 1 8  (0 .23) 
Return 
Market- 0.09 (0.59) 
adjusted Return 
Loss in -0. 1 2  (0.74) 
Operatmg 
Income 
Managerial 0.4 1 (0.69) 052(0.62) 0.48 (0.65) 0.43 (0 .68) 
Ownership 
Fam i ly 0 . 1 9  (0.50) 036 (0.23) 0.3 1 (0.29) 0 27 (034) 
Dummy if age -2.02***  (0 00) - 1 .92*** (0.00) - 1 .90***  (0.00) - 1 . 9 1 * * *  (0.00) 
>7 1  
Board size 0.0 I (0 89) -0 0 I (0 83) -0.02 (0.82) -0.02 (0 82) 
Board 0 1 7  (0 90) 0.03 (0.98) 0.06 (0 96) 0.07 (0.96) 
i ndependence 
CEO duality -0.49 (0 1 8) -046 (0.2 1 )  -0.45 (0.2 1 )  -0.46 (02 1 )  
Fi rm SIZe -0. 1 6  (0 1 2) -0. 1 4  (0. 1 5 ) -0. 1 5  (0. 1 3 )  -0. 1 5  (0. 1 4) 
S tock-based 0.03 (0.72) 0.04 (0.53) 0.04 (0 56) 0.04 (0.60) 
compensation 
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Cash-based -0. 1 3  (0 1 4) -0. 1 4  (0 1 5) -0. 1 2  (0.23) -0. I 0 (0.26) 
compensation 
Number of 393 393 393 393 
observations 
Number or  325 325 325 325 
turnover 
-2 Log 1 65 . 1 2  1 66.94 1 67.52 1 67.6 1 
l ikelihood 
Model p-value 0.00 0 00 0.00 0 00 
McFadden R' 0.088 0.078 0.075 0.074 
Return on assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets and displayed as a percentage. Unadjusted return is the firm share price actual returns in one year and market-adjusted return 
is actual stock returns less the expected returns on FTSE Kuala Lumpur over the same period. LOSS is a dummy variable that is equal to I if the firm has negative performance. Managerial Ownership 1s a proportion of 
shares owned by directors and family-ties are a dummy variable for fam i ly-controlled firm. Age refers to di rector age which represented by a dummy variable for executive turnover more than 7 1  years old. Board size i s  
the number of  directors. Board independence is the proportion of  outside directors on the boards. CEO duality is a dummy variable which 1s equal to  one  when the CEO and Chairman are the  same person, zero otherwise. 
Firm size is the natuml logarithm of the firm's market capitalisation. Stock-based compensation is the natural logarithm of the stock options received by directors during the year of turnover events. Cash-based 
compensation is the natural logarithm of cash payments received by directors. * * * , **  and * indicate the level of significance at the 1 %, 5% and 1 0%, respectively. 
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It is also clear that when a dumm y  variable i s  used to account for negative corporate 
performance that the results reveal a tendency for the top management level to be 
replaced due to unhealthy firm conditions, s ince the coefficient is  positively related 
to current year but negatively related to poorer firm performance. However, the 
results remain insignificant and thi s  impl ies that the relationship between turnover 
and the two performance variables used in the study are weak. The results here do 
not confirm the conclusions of Lausten (2002) who notes that when the pre-tax profit 
is negative, the turnover rate s ignificantly increases. C learly, the conclusions of 
Malaysian data indicate that executive turnover is less sensitive to current as wel l  as 
prior firm performance. 
Executive turnover and ownership structure 
We now proceed to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and 
family-ties and turnover-performance. The study assumes that the percentage owned 
by top executives and control led by fam i ly members may be inversely related to 
turnover. In Table 1 6, it may be seen that the presence of managerial ownership is 
l ikely to increase turnover when there is no difference between current and prior firm 
performance. Specifical ly, the positive relationship does not support previous 
assumptions which indicate that turnover is less l ikely to occur when top executives 
are also the firm 's  shareholders. These results are broadly  in l ine with the find ings of 
Pergola (2005) who report a negative interaction between the percentage owned by 
directors and turnover. This also implies that managerial ownership is not a factor 
determining the l ikel ihood of top executive turnover. Moreover, own ing a fixed 
percentage of a fi rm 's shares does not necessari ly  mean they are able to protect their 
controll ing power in the firm. We accept that this  m ight be due to the nature of 
Malaysian corporate environment wh ich is highly concentrated on family-ownersh ip 
structure which does not welcome turnover. This is not in l ine with our prior 
expectations that owing to fam ily-ties family control led firms are less likely to 
replace top executives. In fact, the changes of executive position in fami ly-controlled 
firms are more incl ined towards voluntary process among family members. Maury 
(2006) for example notes that comm itment and loyalty to family member leads to 
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low turnover i n  fam i ly-based fi rms.  Therefore, to examine the effect of family-ties, I 
substituted a dummy variable into the regression model for fami ly ownership set 
equal to one i f  the firm is fam i ly  control led and zero otherwise to account for the 
sensitivity of turnover-performan ce to th is variable .  The results of the model 
reported in Table  1 6  are not consistent with the hypothesized relationship between 
turnover and current performance s ince the dummy variable coefficient relatina b 
fami ly ownersh ip to prior performance is positive and have the same magnitude as 
the accounting and market-based measures, which indicate that executive turnover is 
less sensitive if  the firm i s  fam i ly-contro l led whi le the l ikelihood of top executive 
turnover is found  to be h igher. 
To validate the result of turnover-performance sensitivity, I make the assumption 
that turnover is weak when the firm has strong fam i ly-ties and therefore a strong 
influence over the board . In this case, I test for the interaction between the dummy 
variable for negat ive performance and ownership structure. The results reveal a 
positive relationship and al l  the statistics point towards sim i lar results when using 
accounting and market-based measures for both the current and preceding year 
turnover. The results provide weak evidence of low probabi l ity of turnover for top 
executive's serv ing in family-owned firms. These results for Malaysian firms are not 
in l ine with previous findings which may be because the firms in our sample with 
strong fami ly-ties are less effective when it comes to removing inefficient 
executives, particularly when they are also a board member or directors. In other 
words, fami ly-based firms support the management entrenchment hypothesis. 
According to the findings of Tsai et al. (2006), fami ly-control led firm apply an 
effective m on itoring, and thus are more accountable for firm performance. 
Surprisingly, on account of our empirical results, weak evidence is found to support 
the hypothesis  which is largely contributed by the method of defining family-based 
firms. Tsai et al .  (2006) for example define fam ily-owned firms as having the 
founder or fam i ly  members as board members, whi le Rachpradit, Tang and Khang 
(201 2) u ses voting rights to determine ownersh ip structure . 
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Board attributes : Age and executive turnover 
As earlier mentioned board characteristics may have an impact on executive 
turnover. A l ikel y  factor in th is  regard wi l l  be the age of director' s  which I would 
expect to p lay a s ignificant role in determining executive turnover. On this issue, the 
empirical evidence is mixed on the precise relation between directors ' age and the 
removal of executives. Some of these studies report that directors remain in their 
position even though they have reached retirement age [Weisbach ( 1 988), Barro and 
Barro ( 1 990), Lausten (2002) and Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (201 2) ] .  In the study 
by Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) split the incidence of executive turnover 
based on age in which the turnover exceed ing retirement age is l ikely to be lower. 
To capture thi s  effect, I use a dummy variable in the model to indicate when the 
retirement age i s  exceeded. The results for the coeffi cient in all models shows a 
negative relationship with executive turnover which although significant at the 1 
percent level does ind icate that older d irectors are less l ikel y  to be replaced by their 
younger counterparts, which suggests that age has a s ignificant influence on 
turnover. This resu lt is inconsistent with results obtained by Lausten (2002) who 
finds that age c lose to retirement does not capture the effect of turnover. However, 
the resu lts ind icating a negative interaction between age and turnover are consistent 
with Borokovich et al. (2006). 
With regard to the sensitiVIty of turnover-performance with retirement age, the 
coefficient relatin g  to current and preceding year performance are sign i ficant at the 
same magnitude, which suggest that age has a direct relationship with executive 
turnover and firm performance. A possible explanation for why older directors 
remain in  position after retirement age may be attributed to their expertise which 
remains appreciated inside the firm .  For this  reason there is less l ikel ihood for the 
level of turnover among older top executives to be associated with firm performance. 
This result is consistent with previous Malaysian legal practices which allow 
directors to remain  in their position beyond 70 to be reappointed. 
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Board size and executive turnover 
With respect to board s ize and executive turnover, there are three variables 
commonly used in most empirical studies to examine the relationship between board 
attributes and executive turnover. These include board size, board composition and 
board leadership structure. The resu lts reported in Table 1 6  for each model indicate 
l ittle evidence that board attributes i nfluence the level of executive turnover. As a 
result, I performed further tests to determine whether larger boards are more l ikely to 
replace executives than smal ler boards and found that turnover increases with board 
size. To affirm thi s  result, previous stud ies use board size as a variable. Lipton and 
Lorsch ( 1 992) and Jensen ( 1 993) indicate that the average board size is I 0, while 
Shivdasan i and Yermack ( 1 999) recommended 1 1  persons and Vafeas ( 1 999) 1 2  
persons. A few Malaysian studies indicate that the mean size i s  between 7 and 8 
members, numbers which correspond to smaller board size when compared to the 
size of boards in developed countries (Abdul  Rahman and Mohamed Ali ,  2006; 
Hafiza Aishah and Susela, 2009; and Wan Nord in , 2009). Therefore, a preference to 
split points for smal ler board size i s  about 8 members or less and larger board i s  9 
and over. 
A crucial part of our investigation is to estimate the influence of board size on 
turnover-performance sensitivity. The results are reported in Table 1 6  wh ich 
ind icates that executive turnover is negatively and weakly related to board size, 
which is cons istent with Faleye (2003) who notes that if the size of boards is less 
sensitive to turnover-performance the observed sign should be significantly negative 
for top executive replacement decis ions. The findings indicate lower executive 
turnover in firm s  with larger board size and that in these firms the board is less 
effective in performing its monitoring functions. The reported inverse interaction 
between variables suggests that turnover is higher when poor performance is open to 
further scrutiny .  Thus I carried out additional tests using two approaches as 
recommended by prior studies in th is field . The first test carried out fol lows the 
method used by Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) which requires splitting the 
sample on the bas is  of board size. The second test I performed fol lows Yermack 
( 1 996) and includes a new interaction variable on performance measures and larger 
board size. The results from each of  these tests are reported in Table 1 7, Panel A, 
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which report the first results based on the current and preceding year data. For the 
current year turnover, the statistics show that executive turnover is significantly 
positive to m arket-adjusted return, whi le the results relating to top executive turnover 
to preceding year performance show ROA and negative operating income to be 
significant at the 1 0  percent level .  Other measures of performance are all 
insignifi cant. 
The results related to current and past performance with occurrence of executive 
turnover and performance indicate that larger boards remain significant and 
negatively associated to turnover. Thi s  result suggests that an increase in board size 
is less l ikely to executive replacement and termination. This is in the l ine with 
Jensen ' s  ( 1 993) observation which emphasise that oversized board might reduce its 
monitoring functions. However, using Malaysia firms data reported in Panel A 
indicate that larger boards are an important factor for determining the l ikel ihood of 
turnover. As a result, I carried out further tests to determine the interaction between 
the performance measures and I also substituted a dummy v ariable into the model to 
account for firms with larger size boards. Our previous expectation is that larger 
board is sensitive to firm performance and therefore the variable should  be negative 
and significant. This wi l l  provide new evidence on the high efficiency of board size 
as Table 1 7, Panel B reports. 
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Table 1 7 :  Panel A - Regression estimates of sample split by board size 
Variables Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Turnorer=j{ ROA,. OlmJ(mlil)', age. large_ boar Turnorer=f{ unadi return , oll'njamily, age. large _boa Turnorer=f{ market return, . ownjanuly, age, l01ge _boa Tumover=f{ loss,, ownjanuly.age, large_ boar 
d, ind. dualii.J .st:e.ESO,cash} rd,ind, duality.si:e.ESO.cash} rd,ind, dua/ity,st:e,ESO,cash} d,tnd, duality,si:e,ESO. cash} 
Intercept , 1 2 .35**  9 02* 1 0 .57* *  1 1 . 94* * 
I 
Intercept ,_, 1 2 . 1 2**  I 0.70** 1 0.72* * 1 1 .0 I * *  
ROA , -0 02 
ROA ,_1 0.04* 
Unadjuste -0.28 
d Return 1 
Unadjuste 0.09 
d Return ,_ ,  
Market- 0.60** 
adjusted 
Return , 
Market- -0 004 
ad_rusted 
Return,.1 
-
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Loss I n  0 . 1 2  
Op!!rating 
Income , 
Loss In 1 . 87* 
Operating 
Income,_, 
Manageria 2.53 2 . 1 3  2 . 8  I 2 .50 
I 
Ownership 
' 
Manageria 1 7 5  1 .63 1 .60 1 .66 
I 
Ownership 
,_ ,  
I 
Family- -0.28 -0.2 1  -0 .27 -0 .27 
ties , 
Family- 0.33 0.53 0.50 0.56 
t 1es , _ ,  
Dummy if  -2 .24* * *  -2.24***  -2.49* * *  -2.24* * *  
age >71 , 
Dummy if  -2.84* * * -2.63* * *  -2 .58** * -2 .37* * *  
age >7 1 ,_, 
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Large -2 . 87* * -2.76** -2.57 *  -2 . 8 2* * 
board , 
Large -0.28 * * -0.29** -0.27** -0.25 * *  
board ,_, 
Board_ind, 3 .97* 4.57* *  47 5  4.26* 
Board md 6.70* 633* 6.27* 6.73 * -
,_ , 
CEO -0.54 -0.58 -0.63 -0 . 5 8  
duality , 
CEO -3.26* *  -03 1 **  -3.07* *  -3 .07* *  
duality,_, 
F i rm size , -0.24 -0.09 -0. 1 8  -0 .23 I 
Firm s ize ,_ -0.33*  0.07* -033* -0.4 1 * * 
I 
Stock -0. 1 4  -0. 1 33 -0. 1 8* -0. 1 3  
opt1ons , 
Stock 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 
options ,_1 
Cash- 0. 1 2  0. 1 2  0. 1 5  0. 1 2  
based , 
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Cash- -0.05 -0. 0 1  0 . 0 1  0 .07 
b<\sed _ ,  
Number of c54 253 253 254 
observat1o 
ns , 
Number of 1 95 1 95 1 95 1 95 
observat\0 
ns ,_ , 
I 
Number of 2 1 5  2 1 4  2 1 4  2 1 5  
turnover , 
Number of 1 69 1 69 1 69 1 69 
turnover ,_1 
-2 Log 95 .56 94.90 93 . 1 3  95.75 
l i ke l ihood , 
·2 Log 60.80 62.35 62.42 60.25 
l ikel ihood 
,_, 
Model p- 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 
va lue , 
Model p- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
value ,_, 
R' , 0 . 1 23 0. 1 27 0 . 1 44 0 . 1 2 1  
- -
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R� 1-t 10.206 I 0. 1 86 I o 1 85 I o 2 1 3  
Return o n  assets (ROA) is calculated by divrdmg a company's annual earnmgs by its total assets and displayed as a percentage Unadjusted return r s  the fmn share price actual returns i n  one year and market-adJusted return is 
actual stock returns less the expected returns on FTSE Kuala Lum pur  over the same penod LOSS rs  a dummy vanable that rs equal to I r f  the fmn has negatrve performance. Managenal Ownersh ip is  a proportion of  shares 
owned by drrectors and t�1mily-t res r s  a dummy vanable for fam i ly-controlled frrm. Age refers to d r rector age whrch represented bv a dummy vanable for executive turnover more than 71 years old Larger board r s  a dummy 
vanable whrch equal to I rf board members more than 9, zero otherwrse. Board independence rs the proportron of outside drrectors on the boards CEO dual ity is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the CEO and 
Charrman are the same person, zero otherwise Firm size rs the natural logarithm of the fi rm 's market capital rzation Stock-based compensatron is the natural loganthm of the stock options received by d irectors during the year 
ofturnover events. Cash-based compensatron 1s the natural logarithm of cash payments received by d i rectors 1 is current year turnover and 1-/ is preceding turnover year * * * , •• and • mdicate the level of s ignifrcance at the 
I %, 5% and I 0%, respectively. 
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For the current year turnover, Panel B reveal that the interaction between laraer b 
boards and market-adjusted return is positive and significant at the 1 0  per cent level 
which impl ies that larger boards are less effective on firm performance when making 
decision on top executive replacements. Contrasting result emerge when the 
estimated regression m odel use prior firm performance in which new interaction 
between larger boards and negative performance generate positive coefficients which 
is sign ificant at the 5 per cent level .  This result suggests that firms with large boards 
are l ikely to rem ove ineffective executives of poor performing firm, whi le other 
interactions produce less evidence to suggest that larger boards are more effective 
than smaller board. Thi s  result is consistent with Yermack ( 1 996) and Rachpradit, 
Tang and Khang (20 1 2) which indicate that smaller boards may enhance the abi l ity 
of boards. In a l l  the reported resu lts could suggest no difference between smaller and 
larger boards in their decision to d ismiss a director of a poorly performing firm. A 
plausible explanation for this  result may be attributed to enhanced corporate 
governance practices which helped the boards of small or larger firms to remove 
ineffective d irectors before they create problems for the firm and for their lack of 
response to performance issues to affect the profitabi l ity of firms negatively (Faleye, 
2003). C learly, the positive coefficient of market-adjusted returns and large boards 
may be considered favourable news to the market (Faleye, 2003). This is consistent 
with Huson, M alatesta and Parrino (2004) who report corporate improvements 
fol lowina turnover announcements. The combined results also suggest that smaller b 
boards increase board functions, despite the effect that larger boards have in 
enhancing shareholders ' wealth. 
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Table I 7: P1mcl B - ncg1·ession estimates fo •· board size and sensitivity of execu tive tumonr to ti1·m pe•·f01·mance 
Variables Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Tumorer =;/i' ROA . .  mrnfanulr. age. large _bo Turno ,·er=f(Unad;_retum, , oH'nfanul)·,age. latge_b Tumora=;(,'.ldarkel_retum, , m <'nfanu/y,age. latge_b Tuntol'er=f(/oss, , ownfamli)•, age. latge _boar 
ard*ROA . . md. duailtv.si:e, ESO.cash} oard*Unad; . md. dualtty.st:e. ESO.cash} oard*marke1 . 111d, duailly.st:e. ESO.cash/ d*loss. md. duahly.si:e. ESO, cash) 
I n tercept , 6 3 8* * * 5 06 * * 6 1 9 . . 6. 5 7* * *  
lntercept ,_, 6.47* ' * 6 23 * * * 6.06 * * * 7.03 * * * 
ROA , -0 .0 1 
' ROA ,_1 0.02 
Unad1usted -0. 1 6  
Return , 
Unadjusted 036 
Return,_, 
Market- -0. 1 5  
adj usted Return 
' 
Market- 0 . 16 
ad_1usted Return 
,_, 
Loss in 0.0 1 
Operating 
-
1 8 1 
Tncome , 
Loss 111 -0 84* *  
Operatmg 
1ncome ,_, 
Managenal 0 47 0 3 1  0 49 0.50 
Ownershtp , 
Managenal 0 4 1  0.50 0 .48 0.44 
Ownership ,_1 
Family-ttes , 0.24 0.24 0.22 0 .23 
f'ami ly-ties ,.1 0 . 1 9  037 03 1 0 .29 
Dummy if age - 1 . 98* ** - 1 .98***  -2.06** * -2.00** *  
>7 1 ' 
Dummy if age -2 .0 1 * * *  - 1 .92* * *  - 1 .9 1 ** *  - 1 . 87* * * 
>7 1  ,_, 
Board size , -0 33 -038 -035 -047 
Board size ,_1 0.002 -0.0004 -0 009 -0.059 
Large 0.004 -0 .02 0.52* 0. 37 
board*pcrform 
ance 
Large 0.0 1 -0.27 -0. 1 0  2 .59* * 
board* perform 
-----
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a nee 
Board -0 . 83 -0. 72 -0. 7 1  -0 .83 
tndcpcndence , 
Board 0 1 6 -0. 0 1  0 . 05 0. 1 8  
mdependence , . 1  
CEO dual 1ty , -0. 74** -0 . 79* * *  -0.78* * *  -0. 74* * 
CEO duality ,_, -048 -047 -045 -0.50 
Firm SIZe , -0 . 1 4 -0.07 -0 . 1 1  -0. 1 3  
. 
Firm size ,_1 -0. 1 5  -0. 1 6  -0. 1 5  -0. 1 7* 
Stock options , 0 . 0 1  0.02 0.002 0 0 1  
Stock options ,_1 0 03 0 .04 0.04 0.02 
Cash-based -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
compensation , 
Cash-based -0. 1 3  -0. 1 3  -0 . 1 1 -0. 1 1 
compensation ,_ 
I 
Number of 6 1 8  6 1 6  6 1 6  6 1 8  
observations , 
Number of 393 393 393 393 
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observatwns ,., 
Number of 508 506 506 508 
turnover , 
Number of 325 325 325 325 
turnover , _ ,  
-2 Log 264.49 264 . 1 9  263 38 264.98 
1 l ikel ihood , 
-2 Log \ 65 02 \ 66.57 \ 67.47 \ 63 .06 
l ikel ihood ,.1 
Model p-value , 0 .00 0.00 0 00 0.00 
Model p-value,. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
I 
R' , 0.086 0.085 0.089 0.084 
R2 ,., 0.088 0.080 0.075 0.099 
" 
Return on assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its total assets and displayed as a percentage. Unadjusted return is the firm share price actual returns in one year and market-adjusted retum 
is actual stock returns less the expected returns on FTSE Kuala Lumpur over the same period. LOSS is  a dummy variable that is equal to I if the firm has negative performance. Managerial Ownersh ip  IS a proportion of 
shares owned by d irectors and family-ties is a dummy variable for family-controlled tirm. Age refers to director age which represented by a dummy variable for executive turnover more than 71 years old. Board size is the 
number of directors and larger board* performance is the interaction variable between larger board and performance. Board independence is  the proportion of outside directors on the boards. CEO duality is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one when the CEO and Chairman are the same person, zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization. Stock-based compensation is the natural logarithm of 
the stock options received by directors during the year of turnover events. Cash-based compensation is the natura\ logarithm of cash payments received by directors. * * *, ** and • indicate the level of significance at the I %, 
5% and I 0%, respectively. 
-
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Board composition and executive turnover 
The composition of boards is measured by the proportion of non-executive directors 
on boards .  Our m ai n  assumption i s  that outside directors are more independent and 
thus I would  expect board m onitoring function to increase. Studies by Weisbach 
( 1 988) finds strong evidence of a relationship between board independence and 
turnover, whi l e  Borokhovich et al .  (2006) report the influence outside directors have 
on firm performance on account of their abi lity to exercise their power to remove 
underperforming  executive. These studies note that turnover is l ikely to increase 
when the number of outside directors occupying boards also increases .  Thus, and in 
response to the resu lts reported in Table 1 7, there has been a positive association 
between board composition to current year turnover and a negative association to the 
preceding year turnover. However, in model 4 which accounts for current year and 
preceding year, a l l  the variables are insign ificant and indicate that board composition 
is not an important factor to u se in estimating the l ikel ihood of turnover. Thus I re­
exam ined the effect of board composition on executive turnover and assume that if 
turnover is more sensitive in firms w ith more independent directors that the 
relationship between these variables should be positive and significant. 
Fol lowing a s im i lar method by Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2), I divide the 
sample into two groups based on board independence level in which one-third or 33 
per cent is  chosen as a cut-off point. Specifically, a board with high independence 
has more than 3 3  per cent of outside d irectors on boards and a board with low 
independence is one with less than 33  percent, Table 1 8  shows the resu lts which 
ind icate that m ore than 80 percent of Malaysian firms satisfy the min imum legal 
requirement for having one third of outside d irectors on their boards. A close 
exam ination of  the coefficient for board independence relating to previous year 
turnover is s ignificant at the 5 percent level with ROA indicating a positive 
relationship. For the current year, the performance measures indicate less support for 
executive turnover. However, when the sample is split between board independence 
level from high and less board independence, the results indicate that high board 
independence has a negative influence on turnover for al l models. This result is 
inconsistent with the fi ndings of Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) who suggest 
that firms composed of more than 3 3  per cent of outside directors are more l ikely to 
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remove ineffi ci ent directors fol lowing good firm performance. I should also mention 
that our results d o  not support the findings reported in the literature concerning the 
effectiveness of board monitorin g  [Triki and Ureche-Rangau (201 2)] . Nevertheless, 
the results ind icate a significant relationship in turnover-performance effects for less 
outside directors on boards which are in l ine with the findings of Rachpradit, Tang 
and Khang (20 1 2), but inconsistent with the reported evidence for Thailand which 
has a s imi lar corporate environment and fami ly shareholdings to that of Malaysia. 
Thus there is less evidence on the preceding turnover year between board size and 
executive turnover though the reported empirical evidence suggests that firms of 
smal ler size are more effective for monitoring purposes. The presence of outside 
d irectors on boards (one-third) indicates a h igh rate of top executive turnover which 
may not be entirely l inked to the level of board independence. 
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Table 18 : Regression estimates of sample split b b . ·d . Y oa1 mdependence 
High board independence Low board independence 
Model ! Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model ] Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept , 7.24***  5.93** 7.02*** 7.16***  5.97** 4.73* 5.78** 5.90** 
Intercept ,_ 1 6.56***  6.34 6. 1 8*** 6. I 2***  6.28*** 6.03*** 5.87** 5.78** 
ROA , -0.01 
-0.01 
ROA , 1  0.03** 
0.03 ** 
Unadjusted Return , -0. 1 7  
-0.17 
Unadjusted Return ,_, 0 . 1 8 0. 1 8  
Market-adjusted Return , 0.08 0.09 
Market-adjusted Return ,_ 1 0.09 0.09 
Loss , 0.1 1 0.1 1 
Loss ,_ 1 -0. 1 8  -0. 1 3  
Managenal Ownership , 0.47 0.30 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.29 0.47 0.47 
Managcnal Ownersh i p  ,_1 0.35 0.46 042 0.37 0.37 048 0.44 039 
Fami ly-t1es , 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.21 
Fami ly-t1es ,_ 1 0. 1 3  0.28 0.24 0.20 0. 1 8  033 0.29 0.25 
Dummy 1f age >7 1 , - 1 .99***  -1 .98***  -2.02***  -2.00*** -1 .98*** 0.22*** -2.01 *** -1 .99*** 
Dummy if age >71 ,_ , -2.06***  - 1 .95  - 1 . 94*** - 1 .95*** -2.04*** - 1 .93*** - 1 .92*** - 1 .93*** 
Board size , -0.39 -0.48 -0.45 -0.44 -0.24 -0.34 -0.31 -0.29 
Board s1ze ,_1 0.0001 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.0 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Board independence , -0.82* *  -0.79** -0.78** -0.81 **  0.55 0.52 0.51 0.53 
Board independence ,_, -0.56  -0.58 -0.58 -0.59 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.28 
CEO dual ity , -0.75* *  -0.79* *  -0.77** -0.75** -0.75** -0.79*** -0.77** -0.76** 
CEO duality ,_1 -0. 5 3  -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.50 -0.47 -0.46 -0.47 
Firm size , -0. 1 5  -0.08 -0. 1 3  -0. 1 5  -0. 1 5  -0.07 -0. 13  -0.14 
Fnm size ,. , -0. 1 2  -0. 1 J -0. 1 2  -0. 1 1 -0. 1 5  -0. 1 3  -0. 14  -0. 14  
Stock options , 0-01 0.02 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.003 0.01 
Stock options ,_ , 0 .02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 
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Cash pays 1 
Cash pay 1-1 
Number of observations 1 
Number of observations 1.1 
Number of turnover 1 
Number of turnover 1.1 
-2  Log likel ihood 1 
-2 Log l ikel ihood 1-l 
Model p-value 1 
Model p-value1.1 
R· � 
R2 ,., 
-0.05 
0 . 1 3  
618  
393 
508 
325 
261.39 
1 64 06 
0.00 
0 00 
0.09 
0.09 
-0.05 0.05 
-0. 1 4  -0. 1 2  
616 6 1 6  
393 393 
506 506 
325 325 
261 .22 261.88 
1 65 .76 1 66.34 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0 00 
0.09 O.o9 
0.08 0.08 
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-0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
0.03 -0. 1 3  -0. 14  -0. 1 1  -0. 1 0  
618 618  616 616 618 
393 393 393 393 393 
508 508 506 506 508 
325 325 325 325 325 
262.14 263.54 263.26 263.86 264.28 
1 66.37 1 64.93 1 66.71 1 67.27 1 67.36 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0 00 
0.09 0.09 0.089 0.087 0.087 
0.08 0.09 0.079 0.076 0.076 
Executive turnover and board leadership 
There is  some agreement among prior studies that have examined executive turnover 
and board l eadership of the existence of a relationship. The effects however are more 
apparent when there i s  a clear d iv i sion of roles between CEO and chairman which 
ind icate that these v ariables influence executive turnover. The results from Table 1 6  
reveal that b y  grant ing the power of CEO and Chairman to the same person results in 
a negative s ign for current executive  turnover and preceding turnover. The results 
ind icate a strong negative coefficient at the 1 and 5 per cent level for the current 
turnover year, but are shown to be insign ificant for the preceding turnover. This 
confirms our expectation for the existence of an inverse relationship between CEO 
dual ity and turnover. Th is result supports the findings of Goyal and Park (2002) and 
Maury (2006). I also rerun the models, but this  time including firms with larger 
boards.  The resu lts are also reported in Table 1 7, panel A of Model 4. The 
coefficient for CEO dual ity indicates a negative relationship, though it is noticeable 
that the p-values are s ign ificant at the 5 percent level for the preceding turnover year. 
The results imply  that large board are less l ikely to change top executives than firms 
who have separate roles. This result supports the findings of Yermack ( 1 996) and 
Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) who report evidence indicating that turnover is 
l ikely to be h igher when firm performance is poor and the size of the board is 
smaller. As a result  I carried out a further regression to investigate this argument. 
The resu lts are reported in Table 1 7, Panel B, which shows that the coefficient for 
CEO dual ity remains negative for turnover which is significant at the 1 and 5 percent 
level for current year turnover and insign i ficant for the preceding turnover. It is 
evident also that executive turnover-performance sensitivity yields positive 
coefficients for the interaction between larger boards, whi le the dummy variable for 
negative performance yields inconsistent results to the earlier reported results. 
Firm size and executive turnover 
Other than ownersh ip structures and board characteristics, there is also a possibil ity 
of the impact of firm size on top executive turnover as reported in the l iterature 
(Cosh and Hughes, 1 997; and Rh im, Peluchette and Song, 2006). These studies
 
h fi · e and compensation pay structures might affect turnover. Thus I suggest t at 1rm s 1z  
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exam ined these factors on turnover decisions.  The results reported in Table 1 6  reveal 
that executive turnover i s  negatively associated with firm size and cash pay but is 
positively related to stock option p lans.  On account of our prior expectations that 
larger firms are less l ikely to experience h igh turnover due to expected good 
corporate perform ance and the benefits from m ore stable income. The results of 
Model 4 ,  Tabl e  1 6  suggests that firm s ize i s  not a significant factor in turnover, 
despite there been some empirical find ings support for the hypothesis that size is an 
important determ inant for determin ing  turnover (Rhim, Peluchette and Song, 2006). 
I also carried out add itional tests to determine the relationship between turnover 
events and firm size based on firm l i stings. For example, firms l isted on Bursa 
Malaysia in ACE market have fewer restrictions to l isting requirements. The study 
by How, J el ic ,  S aadoumi and Verhoeven (2007) indicate that second board firms 
commonly face low trading volume compared firms l isted on the Main Board, while 
Sals iah, Norman and Moham at (2008) note that the d ifferent size of firms l i sted in 
both m arkets tend to have a more d iversified business group operation. Therefore, 
the size of the main  m arket firms i s  greater than the size of the ace market firms, as 
well as the level of  d iversifications. 
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Table 1 9 :  Regression estimates o f  sample split by firm size 
A l l  firms 
Large Firms 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Mode1 4 Model I Mode1 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept , 6 . 39* *  5.09* 6. 1 1  **  6.33**  6. 1 2**  4.36 5.92**  6.06** 
Intercept ,. 1 6.69* * *  6.49* * *  6 .33* * *  6.22* * *  7.32***  6.78***  6.67*** 6.52*** 
ROA , -0 0 1  - 0  0 1  
ROA ,.1 0 .03**  0.04**  
Unadjusted Return , -0. 1 7  -0.25* 
Unadjusted Return ,.1 0. 1 6  0. 1 6  
Market-adjusted Return , 0.09 0.002 
Market-adjusted Return,., 0.08 0. 1 1  
Loss , 0. 1 3  007 
Loss ,., -0 07 -0. 1 1  
Managerial Ovvnership , 0.47 03 1 0.49 0.48 0.65 038 0.03 0.66 
Managenal Ovvnership ,. 1 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.4 1 0.55 0.67 0.66 0.58 
Fam1ly-ties , 0 .24 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.66 0.24 
Family-ties ,.1 0.2 1 0 .35  0 .3 1 0.28 0. 1 6  0.32 0.30 0.25 
Dummy if age > 7 1  , - 1 .98* * *  - 1 .98* * *  -2. 0 1  * * *  - 1 .99***  - 1 .93***  - 1 .92***  - 1 .95*** - 1 .94*** 
Dummy if  age >7 1 ,.1 - 1 . 9 1 * * *  - 1 . 8 1 * * *  - 1 .80***  - 1 . 8 1 ***  - 1 .93*** - 1 .79*** - 1 .79*** - 1 . 8 1  •• •  
Board size , -0. 3 1  -0 .39 -0.36 -0.36 -0.33 -0.39 -0.39 -0.38 
Board size ,.1 0 .0 1 -0 0 1  -0 02 -0. 0 1  0.0 1 -0 02 -0 02 -0.02 
Board independence , -0.86 -0.7 1 -0.73 -0.88 0.82 -0.65 -0.70 -0.81 
Board independence ,.1 -0. 1 7  -0.28 -0.25 -0.25 -0.08 -0. 1 7  -0. 1 5  -0. 1 4  
C E O  duality , -0.74* *  -0 .79* * *  -0.77
***  -0.75**  -0.8 1  **  -0.87***  -0.84*** -0.83*** 
CEO dual i ty ,  1 -0 .50 -0 .47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.55 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 
S1ze , -0. 1 4  - 0  07 -0. 1 2  -0. 1 3  -0. 1 2  -0 03 -0. 1 1  -0. 1 2  
Size,., -0. 1 8* -0. 1 7* -0. 1 8
* -0. 1 7* -0.22**  0 . 19**  -0.20** -0.20** 
1 9 1 
Stock options , 0.0 1 0.02 0.002 0.0 1 0 . 0 1  0.02 0.01 0.01  
Stock options ,_ 1  0.05 0 .06 0.06 0.06 0 os 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Cash pays , 0.05 -0.05 -0 04 -0.05 -0.04 -0 03 -0 04 -0 04 
Cash pay ,_,  0. 1 2  -0 . 1 3  -0. 1 1  -0.09 -0. 1 2  -0. 1 1 -0. 1 0  -0.08 
Number of observations , 1 073 1 073 1 073 1 073 5 8 3  5 8 1  5 8 1  583 
Number of observations ,_1 1 058 1 05 8  1 05 8  1 058 37 1 371 371 37 1 
Number of turnover , 6 1 8  6 1 6  6 1 6  6 1 8  477 475 475 477 
Number of turnover ,_, 398 398 398 398 304 304 304 304 
-2 Log l ikel ihood , 264 . 5 1  264. 1 9  264.75 265. 1 8  2 53 . 1 7  252.04 253.46 253.84 
-2 Log likelihood , , 1 69 . 56 1 7 1 .24 1 7 1 .70 1 7 1 .79 1 59 . 1 6  1 61 .59 1 6 1 .9 1  1 62.05 
Model p-value , 0.00 0 00 0 00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0.00 
Model p-value,_, 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0 00 
R· ,  0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
R' ,_, 0 .0 8  0.07 O.D7 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 
0.08 
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It is clear from the resu lts reported in  Tab! 1 9  h . . e t at there I S  no difference between the 
ful l  sample and a sub-sample grou f 1 a . . 
. . . 
p o arber firms m which firm size has a negative 
associatiOn With executives' turnover H . . . . -· owever, firm S ize d isplay siamftcant results . b to executive replacements i n  preced ing year turnover but . Is insign ificant with the 
current year. In the preceding year th t · e urnover coefficient suggests a strong negative 
relationship w ith the m ain  board which are less l "k 1 t h · I e Y o c ange top executives than 
ACE market firm s .  The negative coefficient of Iarbae firms to turnover may be 
attributed to restrictions imposed by the law, particularly with regard to l isting 
requirements. Thus th i s  is l ikely to l imit top executive replacements. Large firms are 
commonly involved in more than one business operation and this finding is in line 
with Sals iah et al. (2008) who find that a h igh level of business operation decreases 
the probabi lity o f  executive turnover. 
Level of compensation payments and executive turnover 
The literature on compensation pay and executive turnover acknowledge that 
di fferent forms of compensation pay may have  d ifferent impacts on executive 
turnover. In it ial resu lts reported in Table 5 shows that executive pays provides weak 
support for executive turnover in both preceding and current year models. I also 
carried out further tests to determine the precise l ink between various components of 
compensations such as salary, bonus, and stock option grants on executive turnover. 
The study is en l ightened by Hasenh uttl and Harrison (2002) who developed their 
argument between social comparison and equity theory to determine the effect of 
individual component of compensation with turnover. In cash payments such as 
salary and bonus, Hasenhuttl and H arrison (2002) estimate an inverse relationship 
with executive  turnover. A sim i lar effect was predicted between stock option plan 
and turnover, which suggests a d i rect l ink to future performance. With assumption 
that, firms experience low in executive turnover fol lowing stock option plans over 
some period o f  t ime, usually three to five years. On the basis of firm data, I carried 
out further tests by considering an individual component of executive compensation. 
Fol lowing a s im i l ar strategy to that outl ined in Table 1 6, the indiv idual turnover 
effect is exam ined with mix pay; salary and bonus and equity pay. All of these 
variables are included in a d ifferent set of model specifications. For equ ity pay is 
div ided into two components: (i) a ratio of stock option grant for executive director 
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divided by  the total of  m ix pay and ( i i )  the percentage of exercisable stock option 
held near the turnover year which i s  expressed as inventory of stock options. Both 
variables determine the effect of stock option on turnover and explore the possibi lity 
of whether top executives remain in their position with the firm .  Table 20 reports the 
results which show the individual effects of mix pay, stock option grants and 
inventory of stock option i n  model  and 2. Model 3 includes all components of 
compensation i n  the same model . As  indicated earlier, all components in 
compensation are subject to firm performance level, thus  turnover and performance 
sensitiv ity for each level of pay are also reported. 
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Ta ble 20 :  Regression estima tes of sample by levels of pay 
Vunab\es Model I Model 2 ?\•lode! 3 Model 4 
I UJ nnv er=/ : sdl�lf} _bonus. Turnover=/ 1 stock_ optwn. Turno1 er=/ 1 Salary_ bonus. stock_ option. Turnover=( { S alary_ bonus,stock _ optron. 
ROA,Stock _return,nwn. thm r ly ,age,bo<mi_ r nv _SO, R OA,S toe k _return .own, lam 1 ly .age .. board rnv_ SO,ROA.Stock_return.own.ta m r ly ,age,. board rn1  _SO.LOSS,.Stock _return,own,famt ly ,age,board 
Slze,lnd,du<r l r ty,srze: _S IZe . r nd ,dual tty.s1ze } _s1ze, rnd .. dual 1 ty.s1ze )  _slze. tnd,dua l l ty  .size: 
Intercept 5 74* • •  3 83* 4 .90** 6 3 1 * * *  
Salary and -0 23 . .  -0. 1 9* -0 .2 1 * * 
bonus 
I \ Stock 0.03* 0.02 0.02 
! opt1on 
compcnsatl 
on 
I nventory 3 . 1 8  3 .36* 3 .60* 
of stock 
option 
ROA -0 01 * -0.02** -0.01 * 
Stock -0. 1 9* -0.20* -0.20* 
Return 
Loss 111 0 30 
Operatmg 
Income 
-- - --
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Managenal -0 2 1  -0 22 -0 1 9  -0 . 1 2  
Ownershrp 
Fnm i ly  t res  0 29 0 27 0 })• 0 4 1 *  
Age - I (19* . . - I  78** *  - 1  73 . . . - 1  n • • •  
Board SIZe -0 1 3  0 .04 -0 .03 -0 09 
Board -0 93 -0.99 - 1 .02 -I 24 
rndependen 
ce 
CEO -0 48 * * -044* -0 .46' -0. 4 7* 
dual ity 
Firm size 0 .0 1 -0 08 0.0 1 -0.05 
I 
Observatio 969 968 968 968 
ns 
-2 Log -398.54 -394.86 -393 . 1 1  395.95 
l ikelihood 
Model p- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 
value 
R' 0.075 0.079 0.083 0 077 
�- -- -
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It is evident from Table 20 that the results are consistent with the expected outcome 
that mix pay influences executive turnover, though it is the opposite for stock option 
plans. The resu lts from Model 1 ,  ind icates that m ix pay and turnover have a negative 
coefficient at the 5 per cent l evel which is i n  l ine with expectations, whi le the results 
from model 2 shows that the ratio of stock option to cash pay and inventory of stock 
option with executive turnover produce a positive correlation and this is slight 
contrad ict to earlier expectation of negative relationship, while the relative stock 
option grants to cash pay i s  shown only to have a s ign i ficant effect on determining 
turnover. F inal ly ,  the results from model 3 which includes cash and stock option 
variables ind icate that cash pay remains a negative relation. Nevertheless, the ratio of 
stock option to cash pay loses its s ignificance, while the positive coefficient for 
inventory of stock option improves its s ign ificance level of 1 0  percent, though it is 
opposite to our prior expectations. This result indicates that executive replacements 
are l ikely to be h igher when a firm has large value of unexercised stock options. 
Thus an inventory of stock option produces less incentive for promoting top 
executive retentions, which also suggests that granting stock options fai l  to curb 
voluntary executive departure and, m oreover, that the executive is wil l ing to lose its 
benefits over unexercised value. A s  repl icated in the findings of prior studies, 
executive turnover is more l ikely to occur when firm performance decreases. Our 
results based on accounting and m arket-based measures are all negative and 
significant at both the 5 and 1 0  percent level. This  result produces strong evidence, 
as expected, that stock option grants would decrease turnover, which is in l ine with 
Mehran and Yermack ( 1 997) who find that stable firms are less l ikely to terminate 
their C EOs, as opposed to unstable firms.  Further val idation for this result is 
conducted in wh ich further tests for negative performance based on model 4. The 
resu lts from model 4 ind icate only weak support that firms with negative 
performance have a positive association with executive turnover, while other 
contro l l i ng  variables are shown to have more influence on executive turnover as 
expected . 
F h b I t  Clearly executives who are exceed the retirement age are less rom t e a ove resu s, 
· b 1 d even when the firm encounters an unstable business I Jkely to e rep ace , 
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environment or du · nng poor corporate performance . This result reflects on older 
executives as they show that they h th d ave e a vantage over younger executives due to 
their past experiences. S im il arly, the relation between CEO d al "t d · u 1 y an executive 
turnover, as evidenced by earl ier studies, indicate that CEO dual ity has a weak 
monitoring board function, as such the turnover is  even less l ikely in poorly 
perform ing firms as Goyal and Park (2002) and Hou and Chuang (2008) suggests. 
The finding are moderately in l ine  w ith Rachpradit, Tang and Khang (20 1 2) who 
report that appointing the CEO as a chairman of the same board leads him to be more 
accountable for firm performance. However, the lack of significance in model 
specification between stock option and executive turnover does lead us to question 
the effects of incentive plans on reta in ing executive. This question also relates to the 
study's findings from model 3 and 4, which suggests that previously awarded stock 
options increase the l ikel ihood of executive turnover which is opposite to our prior 
expectat ions that stock options m ight defer the turnover for several years in the 
future in order to gain benefits fro m  it. However the result emphasizes that a top 
executive is wi 1 1  ing to risk losing those benefits. In fact, the stock option creates an 
opportunity for executives to increase their ownership as highlighted by Hasenhuttl 
and Harrison (2002) who found  that substantial share ownership produces a strong 
incentive to stay loyal to the company.  However, using stock option value 
excessively damages a firm ' s  reputation which may impact on unsolved issues 
surround ing equity pay to just ify the benefit of retaining and reducing turnover. 
Apart from that, the positive l ink  between stock options and turnover might be due to 
several reasons .  For instance, after several years the corporate governance scandals 
associated with overpaid compensation to cronies resulted in much public criticism . 
In respect to th is, an earl ier study b y  Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Bebchuk and 
Grienstein (2005) posited that CEOs produce less incentive for doing job monitoring 
functions, even though their payments have been increased. But apart fro
m that, 
most of the executive turnover cases are internal ly i nitiated . Accor
ding to Kaplan 
and Minton (2008), increasing b lockholding among shareho
lders and shorter tenures 
among CEOs (usual l y  appraisal in every year) lead to
 a positive relation between 
stock options and turnover. 
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5.5 Summary and implications of p rior findings 
This essay exam ined the role of · · executive stock option on reducing executive 
turnover with in the spirit of agency  theory E h · · 1 · mp asis I s  p aced on the stock option 
plays role for retaining and motivating of executive employee. The study's  main 
interests has been to determine how wel l  stock t" d · op IOn re uces executive turnover, 
and responding to the related q uestion, thi s  study  identifies the factors influencina b 
turnover in  Malaysian firms including performance, corporate governance and firm 
characterist ics .  Based on examination for account ing and market performance 
measures, the result shows that poor finn performance lead to h igh executive 
turnover. Hence, th i s  study  could not fin d  evidence that accounting based measures 
is better than market-based performance measures to evaluate executive turnover. 
In exam ining executive replacement decision according to turnover types such as 
routine and forced turnover, the findings indicate that current firm performance 
in fluence the decision for executive to being dismissed. In relation to other factors 
that are l i ke ly  to bear influence on  executive turnover, the findings suggest that the 
presence o f  managerial ownershi p  do  not leads to h igh turnover. This is in l ine with 
conclusions reached by Pergol a  (2005) who note that high fami ly ownership 
concentration in ownership structure m eans that turnovers are not welcome. The 
reason beh ind this conclusion may be that firms with strong fami ly  ties are reluctant 
to remove inefficient managers. A lso, when the fam i ly member is also a member of 
the board of d i rectors, they may wish to protect themselves from being removed. In 
other words, fam i ly  founding finn supports the management entrenchment 
hypothesis . Moreover, older directors are less l ikel y  to be replaced by their younger 
counterparts ind icating that age h as a s ign i ficant influence on turnover. This because 
older directors have more experience and their expertise remains highly valued. 
The results also suggest that corporate governance influence turnover, particu larly 
for board attributes. At glance, the resu lt indicates that board attributes is not a 
s ignificant factor in determ ining turnover. However, board size shows a significant 
result to turnover wh i le larger board are found to be less inc l ined to replace 
h · unw1· 1 1 1·n0aness to perform their mon itoring functions. Th is executives due to t e1r 
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suggests that h igher turnover in  fi rm s  w ith larcrer board . I . o s1ze resu ts m poor corporate 
performance. However the resu lt for b d · d d ' oar m epen ent is not significant for 
executive turnover and indi cates that board du J " t  · 1 · 1 d · a 1 y 1s ess mvo ve with turnover. 
Among the reason is the position o f  CEO and Chairman for job security and the need 
to continue the fam i ly  status quo [Rokiah Ishak (20 1 1  )] . Therefore they will retain 
fam i ly m em ber as their successor. 
For firm characteristics, firm s1ze produces l ittle evidence to executive turnover, 
while only firm l isting in m ain board i s  found to have an effect on executive turnover 
as opposed to ACE m arket. This  suggests that firms subject to restriction laws are 
less l ikely to rep lace executives or that h igh level of business operation associated 
with larger fi rm s  is  l ikely decrease the turnover. The crucial part of this chapter to 
seek the answer regarding the incentive effect of stock option plans have to reduce 
turnover, an in itial result of us ing  d ifferent form of executive compensation is 
examined, the result ind icates that m i x  pay influence turnover. In contrast to finding 
generated for positive relation between stock option plan and executive turnover and 
th is emphasise that stock option p lan s  apply in Malaysia firms fai l  to prevent 
executive d eparture. Examination on large value of unexercised stock option 
ind icates fewer incentives towards the promotion of retention among executives and 
thus existing option be unsuccessfu l  to prevent voluntary executive departure. Along 
with the l ine of prior stud ies, stock option grants increase as poor firm performance, 
however if the plan is properly designed, it has an abi l ity to reduce executive 
turnover. Regard ing the resu lt for executive turnover is more l ikely to be terminated 
when the executive age is far approaching retirement, this  show that junior 
executives less advantage, particul ar ly when the firm experiences unhealthy business 
environment. This suggests that stock option plans lead to temporary effect for 
lowering turnover during the vest ing period for younger executives
 than older 
counterparts. Th is study also holds that h igh rate of junior executiv
e leaving the firm 
might contribute for other reasons such as attractive offer 
from other firm . 
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ESSAY 4 
6.0 : THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION 
ON TAXATION 
6.1  Introd uction 
The increas i ng  use of stock opt ion plans across firms of various size and industry 
sectors has generated considerab le  interest among scholars interested in investigating 
the various effects of these plans on corporate behaviour which h ighl ighted in 
several stud ies (see Yermack, 1 99 5 ;  Aboody, 1 996;  Baker, 1 999; Murphy, I 999; 
Core and G u ay, 1 999 ;  and Core and Wayne, 200 1 ) . These studies have also shown 
the growing popularity for firms to offer compensation value for equ ity pay for their 
executives as compared to cash pay (Hall and L iebman, 2000). This is consistent 
with Gritsch and Snyder (2007) who find that two-thirds of CEOs received some 
form of stock option plans during this study period. In  addressing the tax effect on 
executive compensation, former studies provide two predictions. One l ine of 
pred iction i s  about executive compensation which could help to minimise the tax 
l iabil ity ( H ite and Long, 1 982). Whereas, the second prediction is based on the 
agency theory that execut ive compensation might be used for the purpose of the 
psychological contract between m anagers and shareholders in order to maximize 
firm value. H owever, S m ith and Watt ( 1 982) argue that compensation plans could 
not explain the tax incent ive except for the incent ive effect within the spirit of 
agency theory. 
Concern ing the tax influence on stock option plans, a study by Hall and Liebman 
(2000) find that the m arginal tax rate plays an important role in determining stock 
option plan in  wh ich, r is ing on corporate tax rates are expected to increase the tax 
deduction from stock option re lative to the immediate tax deduction provided by 
h t . As a consequence using stock option should be less costly for cas compensa 1on . ' 
fi · h 1 · 1 tax rates In sim i lar area of study analyses the impact of tax rms w1t ow margma . 
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pol icy on compensation payments, such as Golsbee (2000) examines the responsiveness of taxable income to the chana · · 1 oes m margma corporate tax rate for short-term and long term effects . He finds that changes in tax rates have a short-term 
effects and the effect is more apparent during the stock opt· · H Ion exercises. owever, 
for long term effect, increasing  used of stock option is a temporary shift in 
compensation payments. Recent study by Gritsh and Snyder (2007) examine the 
response of tax changes to the probabi l ity of CEO to being paid with stock option 
plan and the resu lt is consistent with former study ' s  conclusion. The result shows 
that ris ing in marginal corporate tax rate influences the CEOs to receive stock 
options. Apart from the influence of using a stock option plan, increasing the 
marginal corporate tax rate can be used to design h igher tax for personal income in  
order to  red uce income d ifferences among taxpayer groups [Yong (20 1 2)]. 
Nevertheless, by increasing the tax rates across income brackets produce a negative 
effect for the incentive to lessen the income inequal ities among the taxpayers. 
Therefore, the tax system is usual l y  designed in the middle of the objective to reduce 
the taxed income among taxpayers and raise government revenues, which can be 
used to support programs for tapering income d ifferences. 
Bui ld ing on the evidence of these stud ies, the objective of this  essay is to examine 
how the current taxation pol icy affects the compensation pay received by executives 
in a form of stock options. In specific, the study analysis and discussion identify the 
degree of response when corporate and personal marginal tax rates are imposed on 
stock option grants in relation to cash pay. In add ition,  most of studies in this area 
use execut ive data in developed countries, perhaps they have good data on 
compensation pay. Therefore, examining data for Malaysian executive is worth for 
estimating levels of tax l iab i l ity. This essay is organi sed by describing Malaysia's 
· t t d the ex1·st1·ng tax treatments of each component of executive mcome tax s rue ure an 
· I rt
. u lar it d iscusses Malaysia's taxation rules which underpin compensation .  n pa JC , 
k · 1 I fi rther analysis I examine how changes in the progressivity stoc opt1on p ans. n a u ' 
· t t
. n cou ld be used to explain tax benefits using stock of  personal mcome axa 10  
· (20 1 2) fi r example  h iah] iahts the main distortion generated by a options. Y ong , o , o o 
· · h dditional band of income earned wh ich could cause the progress ive tax rate 111 eac a 
d h
. h ate However, the incentive effect is less l ikely to be earner to be taxe at a 1g er r · 
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lower when progressive tax rates are h . I . . . 
. 
eav1 Y Imposed on h1gher mcome taxpayers, 
which poses challenges for firms, s ince they wi l l  need t d . h . . 
o es1gn t e compensatiOn 
pay m such a way that it is see t · · · · n o m ax1m 1se the mcent1ve for it to be workable while 
at the same t ime m aintain ing som f e m easure o progressivity to narrow income 
inequalities among executives.  
I begin in section 6 .2  with an overview of  the trends in the use of stock options in 
Malaysia's  income tax pol icy. Section 6.3 considers trends in Malaysian executive 
compensation pay. Then in Section 6.4 I outline the empirical research method, the 
data and analysis of the generated results. Section 6 .5 provides concludes and 
discusses the impl ications ofthe results. 
6.2 Trends in the use of stock options and Malaysia income tax policy 
In Malaysia, the growing use of  stock options which also saw a rising trend in the 
use of stock options for executives increased by 62 per cent and with a mean value 
for 20 1 0  of MYR50 thousands as shown in Table 2 1 .  Table 2 1  also shows that the 
cash pay decreased by 54  per cent which suggest that salaries and bonuses continue 
to be the m ost important rewards for compensating  executives. From this result, it 
also indicates that stock option plans for executives (managements) increased which 
in turn gives rise to q uestions as to the reasons behind the motivation for firm using 
stock option. Moreover, th is also emphasis the question on tax benefits that stock 
option plans  have since the value of stock option as share of total cash pay declined 
nearly half and within  the study period, the marginal corporate tax rate reported a 
decreasing value  by almost 2 percent. Th is initial result also provides a debate that 
Malaysia stock option programs produce less incentive for tax standpoints, as 
contrast other forms of executive payments. 
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Table 2 1 :  Summary of the mean a n d  standar . . 
I f 
d deviatiOns of cash payments and stock option 
va ues rom 2003 to 2010. 
Cash Stock option Marginal Corporate Tax rate 
(MYRI ,OOO) 
Year Mean so Mean so Percentage 
2003 1 0 69.25 7 1 6.65 1 9.25 1 5 .20 28 
2004 209 1 .95 1 330 .84 1 6 .5 20.5 1 28 
2005 3 5 5 1 .35 4 1 5 6.87 83 .5 33 .23 28 
2006 2 1 90 .06 748 .65 6.00 5.66 28 
2007 1 049. 1 7  324.32 69.5 3 .5 3  28 
2008 3293 .3 1 3 1 9 1 .45 3 .6  2.26 28 
2009 1 6 1 6.9 1  620.90 57. 1 3  3 1 .29 27 
20 1 0  496.63 362.92 50 55. 1 5  26 
In response to earl ier resu lt, that is better for exami ning the tax benefit at the 
executive level under the Malaysia tax policy .  According to Malaysia Inland 
Revenue Board (MIRB), Malaysia taxation is  based on territorial status, which 
firmly indicates that only income derived or accrued from Malaysia, tax resident is 
l iab le to pay tax. In th is  instance, for firm establ ishes and operates in taxable, while 
for personal income taxation ru les, the tax l iab i l ity is  charged status based on the his 
phys ical presence in Malaysia. In specific, Sections 7 ( 1 )  of the Income Tax Act 
(IT A) of 1 967 detail four ways in which an individual executive may qual ify as a tax 
resident during the income assessm ent year. These are as fol lows: 
a) Section 7 ( 1 )  (a), Income Tax Act (ITA) 1 967 ind
icates the individual must 
be in Malaysia for at least 1 82 days. 
b) Section 7 ( 1 )  (b), IT A 1 967 emphasis f
or the second condition for an 
individual to be a resident i f  he stays in  M
alaysia less than 1 82 days during 
the assessment year and the period must 
l ink to other periods of 1 82 days. 
c) Section 7 ( 1 )  (c), ITA 1 967 state
s the third condition may qualify the 
individual to be a resident is he stays 
in Malaysia for a total of 90 days, then 
the MIRB wi l l  examine three out o
f four preceding year assessment, whether 
the individual was a resident or in 
Malaysia for at least 90 days i n  total .  
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d) Section 7 ( 1 )  (d) i s  the l ast condition in which the individual wi l l  be a resident for the assessment year if he  has been a Malaysian resident in three years before and the fol lowing year. This indicates that the executive could 
be a resident in M al aysia if h e  fulfi l s  one of the four conditions. 
Along with the d i rect benefits that resu lt from being a tax resident, for firm and 
indiv iduals executive wi l l  b e  taxed on the taxable income after deducting non-tax 
deductions and tax rebates. Thus the firm as well executive may enjoy the final tax 
l iabil ity based on a graduated tax rate that rises from 0 to 26 per cent with the effect 
from the year of  assessment, 2 0 1 0, as shown in  Appendix 1 .  Th is is in line with 
Y ong (20 1 2) who points out that the personal tax rate of Malaysia is structured on 
the basis  of imposing i ncreasing m arginal tax rates for h igher income brackets. 
Other than stock option plan s, M al aysia executives also provided with other types of 
cash compensation that is subject to personal income tax as stated in the Malaysian 
Income Tax Act as fol lows: 
a) Salaries 
Salary is the de facto fixed payment that m ight be part of contractual pay. The 
amount of salary received does not usual ly vary exp l icitly with performance. This 
means that salary is not a performance-based pay for employees and as such it would 
qual ify for taxation under employment income in Section 4 (b), ITA 1 967. From the 
tax standpoint, expenses paid as a salary allows for a tax deduction in the year they 
are paid .  
b) Bonuses 
· · ally based on how wel l  individuals, group, or corporation Bonus compensatiOn Is usu 
· fi .- nee (Balsam 20 1 2) and as with the treatment of salary it contnbute to t rm per1orma ' , 
· 
d · th a rece1·ved for individual taxpayers. For firms that offer Wil l  be taxe 1n e ye r 
I S Malaysia income taxation rules allow such firms to bonuses to their emp oyee , 
no more than two months from total pay in the claim a deduction equivalent to 
emp loyer' s  taxable year. 
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c) Deferred compensation and pensions 
Deferred taxation relate to income earned in one period wh· h 1 1  , 1 c  a ows payment to be 
made to executives to be received at a future date, the deferred date . For tax 
purposes, pension contr ibutions are one of the deferred pay provided by firms 
(employer) that are taxable under the Section 4 (e) ITA u d th . t. · , . n er IS sec 10n, 1t 
extends the income types of ann uities and other periodical payments. For example, 
the pension individuals receive for reaching the age of 55,  at the compulsory 
retirement age, or for health reason s  are all exempted from tax. In the case of 
executive who receives m ore than one pension, only the highest pension is exempted 
from tax, whi le other pensions m u st be reported .  Annuities are the sum of money 
received in accordance with an investment of money which entitles the participant to 
receive a series of  annual payments during l im ited period. A periodical payments 
refer to recurring payments received at fixed times. 
d) Others cash incentive plan compensation 
All categories of income received but not included m the prior headings are 
class ified as a l l  other compensations, and in a s imi lar way to salaries and bonuses, 
other cash payments such as al lowance and gratuity wi l l  be subject to personal 
income tax in the year received. S im i lar tax treatment for items such as benefits in 
kinds provided by a firm that is not in cash form is also taxable under personal 
income tax. From tax standpoint, the income reported as taxable under the personal 
income to the executive and deductible by the company. 
e) Stock option grants 
Stock options allows employee to own firm shares at a fixed price and specified 
period of t ime.  Among the taxable income, stock option grants offer special features 
for tax benefit. Among others, it i s  typical ly untaxed at the time the grant is made. 
Therefore, stock options are usual ly granted to executives with the restrictions of 
expiry with the passage of t ime.  It is common for the taxable income for stock 
options to be extended for three to four year after the grant date. Thus, the tax effect 
f k t
. 1 s appears when the holder exercises h is or her options. The o stoc op 1on p an 
h · t bl ·s between market price at the exercised tax date and the amount t at J S  axa e 1 
· ·d fi th hares However since the exercise price i s  sensitive to the actual pnce pat or e s · ' 
· fi f the share price stock options can be extremely valuable underlymg per ormance o ' 
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when the share pnce i ncreas b t . 1 es  su  s ant Ja  ly and can also be worthless if  the share price decl ines .  W ith reo d t th bar 0 e cost of stock option grants such as the cost associated with m aintain ino  stock options Und th M 1 · · b · er e a ays�an taxation rules, are 
not a l lowed for deduction which m th 1 · · eans at ess tax mcentives are provided by law 
to reduce a fi rm ' s  tax l i abi l ity. 
When comparing with the tax rate i mposed on US stock option plans, Section 1 3  ( 1 )  
(a), ITA 1 967 c learly identifi es the taxable i ncome from stock options and cash pay, 
which are treated d ifferently.  U n l i ke i n  the U.S  where taxation rules give executives 
the freedom to choose a d ifferent tax rate, in Malaysia any profits received from 
exercis ing stock options is taxabl e  at the rate of personal income tax. This  is 
inconsistent with Hal l  and Liebman (2000) who found that salary and stock option 
have di fferent means for execut ive compensation. Thus in the U.S .  stock options 
have a much strongest tax benefits i n  relation to cash pay, particularly when 
executives se l l  the stock. C learly, any gains from sel l ing the stock option plan will 
be taxed at the capital gains  tax rate which tends to be much lower than ordinary 
personal income taxes. In th i s  example, salary and bonus were taxable under the 
personal income tax rate at the t ime  of pay out. However, for the stock option grants, 
the holder wi l l  be taxed at the t ime  o f  exercise, hence he  enjoys tax benefits unti l  he 
exercises  h i s  right of the stock options which is usually for the next three to five 
years a fter the grant ing  date. Th is  impl ies that executive may gain the tax benefit in 
short- l i ve .  
Where Malaysia is concerned, i t s  taxation rules for the  past seven years find 2006 to 
be a s ign i fi cant point for a change i n  h ow the tax value of stock options is calculated. 
Th is means that any gains received from exercising a stock option will be treated as 
rt f 
· e fi oin sources of employment. The taxable value is calculated on pa o gross mcom r 
the d ifference between the market value of shares at the grant date and the exercise 
· B .- h "  d n ent t h e  tax treatment o f  stock options appeared when the pnce. e .ore t IS amen I , 
· · · d However the taxable  value should be related back to the stock opt1on I S exerc 1se . 
k 
· nts were awarded . Commencing with the assessment year when the stoc optiOn gra 
d h t x ru l i n  o for determining the tax value of stock options year of 2006 onwar s, t e a b 
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differs s l ight ly  from the m ethod used i n  previous assessments. Under Section 25 ( 1 )  
(A) ITA 1 967 ,  the taxable  value o f  stock option grants is calculated as the difference 
between the m arket price at an exercised date (or exercisable date) and the price paid 
for the share s .  And as w ith the old tax treatment, there is no capital gains tax applied 
for equity (stock option) sold except on gains from the disposal of shares in the 
parent company incorporated i n  M alaysia. In terms of the cost incurred for 
arrangement, the compensatory stock option al lows for tax deductions to be made, 
though th is  is restricted to the offshore parent company which satisfies the 
characterist ic of "wholly and exclusively" for producing the business income36 . The 
allowable cost is extended to expenditure used to maintain the stock option plans or 
reimburse to the parent company. For the purpose of income tax, when stock options 
are sold, the gain  value is not taken into account which means there is no capital gain 
tax appl ied to the d isposal of stock option i n  Malaysia. Details of personal tax 
implicat ions for benefit  received from stock option exercises are as fol lows: 
Resident status Taxable at 
Grant date V esting date Exercise date 
Before assessment year 2006 
Resident Yes No No 
Non-resi dent Yes No No 
A fter assessment year 2006 
Resident N o  N o  Yes 
Non-resident N o  No Yes 
Jr, Section 33 ( l )  of the I ncome Tax Act 1 967. 
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Table 22 shows the components f . o executive compensation with h . 
executive and the firm . 
t e1r tax effects to 
Table 22 : Components of the c . ompensatwn package subjected to Malaysia Tax t" a IOn 
Compensation Executive Firm 
component 
Tax status Taxation Rules Tax status 
Salary Taxable Section 4(b),lncome Tax Deductible 
Act 1 967 
Bonus Taxable Section 4(b),lncome Tax Deductible, 
Act 1 967 
Stock option Taxable Section 4(b),Income Tax Not deductible 
R I  u es 
Taxation Rules 
Section 33( 1 ), 
Tax Act 1 967 
Section 3 3( 1 ), 
Tax Act 1 967 
Section 
Income 
Income 
39( 1 )(m), 
Act 1 967 Income Tax Act I 967 
Deferred compensatiOn Taxable Section 4(e),Income Tax Deductible 
Act 1 967 
Other eo m pens at 1 ons Taxable Section 4(!) Income Tax Deductible 
Act 1 967 
6.3 Trends in Malaysian executive compensation pay 
Section 33( 1 ), 
Tax Act 1 967 
Section 33(1  ), 
Tax Act 1 967 
The purpose of th is section i s  to document h ow executive comp
ensation pay has 
changed in M alaysian firms as well  as d iscuss and analy
se executive compensation 
received over the period 2003 to 20 1 0 . Table 23 sho
ws that other than cash pay, 
stock option grants have played a crucial role  i
n the development of executive 
compensation in Malaysian firms .  I should also 
stress that stock option plans are not 
new to Malaysian firms who have been mak
ing use of stock options since 1 990. 
Moreover, f irms with sizeable profits are
 more l ikely to adopt stock option plans 
(Ari ff, Mohamad and Nassir, 1 998) .  How
ever, fol lowing the Asian financial crisis of 
1 997, the development of executive 
compensation has not been allowed, and 
although the impact of the cris is was
 not as deep as in other large countries in terms 
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Income 
Income 
of size, its effect was fe lt m a l l  components of executive 
resu lt is shown in tab l e  2 3 _  
compensation . A detail 
Year 
2003 
2004 
f--· 200� 
-:ioor; -
-
2007 
---
200X 
�- - �  
2009 
2 0 1 0  
Table 23:  Number of ex t "  ecu IVe compensation pay for 2003 and 2 0 1 0  
Stock opt1on grants Cash payments Total of Number of 
(MYR '000) (MYR '000 )  compensation ( M Y R  Executives 
'000) 
I X  920 7 3  1 1 4,739 .75 1 33,660.48 5 1 7  
76,428,78 37,9 1 5 .28 1 1 4,344.06 665 
I 5 .254 0 I 1 36 , 1 69. 1 7  1 5 1 ,423 . 1 8  532 
- -----
1 07. 1 1 !> 72 77,877.76 1 84,994.47 57 1  
I O'I!J5X 61 97,625.25 207,583.88 643 
X9, 1 'J5 74 54,3 1 4 .65 1 43,5 1 0.39 676 
95 .R77 X2 1 1 4,435 . 1 3  2 1 0,3 1 3.00 663 
7R,470 42 8 1 ,796 45 1 60,266 90 634 
Copmensation 
received per 
person 
(MYR'OOO) 
259.00 
1 72.00 
285.00 
324.00 
323.00 
2 1 2.00 
3 1 7.00 
253.00 
Data for stock opt 1 on grants and cash payments (salary and bonuses) are extracted from annual reports under Directors Reports. 
Wh1lc number of executives are based on the name d isclosed in the statement of corporate governance. Cross-ch
ecking has 
been conducted to !inn website to estimate the number of top executives. 
Table 23 deta i l s  aggregates for the amount of compensation received for the in itial 
sample of  M al aysian pub l ic  l i sted firms with stock option plans. Over
 the period 
2003 to 20 1 0  the va lue of stock option grants increased from MY
R 1 8, 920 in 2002 
to M YR78, 470.42 in 20 1 0 . The increase in  the value of stoc
k option grants is 
primari ly as a resu lt of the better share price performan
ce, however, a sharp drop in 
stock prices i n  2005 resu lt ing from firms provid in
g fewer equity plans to their  
employees (Balsam, 201  2) .  M oreover, the rol e  s
tock opt ion plans is perhaps more 
appropri ate for fi rm s  to use for retain ing execu
tives talent and for motivating them to 
work harder, particu larly in certain i ndustry 
were the level of competition in wages 
markets are h igh. Turn ing to the n ext col
umn, it can be seen that the aggregate total 
of cash compensation pay i ncreased from 
1 1 4,739.75 i n  2003 to MYR 1 60,299.90 
m i l l ion in 20 1 0  and this largely  co
ntributed by cash compensation which also 
2 1 0  
suggests that the s ize of cash payments  relat ive to stock option underline that cash 
pay is sti l l  s i gni fi cant for compensat ing  purposes .  In total, there are 490 1 executives 
included i n  th i s  analysis for which the total of compensation awarded to the lowest 
group was made of 5 1 7  executives and the h ighest group has 676 executives. As the 
l iterature prov ides  evidence which ind icates that despite a large increase in stock 
option plans, the cash pay remains  important i n  executive compensation pay. 
However, the tax treatment for both components pay i s  s l ightly different. Therefore 
examining the tax effect of ind iv idua l  executive who has been sponsored with stock 
options is cruc ia l .  Fol lowing a s imi l ar approach carried out by Balsam (20 1 2) who 
includes in  h i s  samp le  for a l l  execut ives, even though numerous studies l imit  their 
sample only to C EOs.  In add it ion,  execut ives are normal l y  paid less than the CEOs, 
which resu lts in the percentage of us ing  stock opt ion plan s  to decrease. 
Whi le, the variation i n  the s ize of M alaysia executive stock option plans, the general 
pattern of executive stock option p lan indicates that 2007 had the highest grants 
val ue wh ich decreased from 2008 o nwards .  Perhaps, thi s  may be attributed to the 
slow recovery progress from the economic  downturn brought on by the financial 
crisis, in add it ion to firms being m ore l ike ly  to increase their use of stock options 
during periods  of good market performance. When compared to cash payments, the 
percentage of executive stock option grants is somewhat consistent with a trend of 
·d · ·t ay wh ich su aaests that cash components and stock options are prov1 m g  eqLII  y p oo 
equal s ign ifi cant for compensat ing M alaysian executives. Thi s  is simi lar with recent 
patterns in the a l locat ion of large stock options to non-executive employees which 
ind icate that execut ive employees are no longer the predominant holders of stock 
options in the M alaysian firms .  
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6.4 Empirical research:  method, data and analysis 
To est imate the tax incentive on stock option plan, stock option is regressed on the 
marginal corporate tax rate wh i l e  control l ing for other factors. In particular, this 
study identi fies the impact of changes in  m arginal tax rates on stock option grants in 
re lation to cash pay received b y  executives. As  indicated in past study such as 
Gritsch and Snyder (2007) employ both Iogit and tobit model to determine tax 
savings, in wh ich two tax rates ,  personal and capital gain tax were entered the 
equation. There i s  some stud ies  employ ord inary regression model to capture the 
effect and s ince the dependent variable is not binary in nature and also given non­
presence of censored data, the Jogi t  and tobit regression model could not be 
employed i n  th i s  study. A s  a resu l t, I use an ordinary regression model which is  more 
appropriate to exam ine the degree of impact stock option has on total compensation.  
From the tax standpoint, stock opt ions are l ikely to has a positive relation during 
periods of good corporate performance, and therefore the tax sav ing is l ikely to 
increase. Thus,  stock options m ay be used as a m eans of producing tax preferen
tial 
for executives and the firm,  and s eem ingly a clear relationshi
p should exist between 
tax incent ives and stock option p lans.  For thi s  purpose 
we employ the fol lowing 
mode l :  
2 1 2  
XSO= fJo + /31 i\1TR + fJ2ROA + p3 j'\lf + p4 SIZE + E (1 )  
Where XSO represents stock f 
, . 
op  Ion compensation for executive in a given year, 
M fR IS the m arginal corporate tax rate ROA · . . , IS return on assets, NI 1s a net mcome 
SIZE is firm size which is m easured by total assets. 
, 
P a constant and parameters to 
be est imated and c: an error term . 
6.4 . 1  Data and variables 
Al though most of good data on executive pay from developed market, but a study of 
executives in  Malaysia i s  worthwhi le  as using new data and this able to tackle a 
number of  longstand ing issue rel ated stock option p lans. The data in the study are 
based on execu t ive stock option grants of compani es l isted on Malays ia Bourse 
during the  period 2002 to 20 1 0. These data are ideal for our study of executive stock 
option and the  tax effects.  The dat a  u sed here comprises information on a company 
from the year it first announced its executive stock option grants. The marginal 
corporate tax rate is obtained from Malaysia Inland Revenue Service. The dependent 
variable is va lue of stock option as a share of total executive compensations. The 
data sets h ave four control variabl es which is l ikely to have an impact on executive 
stock option . .  These are firm performance, firm size, return on assets and net income. 
From the standpo int of firm performance, Snyder (200 1 )  note that stock option have 
a posit ive re l at ion during periods of good firm performance and at the same time it 
may be negat ive ly associated when the firm is not performing very wel l .  F irm size is 
measured by tota l assets since l arger firms usually experience excesses in cash flow 
wh ich in  turn create an i ncent ive to use cash components rather than stock options. ' ' 
Gritsch and Snyder (2007) pred ict s imi lar incentive effects for smaller firms facing 
problem s  with cash flows. Thus  stock options may be used a means of maintaining 
the cash level of these firms. If stock option plans produces tax preferential treatm
ent 
for execut ives as wel l  as the firm ,  the relationship between t
ax i ncentives and stock 
opt ion plan is straightforward . Thus we conduct further tes
t to detennine whether 
changes to tax pol icy ( increase or  decrease tax ra
tes ) is sign ificantly increase 
t . rt
. larly in the form of stock option. It is noteworthy to mention execu 1 vc pay, pa ICU 
2 1 3  
that under M alaysia taxation rules the . . re Is no capital gains tax imposed for capital 
revenue and for th is  reason the study u se th . 1 e margma tax rate only. 
6.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
ln this section,  we provide some evidence on the amount of stock options exercised 
including the real ized gains  from options exerc· A 1 · 1se .  s ear 1er note, the year of 
taxabi l ity for executive stock option differs sl ightly from the grant year. Therefore, 
the amount reported i n  the grant year differs from the year of exercised. The amounts 
shown in Tables 2 1  and 23 are based on grant date value and amounts summarized in 
summary com pensation tab le  of ann u al reports whi le  the amounts reported in Table 
24 are based on the value of stock options at the t ime the stock options are exercised 
on an exercise date when profits are determined. It i s  evident, on the basis  of the 
aggregate amounts, that the data for executive stock option plan exercised is h igher 
in 2002 and 2007 . This is also noticeable that the aggregate amount for tax 
treatments on gains of executive stock option exerci sed is quite high for both years. 
Looking at the value of the grant size value in Table 24 and the exercise of stock 
options by executives suggests that the behav iour i n  stock option p lans are not 
uniform, which is cons istent with Huddart and Lang ( 1 996) who note that the 
exercise behav iour in stock option plans are not consistent. In this example, some of 
the executives make decision to exercise early of their stock option in order to 
increase their own personal wealth whi le some of them are as a result of l iquidity 
needs .  Stud ies by Huddart ( 1 994) and C arpenter ( 1 998) find that the exercise pattern 
is more apparent when holders perceive the expected benefit is grea
ter than cost. 
Th is  suggests that executive employees usually become more
 risk taker and hence 
their tendency to exercise early would be greater. Regardin
g tax effect and exercise 
behaviour, in  re lated study, these authors find that 
changes in tax levels play a 
crucial role in  determining exercise behaviour
, so that executives would favour 
immed iate exercise before the rate of tax increas
es. As a result, the executive would 
capture a large proportion in value of stock o
ptions and the benefit will be taxed at a 
low rate (Huddart, 1 998). 
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Table 24:  A mounts reported for executive stock options exercised and estimated profits in the 
2003-201 0 (MYR '000) 
Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Aggregate of stock option exercised 
(MYR ' 000) 
1 0,765.08 
5 3 ,471 .6 1 
95 .,225 .59 
3 8 , 1 84.69 
90,794.50 
Aggregate of profit in 
stock option exercised 
(MYR '000) 
44,72 
1 20.65 
374.85 
38,221 
321 . 1 0  
2008 67, 1 1 0.88 68,38 1  
2009 5 0.,706.70 226.60 
20 �1 o:_ _______ 
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also exam ine the impact personal ta r h . . . . 
xa  Ion as m mfluencmg the composition of 
stock opt10n plans in the corn · pensatiOn p ay structure. In this context, I assume that 
each executive wi l l  be taxed o · · n mcome received from various employment activities 
thus Section 4(b) IT A i s  a r d · h · 
, 
, PP J e m t e study. A l l  m comes l isting in Section 1 3( 1 )  
(a) and (f), I T  A i s  inc luded as executive 's  taxable  i ncome. For the granting firm, 
Section 33( I )  emphas izes the types of deduct ib i l ity for compensation expenses 
incurred for employees wh ich i s  restricted to salary, bonus, and other cash payments. 
As earl i er m entioned, stock option grants were not al lowed for tax deductions as 
stated in Section 39, IT A which suggest that i t  is not favorable for granting firms 
under Malaysia taxation rules. Thus est imat ing  the i mpact personal income tax has in 
in fluencing the composition of executive pay, particularly for stock option is a 
crucial .  
i\t this poi nt in the present d iscussion, an example  comparing the amounts reported 
in the proxy statement summary compensation tab le and executive's tax calculations 
wil l  be used to generate i nformation value.  For th is  purpose I consider executive 
compensat ion o f  Malaysian firm s  by referring  to information in statement summary 
of compensat ion table extracted from variou s  annual reports. The received total 
compensation value is presented i n  Table 25 .  A l l  components such as salary, bonus, 
stock grants, and other compensat ion are decomposed into taxable income for 
individual executi ve taxpayer. However, due to the lack of information disclosed for 
individual executive, calcu lat ing the chargeable  income and tax l iabil ity is based on 
the assumption that :  ( i)  the executive taxpayer i s  a tax resident in Malaysia, (ii) who 
chooses a joint assessment in whi ch the taxpayer' s wife is not working. This means 
the tax payer is entit led to tax rel ief  which amounts to M YR 1 9, 000. 
Table 25 reports the total income associated with executive compensation pay for 
h d I based On an aagreaate basis, it can be seen that the taxable cas an non-cas 1 . o o 
· d firoJn M YR 1 6  8 1  m i l l i on in  2000 to more than MYR 78.85 components mcrease · 
mi l l ion in 20 1 0, wh ich ind icates that much of the increa
se value came from higher 
· · h h b d ay Thi s  findina is consistent with earl ier results which mcomes w1t cas - ase p · o 
t ·on remains an important method for compensating ind icate that cash compensa I 
2 1 6  
Malaysian executives. However, when the data for executive stock option plans were 
analysed, the  h ighest gains  occurred i n  2002 and decl ined in  20 1 0  suggesting that 
changes in  the income tax rate had some influence on equity-based payments. 
Surpris ingly, the data suggests that h igh personal income tax rate resulted i n  increase 
gains from stock opt ions exerc ise ,  even though the i ncome tax rate decreased by 1 
and 2 per cent i n  2009 and 20 1 0  as the gain from stock option reduced substantially. 
Th is suggests that stock options are sensit ive to personal tax rate changes, which is 
incons istent w ith Hall  and Liebman (2000) who find that stock options p lan are 
unresponsive to changes i n  ord inary i ncome tax rate. A similar pattern is  also 
observed for stock options exercise .  
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Table 2 5 :  Decomposition of compensation into taxable income and tax liability amounts (MYR '000) 
Ye·,u Number o f  Sai<Htes and Executtve 
executtves Bonuses Stock 
selected OptiOn -
based data exerc1se 
disclosed value 
1 11 annual 
reports 
2003 5 1 7  I 33 ,660,480 44,7 1 7.2 
2004 665 I 14 ,344,060 1 20,648.40 
2005 532  288,7 1 0, 1 80 374,84659 
2006 571  1 84 ,994,470 382,21 .73 
2007 643 207,583,880 3 2 1 , 1 00 
2008 676 1 43,5 1 0,390 68,38 I 
2009 663 2 1 0,} 1 3,000 226,600 
20 1 0  634 1 60,266,900 3 5 1 ,240 
Total taxable 
amount to 
executives 
1 33,705, 1 97.2 
1 1 4,464,708 4 
289,085,026.6 
1 85 ,032,69 1 .73 
207,904,980 
1 43,578,77 1 
2 1 0,539,600 
1 60,6 1 8, 1 40 
--- --·-·-
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Tax reltefs 
9,823,000 
1 2,6 35,000 
1 0, I 08,000 
1 0,849,000 
1 2,2 I 7,000 
1 2,844,000 
1 2,597,000 
1 2,046,000 
- - ---
Chargeable 
1ncome per 
e;�ch executi\ e 
1 23,882, I 97.2 
1 0 1 829708.4 
278,977,026.6 
1 74, 1 83,69 1 .73 
I 95,687,980 
1 30,734,77 1 
1 97,942,600 
1 48572 1 40 
- - -
Margmal Tax 
personal l tab t l t ty of 
tax rate each 
execu!ive 
28% 67,092 .87 
28% 42,875.66 
28% I 46,830.0 1 
28% 85,4 1 4 06 
28% 85,2 1 4.05 I 
28% 54, 1 50.49 
27% 83,595 .66 
26% 65,6 1545 
-· 
6.4.3 Main results 
A: Estimating the tax preferential treatment for executive stock option 
Insofar as stock option grants d o  not provide favourable tax advantages for 
individual execut ive i n  Malaysia .  S i m i l ar effects m ight be observed for granting 
firms, even though taxat ion rules  al low for certai n  expenses incurred to employee 
compensation to be deduct ib le .  Under M alaysia' s taxation rules, expense incurred 
for emp loyee compensation is  a l l owed for deductions i f  i t  satisfies requirements in 
Sect ion 33 ( I )  and Section 39 ( 1 )  of  the Income Tax Act of 1 967. Both sections of 
the Act re late to a l lowable and non-al lowable expenses and it would be treated as 
ord i nary bus iness expenditure i f  it incurs for generat ing business income. In fact, 
there is  no tax d ifference for treatment between larger and smaller finns as a simi lar 
corporate tax rate appl ies for firm i ncorporated in  Malaysia. Recently, the marginal 
tax rates decreased by 1 and 2 per cent; thus it i s  essential to determine the tax 
pre fen.:n t i a l  treatment for ind iv idual  executive as well the granting fi rm .  
B :  Estimating tax preferential treatment for individual executive 
Accord ing to Yong (20 1 2),  tax savings are more favourable to h igh income 
taxpayers, which is to say that h i gh income earner are l ikely to incur an increase in 
tax deduction than their counterparts .  However, this goes against the principle of tax 
progressiv ity, which can be i l l u strated by the use of a scenario for two individual 
· 
d · ' (A d B )  with i dentical incomes over a period of time, and executtve t rector s an . .  
· h d 'f'I" t amounts of tax over a I 0 year period. In  th is case assummg bot pay 1 1 eren 
· · d h stable  i ncome for total salary bonus and stock option execut tve A t s  assume to as a 
a fter deductions and personal rel ief  amounting to MYRI 00,000 per year, whi le 
executive B has fl uctuat ing income as shown in  Table 26. 
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Table 26 :  Estimating tax saving between stable income and fluctuating income case 
Year Executive A (Stable Income) Executive A (Fluctuate Income) 
Taxable 1ncome Marginal personal Tax Taxabl e  Marginal Tax liability 
for stable grants income tax bracket liability income for personal 
for cash and stock rate satble cash income tax 
opt1ons pay and bracket rate 
fluctuate 
sponsor for 
stock options 
2002 1 00,000 27% 1 4.475 80000 24% 9,675 
2003 1 00,000 27% 1 4475 90000 24% 1 2,075 
2004 1 00,000 27% 1 4 .475 1 0000 24% 1 4,475 
----- �· 
2005 1 00,000 27% 1 4.475 1 05000 27% 1 5,825 
200(> 1 00,000 27% 1 4.475 1 1 0,000 27% 1 7, 1 75 
2007 1 00,000 27% 1 4 .475 1 20,000 27% 1 9,875 
200R 1 00,000 27% 1 4.475 1 25,000 27% 2 1 ,225 
f--c- · - --1--- 24% 1 4,325 1 30,000 28% 22,725 200'! 1 00,000 
�i1 10 - 24% 1 00,000 1 4,325 1 40,000 26% 24,725 
- 1 58,925 1 , 1 00,000 1 65,325 1 , 1 00,000 
220 
The result shows that executive A h as an identical taxable income of MYR I 00,000 each year, wh ich fal l  into the income bracket of MYR 70  000- 1 00 000 Th c h , , . ere1ore, t e total income I iab i l  ity is MYR 1 5  8 925 Turn1'na to the n xt 1 c · B ' · o e eo umn 10r executive who has variable taxable incomes, i t  is evident that the total tax l iabil ity is s l ightly h igher by M YR6400. Moreover, executive B fal ls within  the h igh income tax 
brackets as the marginal personal rates of tax increases. In this example, B pays a 
h igh tax value in 2005 and 2009. And although the marginal personal tax rate 
decreases by 2 per cent in  20 1 0, executive B sti l l  pays more in taxes compared to 
execut ive A .  Th is scenario i s  l i nk ing to a factor of inflation would more than l ikely 
push the taxpayer to pay more tax, part icularly among the l ower income taxpayer 
group and known as "bracket creep (Yong, 20 1 2) .  The "bracket creep", where 
inflation pushes income into the h igher tax brackets as the result is an increase in the 
personal i ncome tax rate but no increase in true i ncome power. In response to this a 
conclusion by l la l l  and Rabushka ( 1 983) propose using a single tax rate if it is above 
the income threshold with some exemptions provided to the lower income taxpayer 
group. Th i s  is consi stent with Yong (20 1 2), using s ingle tax rate could achieve the 
desi red outcomes of a progressive tax system which would also help to encourage 
executives d isclose the ir true income. 
As the most ind ividual executive is l i kely to report taxable income that understate 
their income, Malaysian employer sponsors a wide array of taxed perquisite (under 
Malaysia taxation rules stock option i s  a kind of perquisites) to executive without 
tak ing the i n flat ion effect. This is crucia l ly to examine  whether inflation plays a 
sign ificant rol e  in determin ing tax benefits for stock option have. As such, the effect 
· · · t c Id first it results in a sh ift of the i ncome tax bracket and of mflat JOn on tax I S  wo1 o  , 
d · · 1 1  · the tax l i ab i l i ty To encourage the fairness between high and secon , It WI mcrease · 
· · · · 1 r i nformation of taxabl e  income in Table 26, between low mcome earner, usmg s imi  a 
· · B who receive stock option plan gives the fol lowing executive A and executive 
b l  · 1 1  t d the taxable income for executive A shifts to one income resu It. In the ta e 1 ustra e 
l·n flati·on sh ifts the marginal personal income tax rate by 2 per tax bracket because 
rted for executive B, which suggests that the cent, However, no changes are repo 
. 1 te is could be used to design h igher tax for rising the m argma l  persona tax ra . . . 
W h  compared t o  the result for executive B ,  I t  I S  personal income by 1 .33  percent. en 
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noticeable  that inflat ion d id  not  resu lt i n  a shift i n  the income tax bracket, but instead 
it increased the tax l i ab i l ity b y  0.79 per cent. Thi s  is clear indication for firms to 
sponsor stock option plan need to consider thi s  factor when establ ish equity 
payments.  
Table 27 : Illustrations for calculation of personal tax liability 
--�- ��-- -
Taxation computat ion before inflation 
Chargcable income 20 I 0 (MY R) 
Marginal personal tax rate (%) 
Tax payable ( M Y R) 
1\ vcragc personal tax rate (%) 
Executive A 
1 00,000 
24 
1 4,325 
1 4 .33 
t-:laxat i < ;n computation a fter in llation ( I  .70%) 
�(�argc�;hil: income ( M Y R )  1 0 1 ,700 
-M-;-1rgin�l pcrso;wl lax rate ( 'Yo) 2 6  
Tax payable ( M Y R )  1 4,767 
1\ vcragc pc;·sonal tax rate (%) 1 4. 5 2  
Av�;:-�g
�
cpcrs<;nal tax rose (%) 1 .33 
L__�--
Executive B 
1 40,000 
26 
24,725 
1 7.66 
1 42,380 
26 
25,344 
1 7 .80 
0.79 
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C: Estimating tax preferential treatment for firms sponsor executive stock options 
As mentioned earl ier expense-related stock option is nonnal ly deductible in most cou n tries however, under Malaysian taxation ru l es,the tax treatment is not allowed for deduct ion i n  arr iv ing the chargeable  income.  Thus, I examine whether the poten t i a l  o f  pre ferential  tax treatment for ordinary income tax received by the firm 
generates advantage to tax pol icy. The result  from the regression model of  Equation 
( 1 )  earl ier d iscussed is presented in Table  28 .  
Table 28 : Regression estimates of sample by stock option value 
'Variables j Coefficient 
X SO= fJ0 + {J1 MTR + {J2ROA + fh l'/1 + {14 SIZE + s 
I ntercept - 1 .624 
(0.79 1 3 )  
Marginal  corporate tax rate 0.042 
(0.8 5 1 ) 
Return on assets -0.004 
(0.523) 
Net income -0.002 
(0.566) 
1--=-:---F i rm size -0.0002 
(0. 1 089) 
McFadden R 1  0.0 1 9  
Observations 2 1 4  
r VI e I !or executiVe eve s JS equa to SfJ represenrs stock op11on compensaiJOn P 0 11a a m a gJven year. u otherwise. JVI t r<. JS t e margma corporate tax rate, .KUA IS return 
on as;;e1'\. Nl ls :1 ne! mcome. SIZE ts firm SIZe w hi eh • s  measured by total assets, '"*"' '�'"' and * mdJcate statistically sJgmficant at f%,5% and ta"/o level 
..: t "  a! tax treatment of marginal corporate tax rate fi I t "  te i f  the pre Jeren I At l rst, e s  lma  
. . A result from the model estimation is . t ecelve stock optiOn.  affects the execut ive o r . . 
a· al corporate tax rate indicates that the . T b l  2 8  Examm atlon on mar ::,In presented m a e · 
. . 1 h ah the coefficient is insign ificant and . . cted d irectiOn, a t  ouo effect I S  not m the expe 
. 1 te tax rate is l ikely to increase . the m argma corpora th i s  suggests that a decrease m 
Its th is effect is more or less in . m ared to the former resu ' the stock optiOn value .  Co p 
. h d Snyder (2007). W ith regard to . b (2000) and Gntsc an l i ne with Hal l  and L i e  man 
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the contro l l i ng  variables, ne ither v ariables fl 
a d . . 
are ound to determine stock option 
grants n m part icu lar ' the resu lt cannot i . 
. 
mphes that firm size (larger or small 
firms) with problems of cash flow are l "k 
k . 
1 ely to compensate thei r  executive with 
stoc option plan.  Th i s  study c Id . 
. . . 
ou  not present evidence that equity pay m ight be 
one for mamtamm g  the h i gher c h . . . as  position. This result i s  contrast with Sanders 
(200 I )  and Gritsch and Snyder (200?) h 
. 
w o report that cash-constrained firms are 
l ikely to use stock opt ions .  Further analysis, also ind icates that the firm performance 
repres
.
entcd
. 
by ROA and net income less i nfluenced the executive stock option plans. 
On this bas is  of the tests resu lts, it was also suggest that firm performance does not 
mean ingfu l  depend on stock opt ions  as the ffi · 1 coe ICients va ue for ROA and net 
profits are a l l  ins ign i ficant, .  Th i s  suggests fi rm performance does not lead stock 
option grants i n  order to gain preferential tax treatment. Moreover, in the marginal 
tax rate has i ncorporated tax benefits of exerci se gains and includes the expected 
benefit from new stock opt ion  grants. Therefore, the tax advantage for stock option 
has hccn taken into account in the m arginal corporate tax rate. 
6.5 Conclusions remarks 
A !though there is an argument i n  tax stud ies that tax effect for stock option plan is 
d i fferent with cash plan, the ma in  finding of th is  study produces evidence which 
suggest that increas ing compensat ion value for stock option by many execu
t ives did 
not rep lace cash payments. Therefore, salaries and bonuses ar
e sti l l  significant 
component to executive compensat ion in Malaysia .  Unl ik
e cash compensation pays, 
when the stock opt ion i s  met the specific criteria of Int
ernal Revenue Code, the gain 
may he taxed at the t ime exerci se wh ich usually
 three to five after grant date. 
Therefore, they m i ght extend the tax l iabi l ity,
 however the taxpayer usually losses 
for gain ing tax advantages when they fai l  to
 plan and adjust the report income. 
S im i l arly, the result  from th i s  essay co
uld not find evidence to suggest that tax 
chanoes lead to i ncrease i n  the use of st
ock option at executive levels except for the 
1::> 
tax effect o f  stock opt ion plans as a res
ult of a rise i n  the personal marginal tax rate. 
Th i s  ind icates that an increase i n  the
 corporate tax rates did not produce any tax
 
preferential  from stock options relativ
e to the immediate tax deduction provided by
 
h t
. The I·m posit ion of s imi lar ta
x rate for stock option and cash pay 
cas compensa wn . 
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is general ly  driven beyond the s h 1 . p ye o ogical contract between executive and firm Moreover, the  incentive effect that stock f 1 . . 
· 
. . 
op Ion p ans have for mcreasmg employee efforts and JOb sat isfactions are n ot enouah fo 1 1 
. 
b r ega concerns to support tax claims 
[DJ! lavou ( 1 945) ] .  In addit ion apply· t k . ' mg s oc optiOn plans indicate that firm 
perceived tax advantage wou ld  be  captured throuah ·1 1 h b eqm y p ans t ough the tax 
advantaoe i n  stock option 1 · 1 ·  b P ans IS re Iant on government tax policies. Under 
Malaysian taxation rules there are no tax benefits to be oai11ed by a t . fi A b bran mg Irms. s 
such, the taxat ion ru les provide restriction for expense related stock option and is not 
al lowed tax ded uct ion . Thus, th i s  does not indicate that the use of stock options 
shou ld be less costly for firms .  
For  ind ivid ual executive, increasing the  marginal personal tax rate leads to higher 
personal income tax l iab i l ity which suggest that gains from stock option exercised 
will be imposed with h igher tax. Thi s  i s  cons istent w ith the study' s result which 
indicates that h igh tax rate is l ike ly to increase w ith gains  from exercised. However, 
when the m arginal tax rates decrease by 1 and 2 per cent in year 2009 and 20 1 0, the 
stock opt ions decrease substantial ly .  This  shows that stock option is sensit ive to tax 
changes and when compared with the findings of Hall  and Liebman (2000), stock 
opt ions plan i s  found  to be unresponsive to the changes in ordinary income tax rate. 
In addit ion, H uddart ( 1 998) found  that changes in  tax rate m ight affect exercise 
behaviour, such that managers would prefer to exercise immediately before the tax 
rate increases. Thu s  managers would capture a large proportion in the value of stock 
opt ions wh i l e  the benefit wi l l  be  taxed at low rates. 
1 also ment ioned that stock option grants could be recognized unt i l  it is being 
exerc ised, so that taxpayer enjoys tax advantages u sual ly for the next three to five 
;:;t th t date Grant ino firms could therefore use stock option plans as a years a 1 '  er e gran . b 
h I d · the 1nax1·mum benefits in tax. In other word, t
he stock option tax s e ter an gam 
d · d bt tax sh ield However the current scenar
io in Malaysia 
pro uces a un t q ue non- e · ' 
· h h h · e th1· s effect which may cause the
m to overstate the tax 
fi rms t s  as sue  t a t  t ey tgnor 
d d h
. 1 d to incorrect conclusions about the firm ' s  status as being
 
a vantage an t IS ea s 
� th t the l iterature indicates that stock opt
ions have tax 
underleveraged . A part 1 rom a ,  
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preferential as non-debt tax sh ie lds 
Neverthel ess, s ince no deductions are 
as a way 
al lowed for 
of reducing debt financing. 
stock option plans, Malaysia 
firm 's are less sensit ive about the advantages of stock options and whether this 
wou ld serve as non-debt tax sh ie ld 1 . . 
reducing corporate tax payment. 
resu tmg m less debt financing and thereby 
Apart from that, former stud i es emphasis that t k · · s oc optiOn grants mfluence firm debt 
pol icy is assoc iated with the capab i l ity of size to the ef,.,ect f · 1 11 o margma corporate tax 
rates. S ince the M alaysian stock opt ion plans have long J ives, usually ten years, this 
shou ld be c lear that today' s  stock option grants could  produce two tax impl ications. 
The first effect is that stock option produces a huge deduction in the future and the 
second is no deduction at al l wh ich depends on the share price performance. 
l lowevcr, Malaysia tax pol icy ignores al l  these impl ications. 
For an effic ient tax plann ing, executives have to estimate an amount of future stock 
option deductions based on the expected marginal tax rates. In fact, the personal 
marginal tax rate has incorporated tax benefits of exercise gains and includes the 
expected benefit from new stock option grants. Therefore, the relationsh i p  between 
stock option and marginal  tax rate i s  a positive relation.  Although, al l  evidence on 
tax impl icat ions are emphasized i n  the prior l i terature, under Malaysia taxation rules 
the ind iv idual taxpayer seem ingly received sl ight tax benefits. Perhaps, th
e expenses­
related to stock option p lan is not al lowed for deduction for cal
culating taxable 
income. But there i s  evidence which suggest that the tax be
nefit for stock option 
grants have d i ss im i l ar effect for personal taxation to 
cash pay. In some countries 
have imposed d i fferent tax rates for cash and equity
 p ay, but the imposition of single 
tax rate for a l l  types of compensation includ
ing gains arising from stock option 
grants make the d i fferent tax rate not particu la
rly relevant for Malaysian equity pay. 
Moreover, the capital gain tax i s  also not
 relevant for the design of compensation 
contract in for Malaysian firms, whi l e
 stock option plan have no tax advantage 
relat ively to salary and bonus.  Therefor
e, the tax effects for Malaysian stock option 
leads to ambiguous resu lt. 
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
7 . 1  Summary of the main findinos b 
This sect ion summarizes the key find in  f .c gs o lOUr essays on executive stock option 
plans. In �ssay I '  the legal structures governing executive stock option plan in  
Malaysia I S  exam ined. The results through the assessment of the relevant leaal b 
sources, the study documents some evidence of the legal frameworks find that the 
Malays ian law has modelled on the Anolo s t  - axon sys em. Furthermore, Essay 1 
provides ev idence that the law as i t  i s  currently adopted in Malaysia is slightly 
sim i lar with the law operated in m ost of developed m arkets. To date, however, the 
law reforms carried out are not enough to revamp certain provisions. As 
consequences, some parts of the law enforced are not strongly appl ied in Malaysia. 
The study also emphasises the fol lowing reasons which contribute to this issue as the 
exist ing legal system is unable to provide clear guidance although the main laws 
underp inn ing executive stock opt ion p lans l ike company and securities law have 
reformed comprehensively. 
In the Essay 2 exam ined whether granting of executive stock option improves 
corporate performance by i nvest igating Malaysia equity market reactions to plan 
announcements.  The essay presents cons istent evidence w ith former findings i n  prior 
and subsequent stock option announcements. However, such announcements do not 
reveal i n fo rmation value affirms the information leaks before an official 
announcement .  Further finding ind icates the top executive's behav iour for more 
selectively information releases in  order to rule out the gains in short-te
rms. For 
long-term e ffect, the study find ing fai ls to document evid
ence that stock option 
grants at executive levels improve firm value. Thi s  prov
ides a scope for Malaysian 
regu latory bod ies, practitioners and academic ians to d
ebate on the value-enhancing 
effect of executive stock option plans have. The fi
nd ing also confirms that Malaysia 
stock option plans produce an early s ignal f
or existing shareholders that they wil l  
lose their ownersh ip in the form of d i lution e
ffects. 
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I n  Essay 3 i nvestigates the incentive of M 1 . . . a ays1an executive stock option p lans for reducmg top m anagement turnover 0 . . · ur mam mterest has been to determine how 
wel l  the M alaysian stock opf 1 d · IOn P ans re uce execut1ve turnover and responding to 
the related q uestion, th is  study identified the effect through firm-level factors. 
Following past l i terature, the infl uencing factors on executive turnover include firm 
performance, corporate governance characteristics, finn characteristics and level of 
pay. The res u lt in Essay 3 documents a support that unhealthy stock option granting 
tirm 's increases turnover at 1·  ] 1 execu JVe eve s u sing accounting and market 
performance m easures. The stud y, however fai l s  to document evidence that 
accounting m easures are better than m arket-based performance measures for 
eva luating executive turnover. Further test shows that Malaysian executive 
replacements were e ither routine or forced, of which the result show that current firm 
pcrf(mnance among stock option granting firms have a sign ificant impact on this 
decision. Other factors, the presence of fami ly ownership shows that Malaysia 
executive turnover are not welcome and that strong fam i ly  ties in stock option 
granting fi rms do not result  i n  the removal of inefficient  managers. Thus when 
fami ly members are a lso a member of the board of d irectors, they protect themselves 
from being removed wh ich supports the management entrenchment hypothesis. In 
add i t ion, the resu l t  finds that o lder executive d irectors are less l ikely to be replaced 
than their younger counterparts, which suggests that their experience and expertise 
remains val uable .  For corporate governance attributes, the board independence and 
CEO and chairman dual ity were found to be less involved with decision of executive 
turnover and the reason why the posit ion of CEO and Chairman is maintained in 
Malaysian fi rm s  i s  for job security and for mainta in ing the fami ly status quo. For 
firm size, the resu l t  produces less support for interaction to executive turnover and 
only  firm l i st ing on the m ain  board has certain effect to executive turnover. This 
finding is  in the l ine  with pred ict ion that firms subject to high level of business 
t . · 1 1  represented by Jaraer firm who are expected to decrease the opera 1on IS u sua y o 
Th Its also J·nd icate that m ix  pay between equ ity and cash pay turnover rate. e resu 
· n Wh" le  h 1"ah value of unexercised executive 
stock option plans is 
m uence turn over. 1 , o 
· d  1 f · ce11t ive for promoting retention. This  impl ie
s that firms 
found to prov 1  e ess o m 
S l.nce executives are wi l l ing to lose stock option fai I to curb executive departures 
benefits over unexercised value. 
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In essay 4 i nvestigates the tax and executive stock option p lans. The analysis shows 
strong evidence that i ncreas ina  sto k t . o c op IOn grants value do not necessarily mean 
that the rol e  of  cash payments has  been rep laced Ind d 1 · d b . ee , sa anes an onuses are 
sti l l  s ignifi cant for Malaysia firms and execut · E · · h b Ives. nJoymg t e tax enefits, 
however, the taxpayer group usua l ly  d id  not gain the tax advantage immediately l ike 
cash payments .  The e m pirical test further provides a support that change in  marginal 
corporate tax rates d id not pro duce tax deduction from stock option relative to 
immed iate tax deduction provided by cash pay. The result suggests that Malaysian 
stock option plans do not produce t ax benefits to firm which is inconsistent with data 
shows s l ight increase in  trend of us ing stock option by 60 percent in  20 1 0. Among 
the potenti a l  exp lanation is that s tock option grants by Malaysia firms were found to 
be general ly  d riven by a spirit of  psychological contract between employees and 
firm .  For ind iv idual executive, th i s  essay documents an evidence that changes in tax 
pol icy i n fl u en ces personal inco m e  tax which suggests that stock option is sensitive to 
tax changes in ord inary income tax rate. I n  comparison with current practices 
emphasi sed in the finance l iterature, executive stock option p lans offer the maximum 
tax benefit in the form of tax shelter or in other words, executive stock option plans 
have a un ique  non-debt tax sh ie ld .  W ith the recent l aw practice in Malaysia making 
the firm ignores th i s  k ind of tax advantages and lead to wrongly estimate the tax 
l iab i l ity. Th is  result  i s  c lear that M alaysia firms overlook the tax preferential 
treatment for stock option p lan  as non-debt tax shields. And this has caused 
Malaysian fi rms to be less sens i t ive toward the benefits of stock option to yield less 
debt financing, thereby reduc ing corporate tax payment. The extent of executive 
stock option grants contro ls  the fi rm ' s  debt pol i cy;  however rely  on the capabil ity of 
h k t
. t s 1·ze to influence marcr inal corporate tax rates. Moreover, the t e stoc op  Ions gran o 
find ing supports that an efficient tax p lann ing, taxpayer ( i .e firm
) must estimate an 
f fi k t ·on deductions based on the expected margina
l corporate 
amount o uture stoc op  1 
tax rates .  But a lso that the m argi nal  corporate tax ra
te has readi ly incorporated tax 
d l·nc luded are the expected benefit from new stock benefits o f  exercise gains an 
the relationsh ip between stock option and margina
l 
option grants .  Therefore, 
corporate tax rate is a posit ive re lat ion.  
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7.2 Implications of the study 
The purpose of t h i s  section is to h i gh l i ght  l i m itations of the study and in  doina so to of�er som e s u ggest ions for future research aris ing from the l iterature, parti:u larly W ith respect to e merging m arkets such as M al a  . Th E ys1a. e ssay 1 has found that law reform in M a l aysi a ' s  l egal structure is not sufficient to ensure strong practi ces by the 
firm . Therefo re,  the  Malays ian governm ent  should  t · 1 1 pu m p ace a strong egal system 
by taking an i mm e d iate response to enforce new i nitiative. This could solve 
problems of a m end i n g  prov i sions fro m  being superseded.  For example, so far, the 
Companies Act 1 965 h as passed a series of amendments and the establ ishment of the 
comm ittee such as the  Mal aysian Corporate Law Reform Committee (CLCR) has 
modern ised the laws in order to capture current n eeds. 
The Lssay 2 e m phasises that stock option grants m ight contribute to man ipulation in 
account ing m easures as wel l  as stock prices in order to  i ncrease executive personal 
wealth is l i ke ly  to be a cause of publ ic  concerns .  Therefore, this  makes up the 
relevant gro u ps and so a m i n ority watchdog group shoul d  be called upon to moni tor 
any decis ions re lated to the adoption of stock options and executive's  remuneration . 
The re levant authority such as B ursa M alaysia  and Malaysia Securities of 
Comm ission ( SC) should also seek a m echanism that would provide external parties 
to mon i tor  and check on executive ' s  remu nerati on espec ial ly in finns with h igh 
concentrated share h o l d i n gs .  Th i s  i ncludes the ru l e  pertaining to stock option plans 
wh ich should be rev ised to refl ect the concern bro u ght  u p  by th is study. 
For the Essay 3, execut ive turn over is a crucial event to firm because it has some 
impact on fi rm performance; therefore, the main  reason of turnover should be 
inc l uded in d isclosure. Due to l ack of ru les which required firm d isclose for reason 
f 
· 1 e makin a it d ifficult for i nvestors and stakeholders to o top execut1ve urnov r, o 
· h r:c t art1" c u larl y on corporate value. Therefore, the regulators such as est imate t e e .ec , p 
M I 
· h I d  enforce mandatory d iscl osure concerning executive Bursa a ays1a s ou 
· h h Id not only be l i m ited to CEO or  Chai1man . The replacem en ts, wh 1c s o u  
· h I d  be t imely in order faci l itate the market response information d 1 sc losu re s ou 
· chanae announce m ents. appropri ate l y  to any execut iVe  o 
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For the Essay 4, personal tax i s  a one of th · e m am source of government revenue, therefore M alaysian M i n i stry of F in ance th h 1 1 d R roug n an evenue Boards (MIRB) uses the marginal tax rate (corporate or personal ) to des ign the tax system that m ight 
reduce the taxed i ncome among taxpayer groups and find the alternative source of 
government revenues.  The alternat ive source of income can able used to support 
programs for tapering  income d i fferences . For business taxpayers, as an instance, the 
equ ity compensat ion-related expenditure should be al lowed for tax deduction to 
ensure that fi rm m ight enjoy ful l  benefits fi·om stock option plans have in most 
deve loped market l i ke US and s i m i lar tax saving treatment for ind ividual taxpayer 
gro ups who granted with stock options. 
In conc lus ion,  the study has ach i eved its objective to understand the incentive effect 
heh ind execut ive stock option p lans for M alaysian corporate scenario. In this study, 
it is found that stock opt ion is granted as a means of increasing firm performance, 
reduce execut ive turnover and enjoy tax benefits. However, the study finds less 
evidence to support the relat ionshi p  of executive stock option, firm performance and 
tax sav ing.  Th i s  v iew arises based on a prior review of the l iterature but using the 
Malays ia corporate scenario, the effect does not material ize. Therefore, the test result 
questions the e fficiency of M alaysia executive stock option plans. 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
Th is study has a n u m ber of l i mitat ions that affect the interpretation of the empirical 
resu lts such as :  
1 .  h
. d d a new dataset to exam ine the equity pay of executive.  T I S  stu y u se 
Unl ike to most studies i n  developed market, data is more 
· 1 · !able Therefore relyina on s ingle source of publ icly conven ient y ava1 · ' o 
. · � t
. n such as annual reports contribute to less avai lable Jn Jo rm a  1 0  
· · · 1 result as appl ied i n  s imi lar studies. Therefore, accuracy m empmca 
. . . h such as interviews with stock option granting usmg mixed app! Oac 
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2 .  
3 .  
firms, m an agers a n d  employees m ieht � i ncrease the accuracy of the 
i nterpretations of the main  findings. 
For tax data cons i sts f t ·d 0 ax pm by individual as wel l firm are not 
a l low for pub l ic  access. The tax forms are confidential and until 
recently the Mala · . ' ys Jan government IS not disclosed the identity and 
the tota l b i l l  of a l l  t 
. 
axpayer groups. Therefore, I do not completely 
r
_
ecogmze the exact amount and a d irect measure ofthe firm payments 
f o  · R r executive.  e lying on secondary data to estimate the incentive 
effect from tax stand po ints affect accuracy for study conclusions. 
This study ' s  observation period excludes the years when Malaysia 
experienced the economic crisis (such as the Asian Financial Crisis 
period 1 997). Inc lud ing the hurd le  t ime m ight improve the result 
assoc iated with the effect during poor economic  conditions. 
7.4 Conclusions 
To conclude, th is thesis contributes new evidence on four various issues in equity 
payments for executive employees. The contribution not only enlarged the existing 
l i terature, but  it also produces input  for pol icy maker such as Malaysian Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and re lated authority bodies l ike Bursa Malaysia, Securities of 
Comm issions Malaysia (SC) and Registrar of Companies (ROC). The thesis finding 
also provides information for other stakeholders such as investors. From the 
findings, th i s  emphasises that al l stakeholders should not overlook the role of 
executive stock opt ion plans, in  fact the stock option p lan is essential for promoting
 
interests al ignment mechan ism and corporate governance practices 
as the unique 
Malays ian corporate sett ing ind icates a potential for con
fl icting interest between 
agents and p rinc ipals as well as between majority a
nd m inority shareholders. 
Therefore, the authority bod ies such as Bursa M
alaysia should play a role in 
encouraoina the use of stock option p lans, particu
larly in fami ly founding firms in 
b b 
order to mi t igate such problems.  Th is  i s  cons
i stent with the existing l iterature which 
presents conc lus ive ev idence that stock opt
ion p lan is an ideal approach to al ign the 
interest of executives and shareho lders
. Accord ingly, it reduces agency cost and 
th · t
. 1 problems and would aenerate bet
ter financial performances or 
o er organ 1za 10na b 
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alternatively, executive  stock opt ion p lan coul d  serve the purpose for which it was 
i ntended to be used by the firm. 
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APPENDICES 
A PPENDIX I -EXAMPLE OF DISCLOSURE FOR CHANGE IN BOA RD MEMBERS 
ACOU STECH BERH A D  
)ate of change 3 1 /03/2002 
rype of chan ge Reti rement 
Boardroom 
Desi gnation Director 
Directorate Executive 
Name Huan g  Huai-Son 
Age 56 
N ational i ty Taiwanese 
Quali fications Dip. in Business Managem ent 
Working experience and occupation Marketing Director of Formosa Prosonic Technics Sdn Bhd, a 1 00% owned subsidiary of the Company 
Directorship of public companies (if 
any) 
Fam ily relationship with any director 
and/or major shareholder of the l i sted 
issuer 
Detai ls of any interest in  the securities 
of the l i sted issuer or its subs id iaries 
Remarks : 
�il  
Nil  
5 ,026,366 shares in Acoustech Berhad 
�----· - ---- - -··· - - - - - - --
M r  Huang Huai-Son was appointed to the Board on 3 September 200 1 .  The Company was l isted on 27 November 200 1 and up until the financial 
year end on 3 1  March 2002 one board meetin g  was held, where Mr Huang was u n able  to atten d .  Under the Com pany's Articles of Association Mr 
Huang i s  deemed to have vacated office on 3 I March 2002. 
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A PPENDIX 2 -EX A M P L E  OF TURNOVER TYPES (FORCED TURNOVER) 
A C OUSTEC H B ERHA D 
)ate of change 0 1 1 1 212003 
rype of change Resignat ion 
)esignation Executive D irector 
Directorate Executive 
Name Ropli B i n  Ishak 
A ge 40 
National ity Malaysian 
Qual i fications Bachelor Degree in Electrical Engineering 
Working experience and occupation Executive D i rector 
Directorship of pub l ic  com pan ies ( if  N i l  
any) 
Fam i ly relationship with any d irector [Nil 
and/or major shareholder of the l i sted 
issuer 
Detai ls  of  any interest in the securities 8,293,569 shares i n  Acoustech Berhad* 
of the l i sted issuer or its subs id iaries 
Remarks : 
----- -
Out of the total number of shares beneficially owned, 7, 1 00,000 are p ledged to Ban k  Rakyat Malaysia Berhad 
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A PPEND IX 3 -MA L A YS I A  TA X AT ION RATES 
Assessment Year �008 and subsequent years 
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